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A B S T R A C T
During World War II, regionalism was upheld by theorists 
and practitioners of international relations as a needed 
modification or alternative to the sovereign state and 
international system of political organization. Aspects of 
regionalism relating in particular to security matters were 
eventually incorporated into the United Nations Charter in 
1945. This study draws together ideas and historical data on 
regionalism and the war-time search for postwar world and 
European order. Part One of the study identifies three 
theories, or proto-theories, of regionalism and postwar 
order —  interstate, hegemonial, and autochthonous —  based 
on the degree to which state sovereignty was subordinated to 
regional criteria. These theories help elucidate the allied 
debate on regionalism and postwar order. Part Two examines 
the debate on the future world organization by the three 
major powers —  the United States, Great Britain, Soviet 
Union —  as well as, at the 1945 San Francisco United 
Nations Conference on International Organization, among the 
smaller allied countries. Part Three helps unravel the 
allied debate on regionalism and the future structure of 
Europe, including the attempt by eastern European govern- 
ments-in-exile to form one or more regional federations in 
that part of Europe. It also discusses the role of nonstate 
actors. The study concludes with an assessment of 
regionalism as a concept and principle that alters the 
classical, state-centric understanding of international 
relations.
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INTRODUCTION
REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR ORDER: 
STATEMENT OF PROBLEM AND APPROACH
Society is older, better, and 
ultimately stronger than the State.
Herder, late 18th c.
For when we plan a reconstruction 
of the life of Europe, we tend to 
think of ourselves as planners and 
architects, facing the rubble heap 
that was once an edifice; and in 
doing so we fail to see ourselves 
as part of the problem.
John Macmurray, 1943
Regionalism Can Mean More Efficient 
Sales Volume, if its Principles are 
Rightly Applied.
Western Advertising. December 1937
(CHAPTER I)
Unlike during "the war to end to all wars,” World War 
II was marked by considerable allied activity in the cause 
of research and planning for the postwar peace. A second 
general war within a generation seemed to underline the 
precariousness of the established order. Theorists and 
practitioners of international relations were confronted 
with an international system in crisis for having again 
failed to maintain the peace. The paralysis of the League of 
Nations in the face of national imperialisms, external or 
internal, prompted a search for alternative forms of 
political organization. The crisis, when coupled with the 
mandate to uproot an Axis order that had redrawn the 
European and Asian political maps and the need for extensive 
postwar reconstruction, provided the allies with an 
opportunity and challenge to consider changes in the pre-war 
international system. Was the pre-war League of Nations 
model of sovereign states within a loose universal 
organization to be resurrected, reformed, or cast aside 
altogether for another postwar peace structure? What were 
the theoretical flaws of the prewar structure? On what 
principles should a new structure be based? In particular,
7
how was Europe, the crucible o£ both the international 
system of sovereign states and the two world wars, to be 
politically organized?
The Soviet proletarian experiment hypothetically 
represented a historical alternative to the pre-war 
"bourgeois" order. At a time during World War I when western 
statesmen were conceiving national states out of the fallen 
aristocratic empires in central and eastern Europe, Lenin 
and Trotsky were calling for a socialist "United States of 
Europe" and multinational world federation where the state 
itself would wither away. As it happened, the choice during 
World War II among the Big Three —  the United States, Great 
Britain, Soviet Union —  between bourgeois and proletarian 
internationalism never became an issue. Soviet Russia had 
effectively returned to the international community of 
nations in 1933, the year Hitler came into power, and 
conducted its foreign relations on "liberal-bourgeois" 
terms. (That the Soviet postwar capture of the eastern 
European states and the subsequent Asian communist 
revolutions introduced an era of communist international 
relations is not of concern here.). Rather, this study seeks 
to demonstrate that the most serious and plausible allied 
alternative for restructuring Europe and the postwar world 
was regionalism. Together with the smaller allied countries, 
the three major powers sought or were obliged to grapple 
with various forms of regionalism as a promise and/or threat 
to a peacable postwar settlement.
Regionalism in international political organization was 
largely perceived in terms of combining usually contiguous
states for limited or general purposes in political, 
military, economic, social, and/or cultural spheres. Whether 
in the form of a regional alliance, confederation, 
federation, or just mere cooperation, regionalism was 
viewed, significantly, as an intermediary level of 
organization between the sovereign state and a universal 
organization. Its advocates saw multistate regions as 
islands of peace that constituted building blocks for a 
general structure of peace. They argued that the region 
corresponded more closely than the sovereign state to the 
growing, interdependent security and economic needs of 
states and peoples living in propinquity. It was a more 
intelligible form of political organization than sovereign 
states pursuing autarchic and nationalistic ends. Critics 
viewed regional entities as potential power blocs or 
superstates that could be a greater threat to peace than the 
smaller states, which could be more easily contained within 
a general international organization.
Given the importance of regional organization in the 
postwar world on the one hand and the unsettled political 
structure of Europe on the other, a closer study of the 
formative wartime debate on regionalism and postwar order is 
of historical and theoretical interest to the student of 
international relations. A central question during the war­
time debate was whether regional or universal principles 
should be adopted as the basis for world organization.
Some more realistically questioned whether the two 
principles were mutually exclusive and asked how regional
9
groupings or arrangements could be represented in and relate 
to a general organization. These questions applied no less 
to the issue of how Germany, eastern Europe, and Europe 
itself would be organized after the war. The restoration of 
the pre-war system of sovereign states vied with principles 
favoring the regionalization and federalization of Europe, 
whether this involved grouping smaller states into a larger 
entity or breaking up a large state into regional 
components. The former received expression in the 1944 
agreement between the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg 
to form the BENELUX custom's union and the latter in the 
federalization of Germany into regionally autonomous Lander 
governments after the war.
Regionalism was not an issue of note in international 
relations until the war-time debate. In 1919, the League of 
Nations was conceived as a universal organization of 
sovereign member states. The only reference in the League's 
Covenant to regionalism was Article 21, which acknowledged 
the "validity of regional understandings" such as the Monroe 
Doctrine, which was mentioned by name, "for securing the 
maintenance of peace." Though conceived as a world-wide 
body, the League in practice became a kind of European 
regional organization when the United States refused to join 
and when members found themselves resorting to regional 
measures to maintain the peace. Between 1925 and 1936, peace 
in Europe was maintained less through the universal 
principles of collective security and disarmament than by 
the nonagression and arbitration treaties signed in Locarno 
in 1925 by several European states. In the mid-1930s.
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attempts, led in no small part by the Soviet Union, were 
made to form an "eastern Locarno" in eastern Europe.
The main problem with regionalism during the war-time 
deliberations was that, as a relatively new and untried 
concept, there was little consensus on what it meant in both 
theory and practice. There were virtually no theoretical 
treatises on the subject much less practical applications 
that were understood as specific to regionalism. As a 
result, regionalism tended to be defined by its supporters 
and detractors in terms of a vocabulary already held about 
social and political reality and world politics. Perhaps no 
better insight into the intellectual climate of the period 
existed than E.H. Carr's singular contribution to 
international relations theory in The Twenty Years' Crisis. 
1919-1939.1
Published at the outbreak of the war and dedicated "to
the makers of the coming peace," the book was the first
perceptive articulation of the idealist-realist bifurcation 
in international relations theory. Carr argued that non- 
rational principles of power were replacing principles of 
modern scientific rationalism as the central concept in 
world politics. The rationally-inspired views of the 
idealists for an internationalist, Wilsonian world order 
were declared bankrupt and utopian by an emerging group of 
realists pointing to the disintegration of world order under 
those principles. For the latter, power and geopolitics were
the real determinants of politics and world order.
The science of international politics was founded after
11
World War I by idealist writers mainly in the United States
—  Philip Jessup, Nicholas Murray Butler, James T. Shotwell,
and J.L. Brierly, an English international law authority,
among others. The substance of Carr's argument was that they
envisaged a rationally ordered world based partly on the
19th century (European) liberal-utilitarian belief in the
harmony of competing interests and partly on the perceived
need to transfer the order of nature discovered by modern
science into human social and political organization. Like
the discrete individual pursuing his self-interest, the
sovereign state pursued its interests within an
international (i.e., inter-state) system that tended, with
help from the proverbial "invisible hand,” toward
equilibrium. Given the anomalies of politics, however, it
was also necessary to intervene in this process by promoting
the widespread acceptance, through knowledge applied by
reason and a belief in progress, of international law and
organization. After World War I, the budding science of
international relations saw this tendency realized in its
2
most advanced form in the League of Nations.
Carr traced idealist theory to the optimistic late-18th 
and 19th century Enlightenment beliefs about man, nature, 
and social order. These beliefs were based on a new "secular 
'law of nature' whose ultimate source was the individual 
human reason" (22). From the Encyclopaedists via Jean- 
Jeacques Rousseau and Immanuel Rant to Hegel, Darwin, and 
Marx, "never was there an age which so unreservedly 
proclaimed the supremacy of the intellect" (25). They shared 
the view that just as the physical laws of nature as
12
established by science could be apprehended by reason, so 
too could the moral laws of nature be scientifically 
established. And if reason was able to establish what the 
universally valid moral laws were, then the "assumption was 
made that once these laws were determined, human beings 
would conform to them just as matter conformed to the 
physical laws of nature" (22-3). Applied to international 
relations and the problem of world order, these beliefs led 
to an intellectual self-fulfilling prophecy as perhaps first 
expressed by Abb6 Saint Pierre (1737-1814), a historical 
patron of the league of nations idea. Saint Pierre was "so 
confident in the reasonableness of his projects that he 
always believed that, if they were fairly considered, the 
ruling powers could not fail to adopt them."3 In the
same vein, J.L. Brierly spoke for internationalists in the 
1920s when he called the League of Nations, with "all its 
imperfections ... the best and perhaps the only hope of the 
eventual triumph of law and reason in international
4
relations."
The course of events in the 1930s prompted Carr, in 
1939, to declare the bankruptcy of the idealist approach to 
world order. "The inner meaning of the modern international 
crisis,” he declared, was "the collapse of the whole 
structure of utopianism based on the concept of the harmony 
of interests. The present generation will have to rebuild 
from the foundations" (62).
Realists rightly challenged, Carr maintained, the 
assumption that rational scientific principles could be
13
applied to the ordering of world society. Idealist 
assumptions about political reality were based more on 
aspiration than in the hard analysis of experience. "Like 
the alchemists," stated Carr, "they (the idealists) were 
content to advocate highly imaginative solutions whose 
relation to existing facts was one of flat negation" (6). 
Realists on the other hand claimed to base their assumptions 
about political reality on the facts of experience. In so 
doing, they declared that power, defined in military, 
economic, and geopolitical terms, was the central concept 
in international politics. It was illusory to think that an 
international peacekeeping authority existed or could be 
made to exist in international society because it appeared 
reasonable. Rather, experience had shown that power and 
interests as exercised by sovereign states were the main 
determinants in international politics.
Realist theory was anchored in a more pessimistic, 
pre-Enlightenment view of man and society reflected in the 
political writings of Niccolo Machiavelli (1469-1527) and 
Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679). Carr stated modern realists 
joined Francis Bacon (1561-1626), philosophical pioneer of 
the inductive method of modern experimental science, in 
praising Machiavelli for "'saying openly and without 
hypocrisy what men are in the habit of doing, not what they 
ought to do'" (64). Also, Carr approvingly quoted his 
contemporary Peter Drucker, who in his The End of Economic 
Man captured the signature of the time: "The European masses 
realised for the first time that existence in this society 
is governed not by rational and sensible, but by blind,
14
irrational and demonic forces" (224).
While identifying with the realist critique, Carr 
argued that realism was as untenable a principle for 
establishing and maintaining world order as idealism. He 
stated that "pure realism can offer nothing but a naked 
struggle for power which makes any kind of international 
society impossible" (93). He criticized the amoral if not 
immoral character of realism, which he attributed to the 
modern, in this case Hobbesian, view of nature. In point of 
fact, realism and idealism were birds of the same 
ideological feather. Carr traced the origins of realism to 
the same modern scientific assumptions (viz., the need to 
control nature through instrumental methods) embraced by the 
idealists. Carr thereby challenged the realists' premise 
that their views about social and political reality were 
based on "facts." Hobbes' theory of politics, for example, 
was a rational construct which assumed a state of nature 
determined by the principle of mechanical causation. This 
decidedly modern view of reality was reinforced by the 
mechanistic doctrine of nature conceived by physicist Isaac 
Newton (1642-1727), which opened "the possibility of a 
physical science of politics" (64) . The consequence of this 
thinking was the positivist separation of ethics from 
politics that made "morality ... the product of power" (64).
The might-makes-right doctrine and its legal corollary 
of a positive law based on force or command were not in 
themselves preculiarly modern characteristics. They were 
evident in classical Greece. The modern element in the
15
realist premise, according to Carr, was its attachment to 
the Enlightenment idea of progress manifested in the 19th 
century in historical, and also economic, biological, and 
geographic determinism. Realists were not immune to the 
Hegelian belief in the unfolding of an omnipotent state 
according to rationally-determined "laws.” Carr stated that 
"both utopianism and realism accepted and incorporated in 
their philosophies the eighteenth century belief in 
progress, with the curious and somewhat paradoxical result 
that realism became in appearance more 'progressive' than 
utopianism" (65).
In taking both the realists and idealists to task, Carr 
attempted to develop an integrative theory of world politics 
"based on elements of both utopia and reality" (93). He made 
a case, if a tentative one, for what may be described as 
moral realism in international politics. A sound political 
theory in international relations had to "explore the ruins 
of our international order and discover on what fresh 
foundations we may hope to rebuild it; and like other 
problems, this problem (had to) be considered from the 
standpoint both of power and morality" (226) . Influenced in 
part by Protestant theologian and social philosopher 
Reinhold Niebuhr, he drew on the biblical injunction of 
rendering unto both God and Caesar to develop a theory of 
politics where power and morality coexisted in a necessarily 
uneasy balance. "'Politics,'" Carr quoted Niebuhr, "'will, 
to the end of history, be an area where conscience and power 
meet, where ethical and coercive factors of human life will 
interpenetrate and work out their tentative and uneasy
16
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compromises'" (100).
Carr's outline £or a "new international order" was at 
best sketchy in his final 15-page chapter. He looked in 
principle to society and social needs and not to the 
sovereign state and its needs for the source of a new 
morality and legitimate authority. Specifically, he saw the 
pursuit of "tolerant and unoppresive ... social ends" 
(employment, economic reconstruction) as the moral task of 
an ascendant power or powers. In this respect, the United 
States and Britain, or even an Anglo-American association, 
possessed the moral strength to overcome and replace the 
demonic German and Japanese ascendancy in the world.
As a political theorist, Carr did not sufficiently 
explore the premises of his political morality, which 
broached but did not articulate a more integrative view of 
social and political reality. While he pointed to the 
nihilistic consequences of a politics based on the sensate 
knowledge and reductionism of the idealist and realist 
theories, his own moral realism lacked a firm or convincing 
anchor. With Matthew Arnold, he seemed in this area to be a 
searcher "wandering between two worlds, one dead, the other 
powerless to be born" (Stanzas from the Grande Chartreuse). 
For Carr's concept of "society" was unclear and undeveloped, 
as he failed to draw out the socio-cultural realities that 
moved and shaped politics at the societal level. Had he 
probed in this direction, he may have endorsed social 
thinker David Bidney's integrative view of reality expressed 
at war's end:
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The monistic doctrines of both idealists (Platonic 
and Kantian) and realists (positivists and Marxian 
materialists) fail to provide an adequate interpreta­
tion of the cultural process simply because they 
tend to take exclusively either the ideational or 
the actual social and material forces into account.
Both parties fail to consider the inherent inter­
relation of ideational, social, and material ele- g 
ments which give rise to unique cultural phenomena.
Both idealists and realists confronted the issue of 
regionalism during the war by incorporating the concept into 
their respective assumptions about social and political 
reality and world order. Idealists, as world federalists or 
internationalists, espoused forms of what I call "interstate 
regionalism," which ranged from limited cooperation schemes 
among states in specific areas to regional federations of 
states within a full-fledged world federation. Realists 
advanced ideas of "hegemonial regionalism," where 
regionalism was viewed in big power spheres-of-influence 
terms. A third theory or school of thought, which loosely 
corresponds to Carr's adumbration of a third "social ends" 
way between idealism and realism, I refer to as 
"autochthonous regionalism." Here regionalism is based on 
indigenous sociocultural entities of peoples existing in 
more or 1-ess historically defined areas, or regions. It is a 
region-based, not state-based, theory of regionalism.
The three theories, or perhaps more accurately, proto­
theories, of regionalism constitute chapters II, III, and 
IV, respectively, in Part One of this study. The remainder 
of the study applies these theories of regionalism to an 
empirical analysis of the allied war-time deliberations on 
postwar world and European organization. The allied debate 
on regionalism and the future world order are examined in
18
Part Two. The domestic debates of the three major powers on 
the question of regionalism and postwar world order planning 
are described in Chapter V, covering the period from 1940 
(or late 1939) to mid-1943. How the contending positions 
unfolded in the rejection and then partial re-acceptance of 
regionalism in the inter-allied conferences held between 
mid-1943 and the spring of 1945 is discussed in chapters VI 
and VII.
In addition to the future world organization, the 
structure of postwar Europe in general and eastern Europe in 
particular was also hotly debated among the allies and is 
the subject, respectively, of Chapters VIII and IX in Part 
Three of the study. Europe was was seen by regionalists of 
many colors as the most obvious and necessary area for the 
adoption of regional and federal principles of organization. 
Already in the interwar period, and particularly in the 
1930s, the continent had been the subject of numerous still­
born attempts —  from citizen manifestos to high-level 
diplomatic maneuvers —  for economic and political 
integration schemes ranging in scope from the pan-European 
to sub-regional. Perhaps the most notable attempt at a sub­
regional interstate unit was the Little Entente formed 
between Czechoslovakia, Rumania, and Yugoslavia in 1921 
which, after the advent of Hitler in 1933, acquired more or 
less pro forma institutions in a Permanent Council of 
Foreign Ministers, Economic Council, and Secretariat 
headquartered in Geneva.
That the failed experiment of the Entente and numerous
19
other initiatives occurred in eastern Europe was no 
accident, for nowhere was the political turmoil and flux in 
Europe more apparent than in its eastern part. Before World 
War I, southeastern Europe had acquired a reputation as the 
"powderkeg of Europe," a distinction it lived up to in 1914. 
After the war, the ethnic "one-nation, one-state" principle 
of political organization was given its first historical 
application in the region as the basis of the 1919 Paris 
peace settlement. The belt of east European states 
established by the allies was in part motivated by the 
desire to create a regional buffer, or cordon sanitaire, 
between Bolshevik Russia and the rest of Europe. But the 
experiment in nation statehood in this ethnically inter­
mixed region produced mixed results and was short-lived. The 
divisive external as well as domestic policies of the new 
nationalistic regimes produced, rather, a fragmented region 
whose political vacuum was progessively filled by German 
power in the 1930s and by Soviet power after 1944. During 
the World War II, regionalism as a war-time issue was to a 
great extent inspired by and directed toward the question of 
postwar order in the so-called "shatter zone" of Europe. 
Chapter IX examines the allied war-time efforts to establish 
regional federations as the basis for a postwar settlement 
there.
So much by way of an introduction to the nature and 
scope of the problem. With regard to method or approach, the 
question arises to what extent the field of international 
relations has the conceptual tools with which to use the
20
region as a unit of analysis comparable to that of the
state. In other words, can a study on regionalism be
approached by using a regional rather than a state-centric
conception of world politics? Although this remains an open
question, an underlying objective in this study is to
address this problem. Also axiomatic to this study is
the recognition that traditional positivist methodologies in
the social sciences, derived from the so-called hard methods
of the physical sciences, have at best been limited gateways
to truth about social and political reality. This approach,
marked by the practice of isolating and classifying
quantifiable information, served to reduce and fragment
knowledge in the name of methodological rigor and
specialization. By contrast, integrative regional approaches
have been developed by scholars largely outside the field of
international relations. An integrative approach, such as
suggested above by David Bidney, maintains a cognitive
openness to all aspects of experiential reality, including
to structures of consciousness as being integral parts of
the structure of reality. Within political science, only
contemporary political theorists have succeeded in bridging,
or transcending, classical positivist separation between
"values" and "facts," itself a consequence of the sharp
7
subject-object dualism in classical western science.
Political theory was once elegantly defined by Sheldon 
Wolin as reflection grounded in experience. Influenced by 
the post-modern existentialist and phenomenological 
currents of philosophy that emerged in turn of the century 
Europe, contemporary political theorists have taken the
21
existing human being in society or, in the language o£ 
phenomenology, the "life-world” as its central concept —  
and not the state, power, or a logical or ideological
g
construct. A rigorous and comprehensive view of reality
entailed, according to Maurice Natanson, a "root agreement
that any proper epistemology must be built on and through
the disciplined investigation of phenomena taken in their
essential givenness and elaborated in terms of a reflective
9
consciousness" (emphasis in original).
Students of international relations and organization 
remained largely untouched by this irruption in western 
thought (which was not without affinities to eastern 
thought). Rather, a regional approach that embraced the 
regnant positivist methodologies, enhanced by the schools of 
logical and analytical positivism based largely in the 
Anglo-Saxon societies, was developed by the so-called 
neofunctionalist school of integration theory between the 
mid-1950s and early 1970s. The postwar movement toward 
regional integration in western Europe and other parts of 
the world elicited a corpus of scholarship in integration 
theory among, in particular, American political scientists. 
The neo-functionalists owed intellectual debts to, but 
distinguished themselves from, the mainly European 
federalist writers and the functionalist theory of 
international organization developed by David Mitrany and 
his followers.
The neofunctionalists were methodologically grounded 
in the prevailing social "scientism” and predictive claims
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of the period. Most of them focussed research efforts on the 
problem of the political unification of states and came to 
hold, and share with some federalists, that the end product
of the political unification process was "an entity similar
11 . . .  to the modern nation-state... ." For Amatai Etzioni, for
example, a multinational political community was considered
integrated when it possessed effective control over the use
of the means of violence. He defined integration as "the
ability of a unit or system to maintain itself in the face
12of internal and external challenges."
Neofunctionalists admitted their theory foundered when
the experiences in Europe and elsewhere indicated by the
early 1970s that regional integration had not in fact turn
out to be examples of political unification. Hence, "using
them to generate a theory about political unification proved 
13impossible." But this acknowledged failure belied other
theoretical limitations of the school. Its main flaw lay in
its attempt to reduce integration phenomena to quantifiable
variables. Thus, what it may have gained in scientific rigor
and neatness was frequently lost in theoretical relevance,
for, as Donald Puchala pointed out, the main questions of
integration theory defied concepts of metric quantification.
For Puchala, these questions included, "within what
environment, under what conditions, and by what processes
does a new transnational political unit peacefully emerge
14from two or more initially separate and different ones?" 
Additionally, he advised that in order "to understand 
international relations, ...it is essential to understand 
how peoples perceive and feel about one another, from whence
stem such perceptions and sentiments, how and why they 
15change, ... ."
The value-free science to which the neofunctionalists 
aspired in the name of the fact/value distinction belied 
their for the most part unwitting attachment to the 
prevailing Anglo-American rationalist philosophies of 
utilitarianism and reductionist empiricism that shaped their 
vocabulary of politics. Politics was understood largely in 
terms of a rational pursuit and balance of "interests" and 
"demands." While this understanding of politics may have 
meaning for the middle classes in the modern industrial and 
commercially-based Anglo-Saxon societies (and perhaps post- 
1957 Brussels), it had less relevance in the vastly more 
numerous traditional political cultures of Europe, Latin 
America, Asia, or Africa. As Charles Pentland noted with a 
touch of irony, "no matter what his sentiments or actions, 
then, a French farmer who demonstrates in Brussels rather 
than Paris is acting in line with neofunctionalist 
assumptions of instrumental rationality."^
The positive aspect of the postwar integration 
theorizing was the change it initiated toward a regional 
conception of world politics. Regional integration theory 
created an alternative to the traditional Hobbesian vs. 
Grotian (viz., internationalist) paradigms in international 
relations theory which saw international political reality 
in terms of state sovereignty and its logical corollary, 
international anarchy on the one hand, and a universal
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international system of states and law on the other. With
the new integration paradigm, the first steps were taken
toward recognizing 1) the region as a reality existing
between the state and a universal organization and 2) the
postwar state as neither as a unitary entity, "in full
control of all territory, men, and resources," nor as the
sole actor in international politics. The classical notion
of state sovereignty as inviolable and indivisible had ceded
in the postwar world to the more porous concept of an
17"interpenetration of different degrees of autonomy."
The modern state has nonetheless demonstrated its 
capacity to endure in the postwar world as a viable 
political unit in the conduct and study of international 
relations. It is also true that its authority has been 
diluted by a complex of forces, human and material, acting 
within and across state boundaries. These include 
transnational factors such as communication, transportation, 
economic and environmental interdependence, and non­
material, sociocultural factors such as movements for human 
rights and regional autonomy among others. Also, social and 
political theorists have continued to question the authority 
if not the legitimacy of the state. Paul Ricoeur, for 
example, viewed the state as "abstract institution which 
lacks the familiarity and intimacy of a community" and that 
because "relations between the citizen and the state are 
mediated by representation, ... the experiences of everyday 
life do not mesh neatly with those facing political 
leaders.
In the 1970s, following the self-proclaimed demise of
25
the neofunctionalist regional integration theory,
integration studies proliferated into cognate areas that
focussed less on the political unification of states than on
collaborative behavior "via transnational processes within
19settings of interdependence." Political studies shifted
perceptively from "high-politics" to "low-politics" models
of integration. Direct objective variables gave way to more
indirect variables to describe the integration process.
Charles Pentland distinguished between a state model and
community model approach to the study of international
integration wherein structures of consciousness played a not
insignificant role. In his community model, for example,
"more stress is placed on the character of the relationships
between the peoples... (and) the emergence of political
institutions is considered less important than the growth of
20certain common values, perceptions and habits."
The pluralization of integration studies helped to 
break the boundaries of academically acceptable research to 
include approaches and findings from disciplines outside the 
narrow prism of an American-dominated political science. It 
was at this point where regionalism began to regain 
recognition as an integrative and interdisciplinary approach 
in the study of international political integration. Intra- 
regional relationships were as much determinants of regional 
integration in a multistate area than state actors or the 
influence of outside powers. Moreover, the character of 
these relationships suggested that political integration 
could issue as much from a prior "psychological" integration
26
experienced by individuals and groups as by considerations
of utility, power, or fear —  the mainsprings of modern
political thought and behaviour. A new criterion for
integration was the quality of the relations between the
integrating units. According to Daniel Druckman, the study
of regional politics at the beginning of 1980s existed at an
"interdisciplinary juncture where the study of relationships
among nations merges with the social psychology of
21interaction among persons and groups." Pyschological
processes, he argued, undergirded the political processes.
They shaped the political attitudes and behaviors that "are
pervasive in the creation of a 'community of action' that is
22so essential for regional integration or identification."
These processes not only served a dynamic learning and
communication function, but "also play a role in the
creation of structures," Druckman stated, as the "interplay
between structures and behavior is another way of addressing
the nexus between political and social-psychological 
.,23processes.
Using Druckman's thesis, it is possible to see how the
relation of the psychological processes of individuals and
groups in society to the problem of political organization
is mediated by man's relationship to his natural and
cultural landscape, or his experience or sense of "place."
In the 1960s, Harold and Margaret Sprout had explored the
phenomenon of non-deterministic "man-milieu relationships"
24in international relations theory. Their psycho-ecological 
theory was based on hypotheses derived from observed 
regularities of psychological behavior of human undertakings
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"formulated with reference to human persons, as individuals
or in concrete groups," an approach which they said made no
sense when applied to "political systems or other high-level 
25abstractions." Influenced by the French "Annales" school
of human geography, they attached significance to the
geographic quality of political community. They argued that
the distribution and arrangement of phenomena 
upon the earth's surface are always, or nearly 
always, related significantly to what people under­
take and to what they accomplish. The ecological 
perspective and ecological theories bring the 
dimensions of location, distance, space, distri­
bution, and configuration sharply into focus in 
many social contexts, not least in the context of 
politics in geggral and of international politics 
in particular.
Phenomenologically-oriented social scientists developed
a similar concept by drawing on Edmund Husserl's notion of
the Lebenswelt. or life-world, which Husserl developed in
his last work, The Crisis of European Sciences and
Transcendental Phenomenology (1938). Husserl defined such
human societies as essentially preconceptual worlds of
common or ordinary experience that constituted a universal
27set of concrete "regional" types. The life-world was an
ecumeme, or inhabited world, experienced by man in a given
eco-social environment over time. It was capable of being
understood conceptually through its historical
reconstitution. Husserl's Lebenswelt comprised, as
summarized by David Bidney,
not only the naturally selected environment but 
also the social and cultural world of human society.
The sociocultural life-world is a historic achieve­
ment of man in a given ecological environment and 
varies with time and place for different societies. 
Husserl is explicit on this point: 'Among the
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objects of the life-world we also find human beings, 
with all their human action and concern, works and 
suffering, living in common in the world-horizon in 
their particular social interrelations and knowing 
themselves to be such.' He now recognizes that 
historians in particular are concerned with the 
reconstruction of the changing, surrounding life- 
worldSgOf the peoples and periods with which they 
deal.
This spatio-temporal or "culture area" understanding of
human societies, which has been developed in particular by
anthropologists, approximates what is meant in this study by
the autochthonous region. Husserl's allusion to its
historical reconstitution may well refer to the
"regionalist" historiography that emerged at the turn of the
century in Europe (see below, p. 105f.). In any event, such
a historical-cultural, organic understanding of regionalism
as an approach to the study of world politics contrasts
sharply with the state-based concepts of regionalism that
have been dominant in international relations theory.
Although there are points of contact between the two
approaches, the latter projects a mechanical view of regions
as, for example, "areas of the world which contain
geographically proximate states forming, in foreign affairs,
29mutually interrelated units." In the political application 
of systems theory, regions were analyzed as subsystems of 
the international system with little or no regard for the 
beliefs, sociocultural characteristics, or habits and 
desires of the people who lived in them. One political 
scientist who investigated a range of definitions stated 
that "geographical continguity, interaction, and perception 
of belonging to a distinctive community (were) frequently 
offered" (emphasis in o r i g i n a l ) F o r  the most part, the
29
most common criteria for distinguishing one region from 
another were more or less abstract "'differences in the
31quality or frequency of communications and interactions.'" 
Disentangling the various conceptions and theories of the 
region and regionalism as they were expressed during World 
Wat II is the task of the next part of this study.
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PART ONE
THEORIES OF REGIONALISM AND POST-WAR ORDER
It has ... become increasingly 
apparent that formulas of peace and 
prosperity which were conceived 
abstractly and applied indiscrimi­
nately to the various cells of 
which make up the European body 
often failed to solve pressing re­
gional problems. This experience 
may well justify a reversal of the 
process of political and economic 
pacification to the effect that a 
thorough examination of regional 
problems should precede, not fol­
low, the elaboration of guiding 
principles.
Adda B. Bozeman, 1941
Introduction
During the war, regionalism was upheld by many students 
of international relations as a necessary alternative or 
reform for the international system of sovereign states. Yet 
no significant theoretical study or treatise was devoted to 
regionalism as a concept in international relations or 
principle of political organization. Academics and 
publicists nonetheless advanced regionalist ideas and 
proposals for postwar order that, when combined, formed 
corpuses of materials with which to formulate theories on 
the subject. Regionalism was for the most part seen as a 
groups-of-states concept by both realists and idealists in 
international relations theory, but they were challenged by 
regionalists who argued for a society-based, region-centric 
conception of political organization.
Idealists embraced a conception of regionalism which I 
refer to as the theory of interstate regionalism. Under this 
scheme, the sovereign state was retained as the unit of 
analysis and object of regional integration. Maximalist 
schemes devised by utopian federalists envisaged a world 
federation and government with states organized into 
regional units. More modest proposals by internationalists 
favored a strengthened world organization that provided room 
for regional arrangements and agencies designed for specific
security or economic cooperation purposes. Realists blurred 
distinctions between sovereign states with their conception 
of major power orbitry, where large and powerful states 
dominate or exercise suzerainty over smaller neighboring 
states. I have called this the theory of heaemonial 
regionalism. Realists considered the repartition of the 
world into equal and sovereign states as a legal fiction in 
a world that in reality was shaped by major powers. Large 
and powerful states exercising control over sub-continental, 
continental or even hemispheric regions were the important 
political units in global society.
In the margins of the theoretical debate were 
regionalists who downplayed or altogether obliterated the 
distinctions of sovereign states as political units. They 
considered cultural regions, or regional cultures, as more 
intelligible units of global society. The region was in 
general defined by a natural and cultural landscape that was 
a composite of pre-existing environmental, historical, 
socio-cultural, ethnic, and economic realities that existed 
within or across modern state boundaries. In politics, they 
favored the decentralization or break-up of existing states 
into autonomous self-governing regions (units) organized 
into larger federal units. I refer to this "low politics" 
theory of regionalism as autochthonous regionalism. This 
aspect of regionalism has received less attention as a 
concept in international relations than in disciplines such 
as sociology, geography, anthropology, and history. An 
objective of chapter IV in this study is to introduce
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findings from some of these disciplines into the corpus of 
international relations theory on regionalism.
The contrast between a state-centric and society-based 
form of political organization is by no means a new or 
unfamiliar one. It suggests an opposition that can be traced 
in modern Europe to the weariness expressed by artists and 
intellectuals beginning in the 1880s with the impersonal, or 
contractually-based industrial state. Social historian 
Ferdinand Tonnies drew "Gemeinschaft" and "Gesellschaft" 
typologies of societies in his 1887 treatise published, co­
incidentally, in the same year Nietzsche predicted the 
advent of nihilism in Europe in his Per Wille zur Macht (The 
Will to Power). Tonnies linked "Gesellschaft" with modern 
state culture rooted in so-called "rational will" and 
"Gemeinschaft" with community culture rooted in "natural 
will." The latter principle connoted an organic, ascriptive 
solidarity based on timeless affective relationships 
(friendship, neighborliness, kinship) that were still found 
among many peasants, artists, and common people of Europe. 
Historically, he found that a period of Gesellschaft as 
state civilization followed a folk culture period of 
Gemeinschaft. Tonnies saw the Gesellschaft principle in his 
time as synonomous with state, which had created a society 
that was a "coexistence of people independent of each other" 
and, as the realm of the calculating businessman, 
bureaucrat, and scientist, "a mechanical aggregate and 
artifact.
While neither type of society existed in reality 
inasmuch as individuals participated, willy-nilly, in both,
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the dichotomy is heuristically useful in depicting the 
tension people experience between contending modes of 
existence. This tension found political expression in the 
opposition between "high politics," or the realm of central 
and diplomatic-strategic action by and on behalf of the 
state, and "low politics," which addressed the daily lives, 
concerns, and beliefs of individuals and groups in society. 
The modern European state formed a unity of purpose through 
a national culture that linked individuals directly to the 
central authority of the state. In so doing, it weakened or 
ruptured intermediary links such as church, family, guilds, 
ethnic roots, and other traditional organic solidarities 
between people. Autochthonous regionalism, which found some 
voice among political thinkers and writers during the war, 
was an attempt to restore a society-based, or low politics 
model of political organization.
The purpose in the following chapters on theories of 
regionalism and postwar order is not to contruct theories as 
such. Rather, it is to provide some historical data and 
analysis that contributes to a more differentiated, 
experientially grounded understanding of regionalism in 
international relations. The interstate, hegemonial, and 
autochthonous theories, or proto-theories, of regionalism 
are distinguished according to the way theorists of 
international order experience the social and political 
reality in which they participate.
NOTE
1
Quoted in Theories of Society, vol.I, eds. Talcott 
Parsons, et.al. (New York, 1961), p. 192.
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CHAPTER II
INTERSTATE REGIONALISM
The reality of a second world war in a generation
forced idealists to confront, with international law
theorist Wolfgang Friedmann, "the crisis of the national 
1
state." Their reaction to the crisis and need to articulate 
a more viable postwar peace structure elicited a wide range 
of ideas and plans on how the international system could be 
reformed, altered, or even transformed. Most idealists 
still considered the sovereign state and international 
system as the most advanced form of political organization 
known to man. Known as internationalists, they believed the 
international system was the culmination of centuries of 
modern European development in law, economic progress, and 
political emancipation from feudal and absolutist 
structures. For them, the League Nations model could still 
work with proper reforms and improved procedures, including 
regional arrangements. For the most part Americans, they 
constituted the dominant school of postwar thought as a 
whole.
Idealists who were critical of the internationalist 
model were federalists of a utopian bent and, at the other
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end of the idealist spectrum, functionalists who argued for 
a radical pragmatist approach to international organization. 
The federalists under review were a publically visible 
minority who argued for a world federal government built on 
statist principles that combined universal collective 
security and/or socialist planning with regional 
organization. Functionalists sought a gradual dilution of 
state sovereignty in the creation of transnational technical 
and socio-economic agencies, and saw some value in 
organizing these functional activities along regional lines. 
The regionalism articulated by these idealists constituted a 
corpus of theory which I refer to as interstate regionalism.
Utopian Federalism
The federalist writers concerned with world and 
European order tended to be publicists possessed with 
unshaken beliefs about science, progress, and reason as 
vehicles for implementing political change. Among their 
leading American proponents of a politically liberal 
pursuasion were Clarence Streit, a former New York Times 
reporter, and Ely Culbertson, a Rumanian-born bridge expert. 
A less strident and more socially-based form of federalism 
inspired by social democratic values was promoted by Felix 
Gross and an entourage of collaborators organized around his 
New York-based journal, The New Europe. In Britain, 
federalists, among them G.D.H. Cole, W.B. Curry, R.W.G. 
Mackay, R.H. Tawney, H.G. Wells, and Barbara Wootton, were
40
for the most part identified with the Fabian socialist 
2
movement.
Streit, who had covered the League of Nations as a
journalist in the 1930s, first published his plan for a
world "Federal Union" centered on an Anglo-American
association before the outbreak of war in 1939. In a revised
194 0 edition, he expanded his scheme to include all fifteen
western democratic nations as the core and model for a
universal organization. Modelling his scheme on the American
federal experience, his union of states included a defense
force, a custom's union with a common currency, and a postal
and communications system. A five-member executive board ran
a central government that shared sovereignty with the member
states. States retained complete home rule and separate
governmental powers to deal with domestic matters. His plan
gained some notariety with the public in the early years of
the war. Not unlike Abb6 St. Pierre before him, Streit was
convinced of the correctness of his plan. "If we will Union
we can achieve Union," he assured the public, "and the time
3we take to do it depends only on ourselves."
Ely Culbertson's Total Peace was a more original tract 
in terms of its regional component. He blended his Wilsonian 
ideals of a collective security system based on an 
international police force with global regionalism. His 
concept of interstate regionalism, while schematic, included 
aspects of hegemonial and autochthonous regionalism. His 
"World Federation" plan was not based around a North 
Atlantic regional core, but eleven "naturally divided" 
regional federations comprised of one or more sovereign
4states. Culbertson delineated nine "sovereign" regions 
equipped with their own governmental organs: a Pan-American, 
British, Latin-European, Germanic, Middle European, Russian, 
Middle Eastern, Chinese, and Japanese. There were also two 
"autonomous" regions, the Malaysian and Indian, under 
temporary American and British trusteeships, in his scheme.
The largest and most populous state in each region
served as the "initiating state," with each region forming a
natural "economic, psychosocial, and space-political unit"
(256). Economically, a region was large enough to be a
self-contained unit with a balance between agriculture,
5industry, and raw materials. Some of the regions, 
namely the Japanese, Chinese, Indian, and Russian, already 
existed politically and the British Empire, while a 
"geographic absurdity," was none the less a political 
entity. Culbertson's "space-political" concept had an 
affinity with the geo-political ideas developed within the 
realist school. He defined "space-political" as the relation 
"between space and a state from the standpoint of power and 
strategic security" (183). He explained it in terms 
suggestive of geographic determinism: "...in the same way a 
man is largely a creature of his physical environment, a 
nation or state is largely shaped by the extent of and the 
kind of space it occupies" (Ibid.).
As a plan, Total Peace was an ideal prescription for 
world order, complete with a draft constitution on "how to 
organize peace." But Culbertson also recognized regions as 
more than material bundles of legal, economic, political,
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and strategic factors. In a revealing if thin elaboration of
"the regional principle" (256-58), he understood his
"natural" division of the world into approximately eleven
regions in essentially pyschologicalf cultural, and
historical terms. The countries which comprised each
region had a common complex of "psycho-social" forces which,
if not stronger than nationalism, extended beyond the
frontiers of the states and distinguished them from other
regions. These forces consisted of "a common heritage of
history, tradition, culture, law, and often language" (257).
Apart from the Pan-American and British regions, which were
relatively recent historical constructions, the regions he
delineated had previously existed for centuries as
multinational empires and were now seeking to re-integrate
in another form. While his regionalism was fundamentally of
an interstate variety, he developed an argument for
autochthonous regionalism in international relations by
stressing the essential immutability of peoples and cultures
as units of organization. He developed the argument in the
following terms:
Whatever the political or even racial differences 
between states of the same Region, and however great 
their passing rivalries and hatreds may be, during 
many centuries they have been molded into the same 
characteristic way of life. Today those states are 
still held together by their common psychosocial 
patterns inherited from empires of old (257).
...From the standpoint of the philosophy of history, 
many wars of the past were but struggles of the 
'ghosts' of ancient empires to reunite their dis­
membered states. Today, with easier communications, 
the same states seek to reassemble themselves within 
their common psychosocial, historical, and economic 
Regions in order to better resist oppression and 
aggression. The Regional structure of the World 
Federation Plan merely accelerates— and peacefully—
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this inevitable reassembly of kindred nations into 
larger Regional units (258).
Culbertson saw such regional entities as a necessary 
"intermediate mechanism” between the national state and the 
World Federation, whose powers were limited to enforcing the 
peace. The world was "still too large for a central 
government to attend to its needs" (313) . But the powers of 
his regional governments, invested with constitutions 
providing for an executive, legislature, and judiciary, were 
even more limited than that of the world government. In 
fact, he admitted there was very little the regional 
governments could "do without the consent of its member 
states" (315). Nonetheless, the structures and organs would 
be in place for this regionalism to advance with time to "a
g
closer partnership between the member states" (Ibid.).
Britain's Fabian federalists considered such blueprints 
for world federation as impracticable and a penchant of the 
legalistically-minded Americans. With the possible exception 
of H.G. Well's highly utopian idea for a world socialist 
state, they they tended to favor a building block approach 
to world peace that began in Europe. They criticized 
Streit's plan for not contributing to the unification of the 
continent and suggested building up, regional structures in 
Europe based on ideas that combined federalism with 
socialist planning. Federalism was less a unity-in-diversity 
principle than a mechanism for central planning and control. 
As economist Barbara Wootton stated, the principal reason 
for socialist interest in federation was "the fact that 
social progress (was) contingent upon international order"
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in which "conscious and planned direction of economic life
over a wide area (was) essential... Only under the settled
and ordered government of a Federation (was) it possible to
create interstate public utilities that are operated for the
7
common welfare."
Wootton favored a European-wide socialist federation. 
Others in this school thought in terms of several smaller 
sub-regional federations. For G.O.H. Cole, it was not 
necessary or even desireable at this time for all of Europe 
to be covered by a single, unified economic plan. Rather, 
there was room for more than one plan and "for more than one 
group of countries committed to concerted economic and 
social planning on a common institutional basis." As a 
minimum, he envisaged separate plans for eastern and western 
Europe based on the principle that the planning groups 
should be "as large as could be effectively unified, either 
politically or economically, at the present stage of human
g
development in the arts of government and administration."
Economist R.H. Tawney also argued for federations built in
stages, beginning with a union of Britain and France that
was in the works in the months preceding the fall of
France in June 1940 (see Chapter VIII). He believed that the
reorganization along federal lines of state systems in both
eastern and western Europe would serve as the "basis on
9
which later to build a more comprehensive system."
Between the neo-liberal and socialist tendencies among 
the federal idealists was a third cluster of social 
democratic thinkers who sought to base world and European 
reconstruction on social security needs. Not unlike Carr's
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"social ends" idea, American economist Lewis Corey argued
that the "political job of creating federations and a world
organization cannot, in the final analysis, be separated
from the job of social economic reconstruction to strengthen
the attitudes and policies which are needed to insure world
10cooperation and peace."
Perhaps the most thoughtful articulation of this
approach was made by Polish-American labor economist Felix
Gross in his ideas for regional federation in eastern
Europe. Critical of internationalists seeking to base
postwar order on improved (military) security mechanisms,
Gross stressed the the need for comprehensive social
security at both the national and international levels.
Social reforms were necessary to attain the "freedom from
fear" called for in the 1941 Atlantic Charter, for "fear
born of insecurity has determined the behavior of the masses
11of common people." The demise of the Nazi order would 
provide an opportunity to mold new social forms that may 
inaugurate a new era of stability and of peaceful evolution. 
Such changes could not be effected through the structure of 
small nationalistic states. Rather, only a socially 
progressive and democratic federalism offered an "oppor­
tunity to develop the potentialities of these nations" (36).
The future of eastern Europe was a recurrent theme in 
the literature on postwar order. Gross developed a concept 
of "integral federalism" as a principle extending federal 
and social democratic values to every aspect of political, 
economic, and social life in eastern Europe. Unlike the
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British socialists, Gross defined federalism in terms of 
centralizing and decentralizing principles of organization 
between and within states. Externally, he envisaged an 
interstate regional federation that recognized the 
"functional interdependence" of the participating states. 
Internally, federalization meant state decentralization in 
favor of regional and local autonomies, including self- 
government particularly in cultural matters for national 
"minorities." This was tantamount to transforming the 
national states into an "inner federation of autonomous 
provinces" in which the provinces themselves would "not be 
organized in a centralistic way" (44) . With decentralization 
and the transfer of state authority to larger federal 
institutions, the sovereignties of the national states would 
be substantially curtailed. Economically, federalization 
meant the abolition of tariff walls and the formation of an 
single economic unit of the member states. On the social 
level it implied a harmonization of social patterns within 
the union. Gross's "integral federalism" went farthest among 
the idealists in embracing autochthonous regionalism by 
empowering societal structures at the expense of centralized 
state power.
The main pitfall of federalist plans for union was 
their aspirational character. Federalists imputed a sense of 
community and stability among the units to be federated 
which was either unrealistic or simply not there. No amount 
of rational planning or constitution drafting of the 
postwar order that did not take into account the social and 
cultural habits of the people could be expected to work.
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Gross's concept of "inner federation" was perhaps alone
among the idealists in addressing, if not developing, this
issue. For the others, internationalist Percy E. Corbett’s
remark seemed apt: "Federal union cannot be imposed
12simply because it is rationally indicated."
Internationalism
If the federalists had expectations of major social and 
political changes following the war, then the internation­
alists waxed more sober and restrained. As for the most 
part American liberals, they were rooted in a western legal 
tradition whose international law and organization they 
sought to revitalize through reform. In general, they
favored a world organization that was a stronger version of
13the League of Nations, or a league "with teeth." They were
opposed to regionalism as a primary basis for world
organization but explored ways of including or containing it
within a universal organization.
English jurist J.L. Brierly reaffirmed the principal
function of international law as marking out the "sphere
within which each state may exercise its governmental powers
without trespassing on the sphere of other states, and thus
make it possible for a plurality of independent states to
coexist in the same world without colliding with one 
14another. This view was echoed by a gathering of prominent 
North American international law teachers and advocates 
which pledged "to aid in 'revitalizing and strengthening 
international law' and 'in laying the bases of a just and
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enduring world peace securing order under law to all 
15nations'." This community of internationalists identified 
six premises for establishing and maintaining an effective 
legal order in a world of states. The premises illustrate 
vintage internationalist doctrine:
1. The States of the world form a community, and the 
protection and advancement of the common interests of 
their peoples require effective organization of the 
Community of States.
2. The law of the Community of States is international 
law. The development of an adequate system of 
international law depends upon continuous collaboration 
by States to promote the common welfare of all peoples 
and to maintain just and peaceful relations between all 
States.
3. The conduct of each State in its relations with 
other States and with the Community of States is 
subject to international law, and the sovereignty of a 
State is subject to the limitations of international 
law.
4. Any failure of a States to carry out its obligations 
under international law is a matter of concern to the 
Community of States.
5. Any use of force or any threat to use force by a 
State in its relations with another State is a matter 
of concern to the Community of States.
6. The maintanence of just and peaceful relations 
between States requires orderly procedures by which 
international situation can be readjusted as need 
arises.
The conference predictably proposed that the coming
world organization be organized on a universal basis. It
also suggested, if negatively, that a general organization
"not preclude the organization of groups of states on the
basis of regional propinquity, historical relationship, or
mutuality of interest, for purposes not inconsistent with
17those of the universal organization." This cautious 
acceptance of interstate regionalism reflected the wariness
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and uncertainty with which regionalism was viewed.
Internationalists were more openly disdainful of the
federalists who called for a world government. Positive law
theorist Hans Kelsen considered it unrealistic to think that
individual states would unite into a world organization
whose authority "would be on par with the legal order of the
18states themselves." That effectively meant a world state,
and such a centralized structure would mean the end of
international law as it was known. A more realistic world
order could be sought "only within the framework of
international law, that is to say, by an organization which
in the degree of its centralization does not exceed that
19compatible with the nature of international law." A legal 
conservative, Kelsen concluded that any scheme for postwar 
order
should involve no revolution of international 
relations but reform of their order by an 
improvement of the social technique prevailing in 
this field. The specific technique of the order 
regulating the relations between States is the 
Law of Nations. He who wishes to approach the aim 
of world peace in a realistic way must take this 
problem ... as one of a slow and ggeady perfection 
of the international legal order.
Kelsen argued with most internationalists that the main task
of a world organization was to prevent wars, the greatest of
all social evils. What the League of Nations accomplished in
this respect was admittedly little; but, Kelsen stated, "the
21dream of a World State is certainly too much." In 
espousing a positive law which in the last resort was based 
on force or command, he and most internationalists 
recommended institutionalizing sanctions as means of
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enforcement. Specifically, Kelsen favored the establishment
<of an international court with "compulsory jurisdiction,"
which in his view was "the indispensable prerequisite for
221:he achievement of any further progress."
When probing beyond the generalities of conference
declarations, one finds more substantial materijal on
regionalism and functionalism in the individual writings of
internationalists. Internationalists tended to agree on the
value and need for functional cooperation. Percy Corbett and
James T. Shotwell among others encouraged the formation of
international agencies as vehicles that would foster greater
23"'confidence in supranational institutions." Regionalism,
however, was a somewhat more problematical issue. Like the
idea of a world state, regional political groupings
potentially threatened the very nature of an international
community of sovereign states. Shotwell warned that the
"danger inherent in the growth of regional organizations
(was) that they may weaken, instead of strengthen, the
general system upon which the peace of the world finally 
24depends." Pittman Potter stated that regional groupings
could become a new form of isolationism and separatism which
may result in the "setting up of large blocks of nations
against one another, or even of continents and hemispheres
25one against the other." Percy Corbett cautioned that
without an "overall co-ordination, the regional groups might
become merely larger bases of attempted autarchy" and that
"a balance of federations, if left to itself, would be as
26unstable as a balance of states has proved to be."
Most internationalists for these reasons opposed
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regionalism as a primary basis for structuring postwar
order. But they could hardly ignore it. For those not
opposed to regionalism on principle, they sought ways of
including or containing it in a world organization based on
international law and organization. Corbett suggested that a
balance of regional groupings of states within a universal
"co-ordinating organization" in the form of a world
commonwealth may be the best structure for world order. He
called for a world organization that was
neither universal federation nor yet simply 
league. It combines the beginnings of a World 
Commonwealth with other, limited, groupings of 
states around regional or other special interests.
...We must contemplate a world order embracing 
associations of states varying all the way from 
close-knit federal unions in some parts of Europe 
to the something less than confederation of Pan 
America.
Brierly also saw room for incorporating regionalist as
well as functionalist features into the international
system. He admitted that rules devised for universal
application assumed a uniformity among political units and
their interests which often did not exist. It is more
likely, he stated,
that the line of progress will be found to lie 
in the finding of particular solutions for 
particular problems; in the constitution, for 
example of special regimes for special regions 
of the world which are of concern to more nations 
than one..., or in the setting up of special 
functional organs with powers appropriate to the 
particular subject matter which they are charged 
to regulate.
Brierly shared the paramount concern of 
internationalists for security. He envisaged a system of 
interlocking regional arrangements within a wider world
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organization whose principal mandate was coordinating global
security. Security itself consisted of many problems where
"different conditions, political, economic, or strategic, in
different regions of the world make different arrangements 
29necessary." Wolfgang Friedmann went further and favored 
the development of a combination of general and regional 
collective security within the framework of a general 
organization, but in which "primary obligations (would)
30devolve on the regional group immediately concerned... ." 
Similarly, Shotwell admitted that "regional organizations
might constitute a first line of defense against local wars
. . . 31arising out of the quarrels of neighboring nations... ."
Shotwell addressed the problem of the relationship
between regional (and functional) organizations and the
general organization. He advanced the formula of "varied
responsibility" where, on the basis of "enlightened national
interest," states would participate in the organization of
the peace in multiple ways but always within the framework
32of a world organization. He suggested that functional
agencies devoted to matters of health and welfare may "be
more effectively administered from other centers than that
33of the political organization." He acknowledged that this 
formula departed from the letter and spirit League of 
Nations' Covenant, which was based on the traditional theory 
of the equality of all states and the universal obligation. 
Citing the American federal system as a model, he envisaged 
a structure that was prefigured in the European inter-war 
cooperation initiatives in the form of the Little Entente 
and the Locarno treaty system.
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Friedmann and, in particular, Quincy Wright gave more
weight to the regional concept than other internationalists.
Friedmann questioned the very basis of the "national State
as the limit of political, military and economic 
35sovereignty." He saw regional units taking on not only
security but also economic, cultural, and political
responsibilities. Economically, they would develop otherwise
unused energies and resources. Politically, they were a
means with which to redress the imbalance between large and
small states:
If regional groups are developed as more closely 
knit units, within a wider general organisation, 
they can do much more than offset the preponderance 
of Big Powers. They can play a vital part in 
widening the exclusively national horizon, in 
economic planning, cultural relations and political 
allegiance. Indeed, without this process of 
education and mental change, reform and change 
by institutions and constitutions will remain futile.
If Friedmann gave regional organization within a world­
wide organization greater weight than most international­
ists, then Quincy Wright pushed the interestate regional 
idea even further. In his magisterial A Study of War, which 
was published in 1942 after some sixteen years of research,
he downplayed the significance of and was ambivalent towards 
37regionalism. In the work, he developed Woodrow Wilson's 
view that the balance of power system had become obsolete in 
the 20th century. Great Britain's capacity to act as a 
balancer had passed and the United States was not prepared, 
by dint of historical precedent, to assume that role. The 
rise of industrialism, nationalism, constitutionalism, 
democracy, and international organization in the 19th
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century further impaired the assumptions upon which the
balance theory rested. Also, military technology and warfare
had now made all states vulnerable to attack. He concluded
that it was therefore
unlikely that the problem of a just territorial 
distribution can be solved permanently or be 
assured a peaceful solution in the future under 
a balance-of-power system. Such a distribution 
can only be effected through invoking 'the 
organized opinion of mankind' [President Wilson] 
for the authoritative settlement of such issues as 
they arise, and such invocation is possible only 
through procedures functioning within an interna­
tional organization which has superseded the 
balance of power as the basic guaranty of state 
security (772-73).
Wright saw regionalism as a method of collective
security that sought to preserve the balance of power
system. Regional groupings were potentially hostile
continental blocs. At the same time, he also stated that the
interwar regional groupings in Europe had sought ways to
work within League of Nations in an arrangement that
reinforced the functioning of both organizations.
The Locarno, Scandinavian, Baltic, Balkan, and 
Little Entente groupings and, in the opinion of 
some, the British Commonwealth of Nations were 
juridically dependent upon the League of Nations, 
whose functioning they sought to strengthen in 
the 1920s. With the collapse of the League, these 
groupings tended to disintegrate, each state 
holding itself free to take positions in crises 
as the exigencies of balance-of-power politics 
required, with the result that most of them were 
occupied (778) .
Wright thought that the reduction in the number of 
states caused by regional groupings could make the 
international system more unstable. Yet he also saw that 
geographically separated regional "blocs" resembled buffer 
states "designed to keep the European great powers at arm's
55
length" (778). If regions depended solely on the balance of 
power formula, it would contribute to world instability. But 
if they organized themselves in the framework of a "world- 
confederation," they could succeed in reducing their 
dependence on a balance-of-power system (780, 1342-43).
Wright's contingent views on regionalism in The Study
of War were stated with an undertone of uncertainty about
its impact on international relations. During the war, he
was less ambivalent on the subject in his recommendations to
the Commission to Study the Organization of the Peace, a
public group of experts founded by Shotwell and Clark
3 8Eichelberger in the fall of 1939. He still believed that 
an effective world organization was one which continued to 
give national (and local) governments "primary legal 
authority within the territory of the respective States" 
(462). But the present stage of world history also required 
regional and functional structures along with the universal. 
He favored the creation of world regions organized into 
confederations or federations of states.
The national security of states still required respect 
and confidence in international law. But this could be 
attained in an increasingly interdependent world only 
through a "better organization of the world community"
(478). He criticized the equality-of-nations principle in 
international law as "dogma" that was either impracticable 
or undemocratic, as "it would greatly overweight the 
political influence of the citizens of small states" (489).
A better balance between large and small states could be 
achieved international organization allowed "for variations
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according to the traditions and needs of each region" (462).
With consent from a world assembly, regional organizations 
could be formed by groups of states for purposes of security 
and welfare. Each region would develop its own institutions 
in its own way and have "primary resposibility for 
maintaining order and facilitating political changes in the 
r e g i o n . (464). Regional organization would be subject to 
the competence of the universal organization in matters 
covered by a universal convenant. Specifically, regional 
authorities should be "subject to at least juridical 
control" by the universal authority, citing Briand's 
European Union proposal as being within the framework of the 
League as an example (477). Wright envisaged a world 
organized into seven regions based on, "without violating 
reasonably democratic procedures, technical and geographic 
rather than political or ideological considerations..."
(475). The regions were:
1) a European federation with a central police 
authority, posessing "adequate" power; legislature, 
representing both people and states; court, with the 
competence of declaring null and void any national laws 
"violating the fundamental rights guaranteed by the Union 
Constitution;" and powers extending to commerce and social 
reforms;
2) within Europe, a separate Danubian regional
39federation;
3) a Near Eastern region comprised mainly of the Muslim 
fragments of the Ottoman Empire but with "some representation" of
57
European great powers with territorial of historic interests 
in the region;
4) the Soviet Union, which constituted a region in 
itself;
5) the British Commonwealth of Nations. which 
constituted "not a region but an historic political 
grouping...;"
6) the American region organized along lines of the 
Pan-American treaties but also including Canada; and
7) a Far Eastern region organized according to the 
principles of a modified Washington Conference Treaty.
Wright also saw functional organizations supplementing 
regional organizations in his peace plan. Functional 
agencies were necessary in order to facilitate international 
cooperation in dealing with social problems and those of 
health and nutrition, commerce and raw materials, transit 
and communications, labor, and the colonies (466). His 
incorporation of regional, federal, and functional features 
within universal organization was a variant of Shotwell's 
principle of varied responsibility. In a study for the 
Commission dealing with the transition period to postwar
peace, he went somewhat beyond Shotwell in calling for new
. . 40political institutions that curtailed state sovereignties.
The institutions would be devoted to meeting the needs of
people over the needs of the national victor governments. He
argued his case for a European union "rest(ing) on a broad
basis of European opinion rather than upon contract among
national governments" (276). Incorporating and synthesizing
arguments advanced by federalists and functionalists, Wright
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the internationalist stated that postwar order should stress 
welfare over power through a democratic "regime of national 
governments, regional unions, and world institutions 
functioning with the consent of the governed..." (269).
Functionalism
The highest theoretical articulation of functionalism
as a principle of international organization was provided by
British political scientist David Mitrany in his A Working 
41Peace System. The functional idea was traceable to the 
emergence in the 19th and early 20th centuries of 
international technical, economic, and social agencies such 
as the International Postal Union (IPU), Danube River 
Commission, and International Labor Organization (ILO). 
Mitrany attempted to shift the focus of attention in the 
debate on organization from formal or constitutional 
approaches and divisive "high politics" issues to the task 
of meeting practical social and economic needs. The growing 
complexity and interdependence of modern life mandated 
transnational cooperation that was essentially nonpolitical 
in nature. If problems were assigned to specialists 
separated from national political concerns, it would be 
possible to achieve international integration in a growing 
number of sectors. Mitrany argued against both "traditional 
legalistic ideas" and a "forcibly created world state" in
42favor of a "low politics" approach to world organization. 
Such an approach represented a "working" peace system to the 
extent it overlayed "political divisions with a spreading
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web of international activities and agencies, in which the
interests and life of all the nations would be gradually 
43integrated."
Though conceived as a global process, functionalism did
not exclude cooperation on a regional basis. During the war,
Mitrany and a team of collaborators sought to apply the
functional approach to eastern, or Danubian, Europe in
particular. In late 1941, he helped establish an Economic
Research Group for southeastern Europe within the London-
based Political and Economic Planning (PEP). Its purpose was
to study working models for "regional cooperation in
pratical matters ... bent on improving the social life of
44the peoples of the region." One model project promoted by
the functionalists was a Danubian Tennessee Valley Authority
(TVA). For Mitrany, the central idea of such a project was
to isolate a field of activity and organize it under an
autonomous functional authority that left existing state
divisions and authorities intact except for the jurisdiction
of that particular function. Regional functional cooperation
thus allowed "established political units to follow new ways
45without doing violence to old sentiments." Mitrany 
believed it was the "only method likely to take root and 
bear fruit in soil so churned up by centuries of political 
passion and conflict as the Dan ubian region." Based on the 
foundations of the earlier Danube Commissions to which the 
states in the lower Danube transferred authority and from 
which they derived mutual benefit, Mitrany envisaged a 
"multi-purpose" semi-public authority charged with regional
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planning to improve navigation, flood control, irrigation,
46and the hydro-electric power supply.
Mitrany* s functional theory of international issued 
from the liberal idealistic tradition, but its 
organizational principle was not state-based. The idea of 
functional collaboration on a regional basis constituted 
interstate regionalism only to the extent contiguous states 
were left intact and agreed between themselves to relinquish 
authority in a given technical or socio-economic domain. 
Functionalists accepted the reality of the sovereign state 
and international system if with the long-term view of 
effecting a shift from inter-state to trans-state (i.e., 
transnational) relations as functional organization 
developed in international society.
Interstate regionalism as a theory of postwar order 
was an attempt by idealists in international relations to 
enhance the pre-war machinery of the classical international 
system of sovereign states with forms of regional (including 
functional) organization. As a relatively new concept in 
international organization, regionalism was perceived by 
internationalists as a potential threat to the universal 
principles of law and organization underlying the 
international system. They opposed regionalism as a primary 
basis for world organization. But the idea of grouping 
states into regional units as a first line of defense 
against aggression and for welfare purposes came to be 
accepted by most internationalists as long as such groupings 
remained subordinate to a universal organization.
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The sovereign state remained the point of reference if 
not central concern for internationalists, but they 
acknowledged with other idealists that security, economic, 
and even sociocultural concerns also interceded as a factor 
in support of regional organization. With the exception of 
the functionalists, idealists were caught on the horns of a 
dilemna defending a crisis-ridden state system while 
acknowledging that societial needs were not met or 
necessarily conceived in terms of that system. Some 
idealists went a considerable distance toward reconciling 
that dilemna by recognizing regional organization within the 
community of states.
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Germany, Italy, and the Soviet Union... . The 
reestablishment of a federation of the Danubian area 
within the general European federation may be 
desireable. While the limits of such a federation, 
both in area and in powers, would depend on the 
development of political circumstances, the inclusion 
of a restored Czechoslovakia, Poland, and Austria, 
as well as Hungary, Yugloslavia, and Rumania, might 
be desireable thus providing a great power ... 
contributing with Germany, France, Italy, and Great 
Britain to the European union, and maintaining 
sympathetic connections with the Soviet and Near 
Eastern regions.
40Quincy Wright, "Political Conditions of the Transition 
Period," International Conciliation. 379 (April 1942).
41 .Mitrany, A Working Peace System: An Argument for the 
Functional Development of International Organization 
(London, 1943). See James Avery Joyce, ed., World 
Organization: Federal or Functional? (London, 1945).
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Ibid.. p. 6.
^ Ibid. . p. 7.
44 [David Mitrany, ed.], Economic Development of Southeast 
Europe (London, 1945), p. 12. Rumanian-born Mitrany had 
previously written on the economic dislocations caused by 
the break-up of the Habsburg Empire following World War I in 
The Effect of the War in Southeastern Europe (New Haven, 
1936). He suggested that the break-up of the empire "may 
have been an inevitable preliminary, a necessary 
equalization, a levelling of the ground for new 
foundations," for in "that region political and economic 
division ever was, and remains, as much a challenge for co­
operation as an obstacle to it" (241).
^David Mitrany, "A T.V.A. for the Danube Valley," Nov. 1944 
typescript in David Mitrany Collection, Manuscripts & 
Archives, The London School of Economics and Political 
Science, p. 2. The Collection contains a number of related 
materials on this subject, mainly in the form of lecture
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notes, private memoranda, and letters, including a 4-page 
"Note on a Danubian Road Transport Authority." See also 
George Kiss, "TVA on the Danube?," The Geographical Review. 
38 (1947).
46Mitrany, "A T.V.A. for the Danube Valley," p. 13f. For 
other examples of proposed functional collaboration on a 
regional and continental basis, see A Canadian Economist, 
"Economic Reconstruction in Europe," International Affairs. 
20 (1944).
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CHAPTER III
HEGEMONIAL REGIONALISM
The second identifiable theory of regionalism during 
the war was associated with the "realist" school of power 
politics. As we have seen, realists claimed that power and 
not a rationally-willed order was the determinant of world 
politics. They saw the major powers as the architects and 
arbiters of the postwar peace whether or not a universal 
organization existed. In a world they claimed was moving 
toward larger economic and political configurations, 
realists saw smaller states tied in regional groupings as 
spheres of influence to major powers. Both national and 
world security were assured through such combinations of 
geo-strategic forces.
The realist school represented a mixed bag of modern 
ideas that drew both on the pre-Enlightenment thought of 
Machiavelli and Hobbes and the Enlightenment afterglow of 
19th century historicism (principally through Hegel and his 
right-wing followers), positivism, and social Darwinism. But 
the most original theoretical articulation of realism during 
the war came from an independent political thinker, Hans 
Morgenthau, who essentially eshewed these ideologies while
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affirming the non-rational structure of social and political
reality. His Scientific Man vs. Power Politics was a
brilliant if trenchant treatise in political thought based
on lectures delivered during the war at the New School for
Social Research on "Liberalism and Foreign Policy" and the
University of Chicago on "The Scientific Delusion and the
Problem of International Order.
Unlike nature, which was susceptible to laws of modern
science, human society was not infinitely malleable. Society
had a character that was contingent (i.e, unpredictable)
because it was rooted in a trait essential to man, namely
his non-rational nature and faculties. While not eschewing
reason, Morgenthau argued that a rationalism that deified
reason was itself inherently irrational. Reason, he argued,
far from following its own inherent impulses, is 
driven toward its goal by the irrational forces 
the ends of which it serves. ...Clamoring for 
reason to extend its dominion over all human 
affairs and expecting it to reach this goal by 
its own inner force is the most futile, yet most 
conspicuous, social practice of the age. ...The 
triumph of reason is, in truth, the triumph of 
irrational forces which succeed in using the 
processes of reason to satisfy themselves (154, 155).
Morgenthau held that while politics must be understood
through reason, which was abstract, it was not in reason
that it found its model. Politics had its model in social
reality and the unpredictable character of social life. "The
principles of reason are always simple, consistent, and
abstract," he stated, while "the social world is always
complicated, incongruous, and concrete" (10). The western
liberal's belief in scientific rationalism as the ground of
action in politics was the main source of the contemporary
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crisis. Morgenthau's antidote to the crisis was the re­
examination of social and political problems in light of the 
pre-rationalist western tradition. And this process would 
have to begin, he said, with "the assumption that power 
politics, rooted in the lust for power which is common to 
all men, is for this reason inseparable from social life 
itself" (9).
With Machiavelli, Morgenthau accepted the practice of
politics as essentially amoral. "Politics is a struggle for
power over men, and whatever its ultimate aim may be, power
is its immediate goal and the modes of acquiring,
maintaining, and demonstrating it determined the technique
of political action" (195). Yet Morgenthau was not
insensitive to the tension between ethics and human action,
"of the tragic presence of evil in all political action..."
(202). With E.H. Carr and Reinhold Niebuhr, he held that
political action could at best achieve an uneasy alliance
between morality and power:
Whatever choice we make, we must do evil while we 
try to do good; for we must abandon one moral end 
in favor of another. While trying to render to 
Caesar what is Caesar's and to God what is God's, 
we will at best strike a precarious balance which 
will ever waver between both, never completely 
satisfying either. In the extreme, we will abandon 
one completely in order fully to satisfy the other.
The typical solution, however, will be a compromise 
which puts the struggle at rest without putting 
conscience at ease (190).
When it came to a hard choice, however, the realist in
Morgenthau instructed him that man had "no choice between
power and the common good" and that to "act successfully,
that is, according to the rules of the political art, (was)
political wisdom." For Morgenthau, moral courage meant
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knowing "with despair that the political act (was)
inevitably evil," but acting nevertheless, and that moral
judgement was the ability to choose the least evil expedient
action. It was in the combination of political wisdom, moral
courage, and prudential judgement that man reconciled his
political nature with his moral destiny. "That this
conciliation," he concluded, "(was) nothing more than a
modus vivendi, uneasy, precarious, and even paradoxical, can
disappoint only those who prefer to gloss over and to
distort the tragic contraditions of human existence with the
soothing logic of a specious concord" (203).
Morgenthau*s open-ended if also pessimistic view of
life and politics equipped him with the ability.grapple
A
with, if not transcend, the charge of ethical nihilism that
was leveled at the realist school by, among others, E.H.
Carr. In contrast to Morgenthau, most realists during the
war defined morality and power politics in less ambiguous
terms of geography, raison d '6tat, and geopolitics. They
owed an intellectual debt less to the Greco-Christian
tradition or such post-modern social philosophers such as
Reinhold Niebuhr who in part shaped Morgenthau*s thinking
than to Machiavelli, Hobbes, and the 19th century thinkers.
In reasserting that "Machiavelli's method (was) the method
of science applied to politics," positivist writer James
Burnham heralded the elitist and proto-fascist theories of
Wilfred Pareto, Gaetano Mosca, Georges Sorel, and Robert
2
Michels as exemplars of the new Machiavellianism. Apart 
from the new Machiavellians, American realists were also the
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intellectual progency of late 19th and early 20th century
theorists of environmental determinism.
Prominent among them were Friedrich Ratzel (1844-1904),
German founder of anthropo-geography who coined the term
Lebensraum (living space)r and his more radical geopolitical
successors, the Swedish Rudolph Kjellen (1864-1922) and Karl
Haushofer (1869-1946), the servant of German national 
3socialism. In brief, Ratzel saw the modern state in
Hegelian-Darwinian terms as an organism that either
prospered or died. The state either evolved in a Darwinian
process to higher forms or else devolved into decadence.
For a state to be in balance or equilibrium was seen as
static and meant loss of character or vitality. Kjellen, in
his Per Staat als Lebensform (1917), held up the state as an
organism and whose principal attribute was power and
categoric imperative expansion. Karl Haushofer assumed
Kjellen's mantle in 1922 and became director of the Institut
fur Geopolitik at University of Munich in 1933. He was a
principal drafter of geographic and historical arguments in
4the service of the rising Nazi state.
A second branch of environmental determinism derived 
from Anglo-American writers such as British historian Henry 
Thomas Buckle (1821-1862), the American naval officer and 
historian Alfred Thayer Mahan (1840-1914), British 
geographer Halford John Mackinder (1861-1947), and American
5
geographer and explorer Ellsworth Huntington (1876-1947). 
Buckle and Huntington emphasized the importance of climatic 
factors on political behavior. Mahan and Mackinder related 
geographical factors to world politics by emphasizing the
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historical importance of, respectively, seafaring power and 
continental power. Mahan wrote on the naval history of 
Great Britain and the United States and identified six 
factors affecting the development and maintenance of sea 
power among states, namely, geographical position, the 
physical "conformation" of the state, extent of territory, 
population, national character, and governmental character.
Mackinder had perhaps the most direct influence on 
realist thought in general and east European organization in 
particular. Writing after the turn of the century, he 
stressed the increasing importance of landpower with the 
development of more effective transportation and 
communication. In 1904, he argued that history's 
"geographical pivot" was located in the landlocked Eurasian 
"heartland," whose restless, nomadic peoples had always 
placed pressure on the peoples settled in the rimlands or 
littorals. He expanded on this idea after World War I in his 
Democratic Ideals and Reality, whose thinking was rekindled 
by his students during World War II. Mackinder viewed the 
eastern part of Europe as a transition zone between between 
the Eurasian "heartland" and the "marginal crescent" of 
peninsular Europe. It also was also a divide between two 
cultures. He stated World War I was essentially a contest 
between German and Slav and a buffer zone was needed between 
the two. It was "a vital necessity that there should be a 
tier of independent states between Germany and Russia."^
The extent to which fear of Bolshevism also played a factor 
in his thinking at the time in conceiving of^region as a
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"cordon sanitaire" against Soviet power is open to question.
More fundamentally, he argued that in spite or because of
the ethnic diversity of the region,
the peoples of the Middle Tier —  Poles, Bohemians, 
Hungarians, Rumanians, Serbs, Bulgars, Greeks —  
are much too unlikely to federate for any purpose 
except defense, yet they are all too different from 
both Germans and Russians that they may be trusted 
to resist any new organization of either great  ^
neighbor making towards empire in eastern Europe.
The German and Anglo-American branches of environmental
determinism tended to divide the realist school into two
camps during the war. Political geographers found themselves
closer to Anglo-American theorists and were critical of the
adherents of geopolitics, who were closer to the pre-
Haushofer German school. Political geographer Isaiah Bowman,
President of both the American Geographical Society and
Johns Hopkins University and a key State Department advisor
on postwar issues, criticized geopolitics for its
essentially immoral character. Geopolitics presented a
"distorted view of the historical, political, and
geographical relations of the world and its parts" and
contained a "poisonous self-destroying principle: when
international interests conflict or overlap, might shall
decide the issue. Against 'geopolitical needs' democracy
o
opposes moral rights."
In spite of Bowman's critique, geopolitical ideas 
dominated the realist school during the war if perhaps more 
by force of argument than in number of adherents. Its most 
prominent representative was Nicholas J. Spykman, founder 
and first director in 1935 of the Yale Institute of 
International Studies. A disllusioned supporter of the
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League of Nations, Spykman found a new rationale for world
politics in the combination of power and geography. He
held that the power of a state was like a dynamic, organic
force and that "other things being equal, all states (had) a
g
tendency to expand."
Spykman dismissed Haushofer's geopolitics as
10"geographical metaphysics." But the fact that certain 
writers had distorted the meaning of the term geopolitics 
was "no valid reason for condemning its method and material" 
(7). Geopolitical analysis dealt with changing, dynamic 
relationships and was preferable to a merely descriptive and 
static geographic approach. "Geographic position and 
physical power are facts to be reckoned with in the 
international world" and geopolitics was available as a 
"technique ... for the more effective understanding of these 
facts" (Ibid.). Geopolitics provided the possibility of 
considering a state's security problems "in geographic terms 
in such a way that the conclusions (could) be of direct and 
immediate use to the statesmen whose duty it is to formulate 
foreign policy" (5). It was in this context that the region 
acquired special geopolitical importance. Regions were "not 
geographic regions defined by a fixed and permanent 
topography but areas determined on the one hand by geography 
and on the other by dynamic shifts in the centers of power" 
(6) .
In his principal war-time work, Spykman criticized both 
isolationists and internationalists in arguing for a policy 
based on renewed concepts of national interest and balance
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11of power. The primary characteristic of international 
political society was the independence and sovereignty of 
states that had "no central authority to preserve law and 
order" (7). To assure their survival, states had to make 
"the preservation or improvement of their power position a 
principal objective of their foreign policy." (Ibid.). The 
postwar world would not substantially differ from the pre­
war order, and international society would continue to 
operate in "a world of power politics" (Ibid.). For the 
United States, this meant formulating a geo-political 
"strategy for both war and peace based on the implications 
of its geographic location in the world" (8). Although 
Spykman evaluated power in terms of resources and strategy, 
he believed that "all civilized life rest(ed) in the last 
instance on power" (11). Considerations of morality or 
values of justice, fairness, and tolerance, were subservient 
to the power objective. For Spykman, "the search for power 
is not made for the achievement of moral values;" rather, 
"moral values are used to facilitate the achievement of 
power" (18).
This approach to political reality and the problem of
postwar order was echoed, if less stridently, by Robert
Strausz-Hup&, a leading realist theorist based at the
University of Pennsylvania. His point of departure was
Mackinder's thesis of modern technology revolutionizing our
12concept of space. The world had become globalized by 
technology and its demands, which enhanced the value of 
strategic space, placing "an increasingly higher value on 
mere spaciousness" (190). Politically, this accounted for
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and pointed to the further growth of state-based
concentrations of global power. According to Strausz-Hup6,
productive capacity, self-sufficiency in raw 
materials, and defense in depth ... do not only 
call for large size but lure the large state on 
to further expansion at the expense of smaller 
nations whose forces of resistance are limited.
...The history of our times appears to reflect, 
with malignant fatality, the trend toward empires 
and super-states predicted by the Ratzels,
Spenglers, and Mackinders (190-91).
This historical trend drove "men's thoughts about the
world's political organization into yet untried channels"
(193). The forms this organization assumed among realists in
the context of their search for a structure of postwar order
may be termed "hegemonial regionalism." It is a "great power
orbit" theory of postwar order that tended to cluster small
states into regional groupings under the suzerainty or
control of a geographically proximate major power. The basic
concept of larger states exercising power over smaller
peripheral political units was hardly a new phenomenon. What
was distinctive during the war-time theorizing on postwar
order was its justification in terms of the regional
concept. An affinity of interests was imputed between the
smaller, geographically-related units that both tied and
distinguished them as a group from a neighboring hegemonial
power. Cooperation and voluntary integration around a benign
power were implicit in the regional idea.
Mackinder first raised this concept in his thoughts on
post-World War I order. He held that world order could be
best maintained through one or more powers commissioned in
various areas as a "trustee for humanity." He volunteered
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the United States and the British Empire as world trustees
"for the peace of the ocean and of the straits connecting
the basins of the o c e a n a  step which he justified as a
13mere "regularization of existing facts." For Europe, 
Mackinder's proposal for a "belt of buffer states" in 
eastern Europe, gave birth to the concept of a region as a 
glacis. or cordon sanitaire, between power constellations.
A contending example of hegemonial regionalism debated 
during World War I was the German-inspired "Mitteleuropa" 
plan. Spurred by the Allied blockade of the Axis powers, 
Friedrich Naumann, a German liberal politician inspired by 
economic rather than Pan-German interests, advanced a plan
to integrate the German and Austrian empires into a German-
. . 14centered economic and political union. Naumann contended
that the creation of such a central European unit would lead
to the renunciation of the idea of German nationalist 
15expansion. An example and precedent for hegemonial 
regionalism in the Americas was the relationship between the 
United States and the smaller American republics. The idea 
and even urgency of "Pan-American union," which had a 
history extending to the 19th century, gained in currency 
during the 1930s and early 1940s.
Acknowledging the global trends toward economic 
integration and political consolidation, geopolitical 
realists maintained that regionalism as a principle in 
international relations was "the attempt to organize large 
areas of the world —  usually but not necessarily 
continental in extent —  in political, economic, and
16cultural units under the leadership of a dominant power."
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Within this framework, postwar order would result from a
concert or balance of great power regional systems which, as
building blocks, would serve to maintain the peace. Such a
system was designed to thwart any aspirations of a single
power for world hegemony. It would pool economic and
military resources to reflect the strategic interdependence
that can preserve the national independences of both the
major and affiliated lesser powers. There was little or no
need in such a scheme for a universal organization. At best,
a general organization could consist of a forum or coalition
of the major powers. As William T.R. Fox, an associate of
Spykman's Yale institute, stated, "effective collaboration
to check aggression must be built on the distribution of
power in the world we will have to live in. In this world a
self-contained coalition of first-rank powers must be the
17nucleus of a general security program."
The idea of a western hemispheric regional alliance did
not sit well with globally-minded realists, particularly
after America's entry in the war. Spykman viewed pan-
Americanism as a product of a new, larger scale
isolationism. In an globalized world where the United States
was militarily engaged in both Europe and the Pacific,
"hemisphere defense through hemisphere isolation became the
18new streamlined version of the old isolationist position."
In a similar vein, Eugene Staley argued that globalization 
of war and economic and technological change required a 
commensurate approach in meeting the problems. "On this 
basis, it is clear that continents, as such, have no very
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great claim to be regarded as the natural building blocks of
19postwar order."
Instead of casting the United States as a regional
power, Spykman, Strausz-Hup6 and other American realists
saw the United States as the world's premier arbiter of the
peace after the war. It was time for the United States to
definitively shed its isolationism. As a power endowed with
abundant resources, favorable geographic position, and a
benign attitude towards the world, the United States was
best suited to shape the postwar order. In the words of
Strausz-Hup6, the United States had
a peremptory interest in enforcing the creation 
and maintenance of a universal order... Its great 
size, space deepness, and resources, its possession 
of all the geographical perquisites of land, air, 
and sea power make the United States a state 
capable of exerting that measure of international 
control needed to guard the community of nations 
against the ever-present minority of would-be 
aggressors... Space is power, and the space 
realities of the U.S. endow it with the attributes 
of beneficent leadership.
Spykman assumed.postwar world would still be comprised 
A
of independent sovereign states. At the same time, he
questioned the viability of small states and prized the
potential of an American-British hegemony within a wider
21balance of power system. The idea of an Anglo-American 
condominuin was popularized in the early 1940s before the 
Soviet Union and United States became belligerent in the 
war. Unlike Streit's "Union Now" scheme, Spykman did not see 
an Anglo-American union as the nucleus of world order, 
federated or not, but as part of a wider system of global 
security. United States policy was to be guided by a 
strategy that demanded "the preservation of a balance of
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power in Europe and Asia..." (465). This precluded a
regionally united Europe. A postwar Europe federation would
be against United States' interests in a balance system. "A
federal Europe would constitute an agglomeration of force
that would completely alter our significance as an Atlantic
power and greatly weaken our position in the Western
22Hemisphere" (466). Nor did his system of balance mean 
the outright hegemony of Europe by one or two of the major 
powers. Rather, he argued for a relatively weak Europe in 
the form of a European "League of Nations" composed, 
however, of more or less equal political units. Creating 
equal units meant breaking up large powers such as Germany 
and the Soviet Union and combining the smaller states "into 
larger federations which will preserve the cultural autonomy 
of the component parts, but which will be strong enough to 
discourage thoughts of easy conquest" (466).
In the spirit of Mackinder, Spykman believed the main 
problem in Europe was balancing Germany and Russia. Ruling 
out a common frontier between them, Spykman revived 
Mackinder's idea of an east European buffer belt, only this 
time consisting not of separated states but a single 
political unit. He favored "a great eastern European 
federation from the Baltic to the Mediterranean" 
supplemented by "a British-Scandinavian group around the 
North Sea and the Baltic, and a Latin group around the 
Mediterranean" (467). Thus, while opposing a European-wide 
regional union, he favored sub-regional groupings within 
Europe as the way to achieve a power balance on the
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continent. He was not sanguine, however, that such units of
approximately equal size and strength could be realized.
Barring this, he thought an enhanced balance of power regime
for Europe could be created in the form of a regional League
of Nations with the United States as an extra-regional
member (468).
Spykman's regional concept did not extend beyond
Europe. He did not develop it into a general structure for
postwar order. In a world of independent states whose basic
structure was unlikely to change in the postwar world, he
inclined toward a system of collective security guaranteed
by the major powers, preferably the United States and
Britain. The major powers were regional powers by virtue of
their strategic position, interests, and ability to extend
23"protective guarantees" to the smaller states. But this
was done less in the context of a regionalist structure of
postwar order than "on the separate calculation by each of
24the great powers of its own national interest."
Hegemonial regionalism as a great power orbit theory 
of political organization was developed more fully by 
Strausz-Hup6 and the journalist and public philosopher, 
Walter Lippmann. In 1918, Lippmann had been a member of 
President Wilson's so-called "group of experts" that helped 
prepare the Paris peace settlement, at which time he 
reportedly drafted eight of Wilson's "Fourteen Points." 
During the interwar period, he came to the realization that 
^hniversal League commitment to collective security was a 
mirage. "By preferring peace in general to a specific peace, 
President Wilson in effect forgot about Germany," he stated.
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It was a mistake to have dissolved "the coalition which had
won the war and could have alone perpetuated the 
25settlement." The next postwar settlement, he averred, had
to be based on the combined power of the allies in the
framework of a given state's realistic balance between power
on the one hand and commitments on the other as both of
these related to areas of vital interests.
In his widely-read U.S. Foreign Policy: Shield of the
Republic. Lippmann promoted a postwar order based both on a
"nuclear alliance" between the three major powers —  the
United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union —  and a
26western hemisphere security zone. Fearing that an Anglo-
American vs. Soviet confrontation in Europe as well as Asia
would lead to World War III, Lippmann held it essential to
include Russia in a three-power pact that could serve as a
27core for a possible "wider association of nations" (168).
In order to avoid such a confrontation in Europe, he 
proposed, like Spykman and an array of postwar thinkers, a 
neutral border zone between the "Atlantic community" and 
Soviet power that extended from Finland to Turkey (157f.). 
Poland and the Danubian and Balkan states were unlikely to 
organize themselves independently of the Soviet Union 
and would most likely fall into the latter's sphere of 
influence. But this did not preclude their "neutralization" 
as a safeguard against both East-West conflict and their 
satellitization by the Soviets. This idea again reflected 
Mackinder's idea of an east European "buffer" while also 
serving realist opposition to a united and independent
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Europe.
Lippmann developed a more sophisticated regional plan
toward the end of the war. The emerging relationship of
world political forces pointed toward two major and three
minor power constellations that could serve as strategic
nodal points or zones of global security. The United States
was consolidating her strategic and diplomatic position not
in the Western Hemisphere but Atlantic Community. The
second major power constellation was emerging in a Soviet-
led orbit that now included eastern Europe. Lippmann's
secondary security zones were located in Asia and Near East,
consisting of a Chinese orbit centered in east Asia, a
Moslem constellation centered in the Near East, and an
Indian-led Hinduized region in South Asia. In an apparent
departure from realist orthodoxy, he saw the power
components of these constellations not in terms of a state's
material power attributes, but as nations and communities
emerging dynamically into ever larger regional groupings.
The process was not top-down but one of development upward.
Lippmann doubted that some sixty-odd separate states could
form a world-wide organization for the maintenance of peace.
He contended that individual states had to first "combine in
the their neighborhoods," followed by larger communities and
constellations, which could then participate in a world
society. In this building-block process, each state would
28recognize that it belonged to one larger security area. 
Without elaboration, Lippmann considered not only states 
but "historic communities" as partners in the integration 
process, which itself was not defined. But in axju^ing
against a general organization as a starting point, he
stated that:
we have to reverse the Wilsonian pattern of 
collective security. We cannot build a universal 
society from the top downwards. We must build up 
to it from the existing national states and 
historic communities. That, I think, is what we 
must learn from the great experiment at Geneva 
and from its failure. We have, I am convinced, to 
learn it thoroughly. For we cannot afford to fail 
again.
Strausz-Hup& had also identified several "geographical
nucleii of power" in his conception of postwar order. The
American nucleus, however, was the first among equals,
singularly capable of exercising the global "balancing and
stabilizing control." This was no simplistic brief for world
domination, he argued, but a recognition that the United
States "had a preemptory interest in enforcing the creation
and maintenance of a universal order ... (whose) security
will utlimately depend on armed force, as does the security
30of any political system." At the end of the war, he 
recognized that the world system would not be multipartite, 
but bipolar. This structure would work against the 
possibility of a future global integration of several power 
centers because it reduced the basis for compromise. Rather, 
military preparedness would become "the indispensable 
guarantee of security and hence peace" and there would be a
disincentive "to dismantle a compact security arrangement
. . . . . 31fortified by a solid aggregation of client states."
In response to the stalemate that would ensue from this
postwar structure, Strausz-Hup6 developed a regional concept
that departed from the realists' "great power orbit" theory
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and broached the third, or autochthonous, theory of 
regionalism. Dividing the world into orbital zones, he now 
argued, until no small power existed outside a great power's 
sphere of interest entailed a "loss of 'play,' without which 
not only engine parts but also parts of a state system are 
exposed to intolerable friction" (35). With the fate of 
eastern Europe perhaps on his mind, the Viennese-born 
scholar-strategist called for the integration of small 
states into independent supranational units outside the 
security spheres of the great powers. Regionalism was now 
viewed as a third alternative for small states faced with 
choices between being placed in a great power orbit vs. 
isolation on the one hand or collaborating within an 
international organization vs. submission to a single power 
on the other.
Strausz-Hup& probed regionalism as an idea that went 
beyond concepts of power and geopolitics. He now considered 
it a mistake to confuse a region with "orbit," "bloc," or 
"zone," which were euphemisms for domination. His focus 
shifted to view regions as multinational human societies 
existing in defined time and space. He observed that a 
region was defined by sets of "affinities" composed of a 
distinctive blend of geographical, economical, cultural, and 
historical characteristics. "The regional affinities of 
western Europe lie in its economic interdependence, Atlantic 
outlook, and cultural experience" (273), he affirmed. And in 
spite of
political anatagonisms, the peoples of the Danubian 
basin and the Arab lands of the Middle East are 
each drawn together by a common or similar geo-
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graphical and shared historical experience. The 
accent may lie on this or that unifying factor. The
fact is that among these races the idea of regional
unity has sturdily survived long periods of 
fragmentation and foreign domination (273-74).
The regional affinities were the lost "play" factor in 
politics. Not recognizing this factor would adversely affect 
the stability of the great powers. Although he did not 
develop'this idea, Strausz-Hup6 described regionalism as a 
"comparatively recent phenomenon" whose "unfolding" would be 
a slow process. In a bold claim, he stated that it was "the
only truly new phenomenon which has appeared on an
international stage which for more than a century has been 
dominated by nationalism" (273). Regionalism represented "a 
fundamental alternative in world-political strategy," the 
need for which was reinforced by the threat of revolutionary 
ideologies to Western civilization. He challenged the West 
to "evolve new political forms" such as regional and sub­
regional federations "adapted to a new political situation 
and its power-political instruments" (275). With its own 
federalist tradition, an American foreign policy that 
nurtured a federalism of regional as well as global 
dimensions was consistent with American interests. In fact, 
"if the settlement of World War II (did) not afford scope 
for the formation of new autonomous units created by the 
voluntary association of small nations," he argued that it 
"would be the antithesis of a system of balanced power"
(35) .
As we have seen, regionalism in world organization 
remained a subject of some disagreement and shifting 
emphasis among realists. There seemed to be less confusion
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among them with regard to the structure of postwar Europe.
Realists saw Europe as a power vacuum that was not to be
filled by a single European power, notably Germany. At the
same time, they were skeptical of a united Europe, favoring
a weak Europe under the sphere of one or more extra-European
major powers. At the same time, they thought it made balance
of power sense for the smaller states to be integrated in
sub-regional groupings commensurate in size and strength to
the larger European states. As with the idealists, their
particular concern was directed at what political
geographers referred to as the strategic "shatter zone" of
Europe, namely its eastern half.
Emphasizing the region's inherent volatility and
instability, most realists developed regional concepts that
were variations on Mackinder's theme. Writing after the
German invasion of Russia, geopolitical publicist Bruce
Hopper declared that the key to understanding the present
conflict had to "be sought in the forces of history which
have perpetuated a disequilibrium in the No Man's Land of
32Eastern Europe... ." Peace required a new, creative
balance in eastern Europe, which was attainable
only through the creation of strong buffer states 
to prevent direct contact between the Germanic 
and the Russian zones of power and likewise to 
prevent the division of the area into small 
nationalistic states... Unless a constructive 
solution is achieved for the "Teufel's Gurtel"
(devil's belt), it will continue as the crad^ of 
wars and the graveyard of peace settlements.
Political geographer Richard Hartshorne similarly argued
that the belt of buffer states had proven inadequate to
prevent great power penetration in the region. He observed
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that "for a second time in a generation we are engaged in a
war that originated in that belt" and that "the war has
merely demonstrated a more obvious point, namely, that
national sovereignty for these states provided no national 
34security."
As Quincy Wright had considered on behalf of the
internationalists, Hartshorne raised the question of
restoring the lands and economic infrastructure of the
Habsburg monarchy. He envisaged welding the disparate
elements of Danubian region into a federated geopolitical
unit capable of defending itself and playing the balancing
role it had done in the past. Before the war, he had
diagnosed the monarchy's disintegration in part to its
inability to articulate supranational political concepts or
institutions capable of containing the centrifugal force of 
354nationalism. He now argued that "the territorial basis of
the former empire in the mid-Danube realm could provide the
basis for a federated state, bound in its economic geography
36and in its external geopolitical relations... ." Whatever 
the outcome, any realistic planning for east Europe; had at 
least three factors to take into account. The first was the 
impossibility of creating "clear-cut national states 
comparable with the system of states in Western Europe." The 
second was that all national or ethnic groups were a 
"definite reality ... and no politico-geographic system can 
be expected to succeed that does not give expression to 
each... .” Finally, that the great powers possessed the 
means to "destroy whatever structure is set in East Europe
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unless the structure is effectively designed to prevent that
outcome" (211).
Hartshorne's second factor introduced autochthonous
criteria as requisites for the reunification of the region.
Just as Strausz-Hup& tentatively moved away from regionalism
as a purely great power orbit theory at the end of the war
to one based on historical, cultural, economic, and other
"affinities," Hartshorne embraced the notion that only
indigenous peoples and not states could provide the impetus
for unity. "Stability in the shatter zone cannot be acheived
from the outside, whether from west or from east, nor by the
reestablishment of free but hopelessly small units, but only
by integration into a free association of free peoples.
capable of providing a major element of its own defense"
(emphasis added)(214). Such an east European regional
grouping, while empowered to address its own problems and
fate, would also have to coexist within a larger European
and world organization. He concluded his case for a regional
unit in east Europe related to larger units by stating that
such an organization within this area would not be
in conflict with plans for a larger-scale organiza­
tion of the states of Europe, or of the world, but 
on the contrary would be supplementary to it. A 
world organization should not be called upon to 
solve the endless number of local problems involved 
in the community life of the many individual 
peoples living in this area. On the other hand, 
the addition to a European, or world, organization 
of an additional large federal state would give 
strength where the addition of a dozen small 
states would give only confusion (214).
Both Hartshorne and Strausz-Hup& remained realists
with regard to eastern Europe to the extent they also
emphasized the strategic factor in the region. Strausz-
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Hup&, for example, took the statesmen who crafted the 1919
peace settlement to task for having neglected strategic
considerations in their desire to satisfy ethnic demands:
If a great tier of buffer states —  as envisioned 
by Curzon and Mackinder —  was to have lastingly 
barred Germany and Russia from each other, and 
Russia from the sea, then the frontiers of each 
state should have been drawn with special regard 
to strategic requirements even when they conflicted 
with the principle of national self-determination.
The strategic role of these states in the grand 
scheme of world policy should have been given., 
precedence over their individual aspirations.
He also joined Hartshorne in criticizing the Paris Peace
settlement after World War I for allowing the dissolution of
the supranational Danubian monarchy, as the resulting
strategic power vacuum bred antagonism and war. "World War
II can appropriately be called the Second War of the
Austrian Succession," he suggested, "for Germany's
annexation of the succession states of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire, namely Austria, Czechoslovakia and Poland, presented
the concrete issues on which the Great Powers lined up for
war."38
During the war, regionalism had become an accepted if 
also imprecise concept in theorizing on postwar world and 
European organization. Neither the idealists nor realists 
developed more than tentative and partial theories of 
regionalism and postwar order in writings that did not focus 
on regionalism as such. Both interstate and hegemonial 
regionalism were in essence state-based theories of 
reforming the international system. Regions were largely 
conceived in terms of groups-of-states tied either to an
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universal organization or hegemonial power. With some 
exceptions, neither interstate or hegemonial regionalists 
went much beyond fitting regionalism into their idealist or 
realist conceptions of political reality. The concept of 
state sovereignty was, if frequently decried, rarely 
questioned to any degree or depth. Most theorists of groups- 
of-states regionalism did not venture to challenge the 
assumptions of the modern unitary state as such.
Realist theorists of hegemonial regionalism were more 
penetrating in their critique of the abstract foundations of 
the modern international system than were the theorists of 
interstate regionalism in defending the assumptions of that 
system. But their alternative for restructuring world 
society into regional imperiums led by a major power did not 
transcend the basic assumption of national self-interest 
that undergirded the international system. Yet some writers 
in both schools —  Culbertson, Shotwell, and Quincy among 
the idealists, Strausz-Hup& and Hartshorne among realists —  
attempted to go beyond state-centered conceptions of 
regionalism by acknowledging historical, economic, and 
socio-cultural factors operating at the societal level as 
something that was inherent in the regional idea. This 
approached the autochthonous theory of regionalism covered 
in the next chapter. The primary contest, however, was waged 
between the state-centered idealist and realist conceptions 
of postwar organization. At war's end, the idealists, or 
more precisely, the internationalists among them, had bested 
the realists at least on paper when the United Nations 
Charter was adopted in 1945. But as the moderate realist
92
Frederick L. Shuman observed somehat wryly at war's endf
this settlement did not
alter in any fundamental way the traditional 
concepts of international law and diplomacy or 
the established structure of the Western state 
system as a congeries of theoretically equal 
sovereignties. It reiterat(ed) the principles of 
international rectitude and self-denial which have 
long been praised by all right-thinking citizens 
pursuing international morality and long ignored 
by all realistic governments pursuing national 
interests.
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CHAPTER IV
AUTOCHTHONOUS REGIONALISM
On the eve of the war, sociologist F.W. Morgan 
identified three aspects of regionalism that had become 
part of the western consciousness since the latter part of
i
the 19th century. These were the rise of the socio-cultural
and political movements known as "regionalism?" the development
of regionalism as a concept in geography and other fields;
and the emergence of the regional novel as a genre in
literature. The latter expression, of which the Wessex
novels of Thomas Hardy and Maurice Barres' Les D6racin6s
(1897) were perhaps the best exemplars, will not concern us
here. But the parallel emergence of these phenomena in
various parts of the West suggested a synchronicity.
According to Morgan, the three expressions were "roughly
contemporaneous and ha(d) enough characteristics in common
to justify the assumption that they (bore) some relation to 
2
each other." Before turning to the war-time theoretical 
discussion of regionalism as a phenomenon of autochthonous, 
or indigenous, criteria, it is appropriate to briefly review 
the development of regionalism as a historical movement and 
concept in the social sciences.
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"Regionalism" as a Historical Movement and Concept
So-called "regionalist" movements sprang up in France
and Spain in latter half of the 19th century followed by
similar movements in other parts of Europe, east and west,
3
and even the United States. While diverse in their
expressions and goals, the movements proceeded, in Morgan's
words, "from the reaction against the centralized government
of the modern State, against the centralizing influence of
the capital city upon all cultural activities, and against
4
the standardizing effects of modern civilization." If the
regions of the regionalist, geographer, and novelist rarely
coincided, they were nonetheless "signs of a developing
consciousness of the smaller units of the earth."
It was no accident that the regionalist movement was
born and acquired its greatest momentum in France, home (if
perhaps in competition with Prussia) of the modern unitary
state. Political and administrative centralization in France
had already begun during the early modern period of absolute
monarchies. The road network of the ancien regime. for
example, upon which the later rail system was built,
basically led to and from Paris. But it was not until the
French Revolution, with its invocation of "la nation
frangaise," and subsequent Napoleonic reforms that
centralization acquired its modern form. In the 1931,
historian Carlton Hayes described the transformation in the
following terms:
[T]he inhabitants of France, shortly before the 
Revolution of 1789, were not a closely knit
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nationality; they were a congeries of Gascons,
Provencals, Artesians, Bretons, Normans, Alsatians, 
etc., whom their common king addressed as 'my 
peoples'; ...[T]hey learned to be 'the French 
people' ('la nation frangaise') from middle-class 
instructors who had already outgrown the cramping 
bonds of provincial loyalty and who utilized the 
Revolution as a popular and even compulsory 
training school in French nationalism.
(parens in original)
The logic of the new state required people to conform 
to a common national purpose that linked them directly to a 
central authority. This idea, Hans Kohn has argued, received 
its theoretical justification in the 17th and 18th century 
political thought of Thomas Hobbes, John Locke, and Jean- 
Jacques Rousseau. Hobbes and Locke prepared the way by 
devising new political philosophies based on "a fervent 
rationalism ...(and) the theory of the state as an 
expediency."6 Locke as an Enlightenment precursor of 
idealism believed in the rule of reason and the fundamental r
goodness and perfectability of man. By contrast, Hobbes'
pessimistic view of man and nature led him to believe that
the "state was not an instrument for social good, but an
essential brake upon man; (that) law was nothing but the
command of the sovereign actually in power." While they
differed on the ends of the state, Hobbes and Locke shared
in common the idea of a new political order where the state
was emptied of the traditional constraints of an
transcendent, or independent morality.
The moral vacuum was filled by Rousseau who founded, as
Kohn put it, "the state on a new basis, on a truly patriotic 
7
basis... ." The process entailed transforming the medieval 
natio, an unselfconscious, ethno-cultural concept, into an
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abstract political concept called the "general will." If 
during the medieval period there was no sovereignty as such 
with regard to political authority, the general will now 
became an expression of a people (peuple) endowed with
D
sovereign power. Nationalism became the new communitarian
morality which provided the glue that welded the people with 
9
the new state.
The administratively centralized state became a
historical reality in France on July 14, 1790 with the
merger of local and regional defense groups into a single,
10self-conscious nation. The revolutionary Constituent 
Assembly agreed on that day to break up the old provinces, 
or pays d '6tat. into arbitrarily delineated administrative 
units, or d£partements. Napoleon completed this process with 
the law of Pluvoise of the year VIII (February 17, 1800), 
which gave the first consul the power to appoint d6partement 
prefects, arrondissement subprefects, and municipal mayors. 
The administrative centralization was accompanied by cultural 
centralization through the creation of a national system of 
education centered in Paris and extending from the village 
level to the highest institutions of learning. This policy 
atrophied independent intellectual and cultural life 
which had been flourishing at the time of the revolution.
It was accomplished by eviscerating intermediary 
institutions (guilds, parishes, local assemblies, cultural 
associations) that stood between the individual and the 
state. The new arrangements worked toward making, as Octave 
Feuillet wrote to Napoleon III in 1867, all of France a 
suburb of Paris. Similar processes took place in London,
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Berlin, and other major European capitals. Regional planner
Lewis Mumford described the social impact of this
transformation in the following somewhat sardonic terms:
[T]he living tissue of customs and traditions, 
the vernacular architecture, the folk-ways and 
the folk-tales, the vulgar languages and dialects 
which were spoken outside of Paris or London —  
all these were looked upon by the intelligent 
eighteenth century gentleman as a mass of follies 
and barbarisms. Enlightenment and progress meant 
the spreading of London and Paris, Vienna, Berjjn, 
and St. Petersburg over wider and wider areas.
Although opposition to central control was never absent
in France, the first significant protest movement arose in
1854 among a group of Provengal poets led by Fr&d&ric
Mistral. Highly romantic, they called themselves the
f61ibristes in the tradition of the medieval troubadors.
Toward the end of the century, the initial romantic strain
of the movement became political. In 1892, the movement
issued a declaration calling for "freedom of the communes"
and "the liberation of the soul of the provinces from their
departmental prison." They demanded what was to become the
classic regionalist refrain of autonomy guaranteed by
federalist principles and structures. In 1900, various
regionalist currents united to form the F£d6ration
R&gionaliste Francaise (FRF), one of whose leaders, Jean
Charles-Brun (1870-1930), drafted the magna charta of the
12regionalist movement in the following year.
World War I proved to be a turning point in the history
of regionalism in France. In the wake of external danger and
a recrudescence of local and regional activity, the central
13government's authority collapsed. In August-September
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1914f as Paris faced the danger of German occupation, the 
connection between the capital and the various parts of 
France had broken down. Left to their own devices, the 
regions spontaneously organized effective action on behalf 
of the war effort in such practical areas as humanitarian 
relief, land cultivation, transportation, and food and coal 
supply. These initiatives contrasted with the period between 
the French Revolution and the 1870-71 war, when mayors, 
prefects, and local assemblies dared not act without prior 
instructions from Paris. Through a 1915 decree, the central 
government attempted to coordinate these activities through 
the creation of regional economic advisory councils which, 
in 1919, evolved into recognized organs called regions 
6conomiaues. "This reform in the classic land of 
administrative centralization," Hedwig Hintze suggested,
14"signalized a decisive victory for the regionalist idea."
For Lewis Mumford, the regionalist movement in the
early 20th century represented "an effort to create a new
mould for life as a whole, in continuity with that which had
continuously existed in Europe." He saw regionalism as a
paradigm for a new, as yet undefinable, politics that was at
once idealistic and practical, radical and commonplace, and
cultural and technical. It carried the promise of a social
cure for a body politic afflicted with the other-directed,
mechanistic values of the industrial state:
In the slow, varied and partly involuntary growth 
of regionalism there is the promise ... of changes 
more subtle and profound than those that can be 
embodied in any definite political programme. What 
we are working for is a new attitude towards our 
political and industrial institutions... Our 
industrialism has been other-worldy... It is time
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that we came to terms with the earth, and worked 
in partnership with the forces that promote life 
and the traditions that enhance it. Regionalism 
suggests a cure... .
The regionalist movements at the turn of the century
were accompanied by efforts among academics to develop a
regional concept. Geographers in particular, but also
anthropologists, sociologists, cultural historians, and
political economists were developing new fields of social
study that took man's relation to his natural and cultural
landscape, and not the state, as their locus of concern.
Influenced in part by the 61an-vital. or life-philosophy of
Henri Bergson (1859-1941), who discarded both the positivist
and idealist philosophies of the 19th century, and Wilhelm
Dilthey (1833-1911), Ferdinand Tonnies, and Max Weber (1864-
1920) in Germany, these new social science disciplines, or
Geisteswissenschaften, brought social and political reality
"down to earth,” as it were, without resorting to scientific
reductionism. French sociologists Emile Durkheim (1858-1917)
and Lucien L6vy-Bruhl (1857-1939) studied the "morphology"
of social groups in society and cultural anthropologists
Franz Boas (1858-1946) and Bronislaw Malinowski (1884-1942)
were among the first to develop the concept of "culture
area." In 1911, Boas heled that each culture could be
understood "only as an historical growth determined by the
social and geographical environment in which each people is
placed and by the way in which it develops the cultural
material that comes into its possession from the outside
16through its own creativeness." Political economist Max 
Weber was in particular concerned with the mutual
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relationship between econonomic, cultural, and political 
factors in the development of western society from 
"traditional" to "rational" principles of authority and 
legitimacy.
It was in the field of geography that the regional
concept as such was developed at the turn of the century.
According to regional geographer Robert Dickinson, "the
regional concept was developed around 1900 with reference to
17the division of the world into systems of major entities."
In England and in particular Germany, "regions" tended to be 
delimited in terms of physical nature and climate which 
affected if not determined culture. Others, notably Paul 
Vidal de la Blache (1845-1918) in France and the German-
American Franz Boas in the United States rejected this
environmental determinism and stressed environmental and 
cultural interaction as the differentiating factors between 
regions.
In 1891, the Languedocian Vidal de la Blache founded
the Annales school of human geography which produced a
generation of "genre de vie" (way, or mode, of life )
monographs on the various regions, including trans-border
regions, of France. He extended his basically descriptive
regional human geography approach to the differentiation of
world regions, asserting that the repartition of the world
18was "regionally organized." He distanced himself from the
determinism initiated by Friedrich Ratzel and developed by
his followers and was not content to link the concept of
19terrestrial unity with the modern state. Rather, in his 
Tableau de le a6oaraphie de la France (1903) , Vidal de la
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Blache defined a region as a composite of environmental and
human factors, specifically as
a reservoir of energy whose origin lies in nature
but whose development depends upon man. It is man,
who, by molding the land to his own purposes, 
brings out its individuality. He establishes a 
connection between its separate features. He 
substitutes for the incoherent effect of local 
circumstances a systematic concourse of forces.
It is thus that a region defines and differenti­
ates itself and becomes as it wgre a medal struck 
off in the effigy of a people.
The above disciplinary innovations took place in
the context of a more general reorientation in scientific,
social, and political thought in fin-de-si&cle Europe.
The changing perceptions in society and politics were
manifested, as H. Stuart Hughes suggests, in a revolt
against the dominant naturalistic and positivistic
assumptions about reality and in the (re)emergence of non-
rational, subjective factors (intuition, consciousness,
21spontaneity) in understanding human behavior. German
historian Karl-Georg. Faber has argued that a "paradigm
shift" in historical and political research began at the
turn of the century when the concept of the historical
region emerged as "a new object of historical 
22science... ." The region and regional consciousness were
(re)discovered as constituent elements of Europe's social
23and political structure. According to Faber, the change
signaled a shift in focus in the study of politics away from
"the state and politics as an Statist arrangement, or at
least its relativization as a historical force, toward that
of popular forces (in Germany), to society (in France), and
24to 'social forces' (in the USA)." The regional concept
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provided the means through which the region could begin to 
join the state as an intelligible unit of study.
In Germany, the phenomenon of popular forces, or
Volkskraften, was tied to the concept of
"Geschichtslandschaft," or historical landscape, an idea
traceable to the thought of cultural historian Johann
Gottfried Herder (1744-1803) and geographer Karl Ritter
(1779-1859) but identified principally with Friedrich Ratzel
in his Deutschland. Einfuhruna in die Heimatkunde (Leipzig
1898) and the works of cultural historian Karl Lamprecht 
25(1856-1915). In France, "Region historique" referred to 
the "Annales" school founded by Paul Vidal de la Blache and 
developed by Jean Brunhes, Lucien Febvre, and others 
including Henri Berr and his journal, Revue du svnth&se 
historiaue. founded in 1900. American "sectionalism" was was 
developed by frontier historian Frederick Jackson Turner 
(1861-1932), whose article "The Significance of the Frontier 
in American History" (1894) and The Significance of the 
Section in American History (1926) helped sparked the 
American "New History" school that set itself apart from the 
dominant constitutional historians. Turner adopted 
philosopher Josiah Royce's 1902 definition of "section" as 
"any part of a national domain which is geographically and 
socially sufficiently unified to have a true consciousness 
of its own ideals and customs and to possess a sense of its 
distinction from other parts of the country."
The emergence of the regionalist movement and the 
"region" as a concept in the social sciences provide a
107
basis with which to explore regionalism as an authochthonous 
force or the region as unit in international relations. 
"Autochthonous" is synonomous with "indigenous" and derives 
from the Greek "autochthon" meaning "of the land itself." The 
war-time materials under review in this study point to the 
development of autochthonous regionalism as both a concept 
and principle of postwar political organization.
Autochthonous Regionalism as a Concept of Postwar Order
After reviewing the corpus of writings on regionalism
and postwar reconstruction in 1943, sociologist James
Watkins observed that "both the concepts and methodology of
regionalism (were) conspicuously lacking. ...Without
apparently being aware of the scientific reasoning which
should have led them to do so, the authors have uniformly
rejected the physiographic region in favor of the group-of-
states region and have constructed their world schemes in
26conformity with the latter." There was little to
suggest that the "regions selected (had) been delimited in
accordance with indices previously determined and
investigated" and there was "plainly no conception of
'composite major societal region(s)' within a larger whole
(which in this case is the world itself or one of the
27continents)... ."
Watkins took part in a symposium of American 
sociologists led by Howard W. Odum (1884-1954), editor of 
Social Forces at the University of North Carolina (Chapel 
Hill), who sought to develop and apply the regional concept
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to the problem of postwar order. Odum had founded the 
Institute for Research in Social Science and the journal 
Social Forces in the early 1920s with support from his 
mentor Franklin Henry Giddings (1855-1931) at Columbia 
University. Giddings built on William Graham Sumner's 
pioneering study on Folkways (1906) to develop the concept 
of "sustentation area," designating an area capable of 
sustaining elemental social life. Analogous to Tonnies1 
Gemeinschaft/Gesellschaft dichotomy, Giddings and in 
particular Odum contrasted "folkways", or natural and 
enduring features of social life, with "stateways" (or 
sometimes, "technicways"), which were the artificial and 
transient artefacts of civilization. The contrast between 
the permanent, continuous, and voluntaristic "folk culture" 
and a necessarily coercive "state civilization" was a 
central feature of Odum's folk society theory of 
regionalism.
Odum began his work in community studies of race and
folk culture in the American South. In the 1930s, he turned
to develop theoretical aspects of regionalism and folk 
28sociology. With Harry E. Moore in the late 1930s. he
authored American Regionalism: A Cultural-Historical
Approach to National Integration, which became a landmark
29study on regionalism in the United States. Odum distanced 
himself from Turner's "sectionalism," which he interpreted 
as a "cultural inbreeding" that invariably led to political 
isolationism and national separatism. The danger inherent in 
sectionalism, a danger which Turner himself recognized in 
the war between North and South, was the idea of "separate
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units with separate interests" akin to the exclusivist
European nations. Odum stressed the integrative and
synthetic character of regionalism, where regions were
studied in relation to a larger whole, in this case, the
United States. Regionalism implied a unifying function whose
premise was not to "become a federation of conflicting
sections but a homogeneity of varying regions" (39).
Odum and Moore defined a region as a social gestalt.
or complex of interrelationships of natural and cultural
forces that formed a unique regional pattern. The synthetic
character of the region was in part determined by the
presence or absence of various elements of social 
organization, but in greater part by the pattern 
those elements which are present form through 
their interrelationships and through the peculiar 
interpretation given them by the folk occupying 
the particular region under study. The elements, 
therefore, can be understood only when conceived 
as parts of the whole social organization (413-14).
The region served as the frame of reference for the study of
societal phenomena. The region was an object of study for
the biologist, the geologist, the geographer, the
anthropologist, the economist, the historian, the political
scientist; but the sociologist's region was the nearest
approximation to a synthesis of studies, methods, and
concepts where regionalism could emerge as a "'gestalt' on
the one hand and a comprehensive methodological approach on
the other" (414-15).
Methodologically, a region's concrete existence was
established in part by a statistical-cultural approach that
determined "a relatively large degree of homogeneity
measured by a relatively large number of indices available
110
for a relatively large number of purposes and 
classifications" (30). The limitations of such an approach 
were also recognized. A descriptive compilation of facts and 
comparative indices were necessary but not sufficient to 
establish the existance of a region. There were other 
contributing factors of a cultural nature, such as 
"personality, folkways, motivation, handicaps, (which were) 
not measurable in terms of our present objective methods" 
(448). Odum addressed the problem by adapting gestalt 
psychology to sociology. He applied the concept of gestalt 
to suggest a given "cultural determinism" inherent in the 
region:
The concept borrowed is that of the mutual depen­
dence of the field and the figure, the insistence 
that form and relationship are as important as 
content, and give much of their meaning to the 
individual bits composing the whole; that the 
meaning of a line in a drawing, a note in a musical 
composition, or any other bit of sensory evidence 
depends in large part on associated sensory percep­
tions... This is tantamount to saying that all the 
factors are mutually conditioning, at once cause 
and effect. In still other words, regionalism 
points to cultural determinism in that the tools 
by which man has surrounded himself, both physical 
and mental, and by which he seeks his well-being, 
direct and affect his response to the physical area 
in which he finds himself (414).
Interrelated environmental and cultural factors are
ingredients in a natural pattern of organization that gives
a region its distinctive character. "For both the individual
and the social group, the pre-existing culture is largely
determinative of the present organization" and represented
the customary, or "natural" order of society (Ibid.). Its
nucleus consisted of "the valuable heritage of 'the folk’"
(Ibid.).
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Between 1942 and 1945, Odum devoted space in Social
Forces for a symposium on the regional concept as it related
in particular to the problem of postwar planning and 
30order. Open-ended in design and scope, this symposium of
"regionalists" contributed substantially toward the
development of regionalism as an autochthonous concept in
political organization. The symposium was initiated by
Odum's postulation of twelve axiomatic "assumptions" on the
theory and practice of regionalism as a social analysis and 
31planning tool. The sociologist was being asked to 
interpret the nature and role of regionalism in contemporary 
society in general and post-war reconstruction in 
particular. With the war, Odum’s folk sociology 
differentiating folk "culture" and state "civilization" had 
taken on new meaning. The enduring human ecology values of 
folk culture in regional society were seen more than ever as 
a needed corrective balance to the ersatz character of state 
civilization "now so tragically destructive in contemporary 
society." As a comprehensive, or synthetic, science of the 
region, regionalism became an "extension of the postulates 
of human ecology into a broader framework of societal 
development and a frame of reference for societal planning."
If his regionalism in the 1930s was confined to the 
American experience, Odum now emphasized the generic value of 
the regional concept, which was applicable "to all societies 
and in particular to the world of war-regions." In his 
second series of assumptions, he distinguished between two 
levels of regionalism, the structural-organic and the 
functional-organizational, each of which shared two
112
features. The structural-organic corresponded to the world's 
geographic regions, "described and characterized in terms of 
nature's settings," and to the world-cultural regions, in 
which was understood the "organic character of the relation 
between men and resources, between physical areas and 
culture areas, between cultural environment and 
technological forces... ."
The functional-organizational level of regionalism 
corresponded to the eco-political repartition of the world 
into political units ("nations, federations, and empires") 
and the existing war-regions and coming postwar world, "in 
which the promise of a new regionalism in post-war 
reconstruction may set the stage for cooperative societies 
of regional balance" that transcended "economic nationalism 
and totalitarian militarism." Odum devoted the next ten 
series of assumptions to the application of American 
regionalism to an understanding "not only the world of 
culture of today and tomorrow, but in the understanding and 
planning of any realistic post-war world reconstruction."
In brief, the American experiment was in no small way 
defined by a pioneering spirit that, for reasons of 
survival, was forced to continually make adjustments to 
frontier environments. Odum cited Frederick Jackson Turner's 
statement that "'American social development has been 
continually beginning over and over again on the frontier'." 
This condition now applied to a war-torn world and was 
needed to face the frontier challenge of rebuilding and 
restructuring the postwar world.
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Odum's article, drafted in the form of a syllabus for
32future research, elicited a number of responses. George
Lundberg ("Regionalism, Science, and the Peace Settlement")
understood regionalism in terms of "social space." In human
sociology, regionalism referred to the study of social
behavior in a geographic area from a regional point of view,
"because we think of all behavior taking place in space"
(132). He discussed the integrative function of the concept
and found a shared vocabulary with the Unity of Science
movement recently established by physicists at the
University of Chicago. The use of such terms as
"organismic," "symbiotic," "gradient," "equilibrium," and
"balance" were common to both fields (133). Lundberg
doubted, however, that these concepts of regionalism and
science would receive practical consideration in the
organization of the postwar peace. The vocabulary of the
international settlement was likely to remain in the realm
of "'balance' of political power" and the "whole legalistic,
33moralistic frame of reference" (135).
Svend Riemer ("Theoretical Aspects of Regionalism"), 
described regionalism as a integrative disciplinary approach 
that had developed from a practical need for social 
orientation (275). He presented an operational definition of 
the region as both a functional unit and an "ideal type" 
(278-9). It was in this context that Odum's ideas of 
equilibrium and cultural harmony and organic growth "move 
into the center of theoretical discourse the problem of 
purposeful social action" (280). Rudolf Heberle 
("Regionalism: Some Critical Reflections") distinguished
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between regionalism as a political phenomenon —  "the 
popular sentiment of the inhabitants of a certain 
geographical region ... constitute a forceful factor in 
political life" (280-1) —  and regionalism in the social 
sciences, which aimed at the "thorough and at the same time 
comprehensive knowledge of a concrete society" (282). 
Comprehensive meant going beyond the measurement of 
quantifiable regional indices to a consideration of the 
region as, quoting from Odum's syllabus, "'an area of which 
the inhabitants feel themselves a part'" (283). Heberle 
called for "analysis of the socio-pyschological nature of 
this "'consciousness of kind'," stating that people of a 
region are likely to be bound less by common "interests" 
than "the imponderable factors of a common tradition and 
history" (283).
J.O. Hertzler ("Some Basic Queries Respecting World 
Regionalism") attempted with admittedly limited success to 
project the "principles of intra-national regionalism, 
especially as it has developed in the United States," into 
the world arena (373). He tried to integrate the 
autochthonous regionalism principle of the North Carolina 
school with the groups-of-states formulas that dominated the 
debate on regionalism and postwar organization. He envisaged 
regions as administrative units within a universal 
organization composed of states organized where possible 
into regional federations. But he found that trying to 
"establish subdivisions in which a consistent natural- 
cultural 'landscape' existed (would) not be appropriate for
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most administrative purposes" (379) . In spite of this 
assessment, the North Carolina school of regionalism 
represented the only concerted effort to open a theoretical 
discussion on a region qua region approach to postwar 
organization.
International relations theorists who developed
regionalism along these or similar lines were few and far
between next to the idealists and realists who dominated the
academic and public debate on regionalism and postwar order.
Perhaps singularly among them, George B. de Huszar of the
University of Chicago strove to develop regionalism as an
integrative concept in international relations and the
34problem of peacemaking. Huszar took issue with the
contending "geographical" and "legal" approaches for their
static conceptions of peace. Both were concerned with formal
structures —  boundaries, treaties, territory, armaments,
laws, balance of power —  to the neglect of social,
psychological, economic, anthropological and other related
factors. "Habits of cooperation are more important than
formal structures," he argued, "for no organization, no
matter how perfect in structure, can succeed unless there is
35a will to work together."
International relations as a field was in Huszar's view 
limited in its study of law, institutions, diplomatic 
history, geography, and current events. As such, it was 
unable to "realistically appraise a social situation, take 
account of the interdependence of a variety of economic, 
social, and psychological factors..." (21). He regretted the 
near absence of sociologists, psychologists, and
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anthropologists in the discussions on the postwar peace. A
synthetic over an analytic approach was needed in
international relations that took into account a variety of
concrete social phenomena. It was necessary to integrate
data from a number of social science disciplines to obtain a
more functional view of the social reality that undergirded
international politics:
...(O)nce we realize that the orthodox methods 
are not sufficient, we will pay less attention 
to legal formulas and maps and more to the 
relations between peoples. Sociological, economic, 
and psychological methods cannot hope to offer 
diagrams and blueprints for peace...; but by 
dealing with intangibles, with dynamic forces, 
we may grasp the realities of international 
politics. Such forces are not sideline issues, 
for nations are not merely legal units and pieces 
of land; they are made up of human beings (24).
Huszar drew in part on the anthropological concept of
"culture area" to develop his regional approach to the study
36of postwar organization. He defined a culture area as a 
"region having certain definite characteristics of culture, 
both material and non-material, which distinguish it from 
other areas." A regional approach counteracted both "the 
crude empiricism" implicit in overspecialized research and 
the dilettantism associated with the "vague theorizing" of 
universalists. The region, while it cut in to or crossed 
state boundaries, was nonetheless delimited in time and 
space and its successful study required multidisciplinary 
team research. The regional approach served an integrative 
function in drawing together various social and physical 
science disciplines for the study of a given region. In 
language that approached that of the North Carolina
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school of regionalism, Huszar stated the objective of such
an approach was to build a configurational "perspective" of
a region by bringing data on that region together in a
pattern. A regional approach treated a culture area as an
organic unit that could only be understood if its individual
traits were considered in relation to an integrated whole.
The interdisciplinary scope of this approach meant studying
"the physical characteristics, climate, resources,
transportation system, economic structure, linguistic
pattern, racial situation, political structure, social and
religious pattern, and intellectual and artistic life of a
region." From such a study of "uniformities and diversities
the basic trends and problems of a region would emerge. By
contrasting various areas a morphology of world regions
would result." Interdisciplinary regional or area research,
introduced in American universities in the 1930s, came to
37its own m  the years following World War II.
Autochthonous Regionalism as a Principle of Postwar 
Organization
The idea of authochthonous regionalism as a principle 
of postwar organization was pursued among others by Alfred 
Cobban, a Reader of French History and writer in
38international affairs at the University of London. With
Europe as his focus of concern, Cobban advanced the
principle "that administrative areas should wherever
. . 39possible represent social realities." This invariably 
meant recognizing political units that cut into or across 
pre-war state boundaries. Political units were not divisible
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according to "mathematical or geometric criteria; local
conditions are the only criteria, and these may sometimes
dictate a large, sometimes a comparatively small area" (92).
A political structure comprised of local or regional units
representing real communal interests was a repudiation of
the existing French system of administration that had spread
throughout Europe in the 19th century. The system, a legacy
of the French Revolution and Napoleon, had proven "a perfect
instrument of centralized government, whether the ruling
authority (was) an individual despot or a Parliament" (92).
The French Revolution sought to establish liberty from the
top downwards; for Cobban, "the only sound process is to
build it from the bottom upwards" (93). He saw a need for
both integration and decentralization in a postwar structure
composed of supra-national and sub-national units organized
along federal lines. He acknowledged that this effectively
meant the end of the sovereign nation state:
The truth is that the sovereign nation state is 
no longer a possible, as it was never an adequate, 
political framework for the organisation of Europe, 
to say nothing of the rest of the world. Above the 
nations, vastly greater military and economic 
systems are required by the circumstances of the 
age. Below them the existence of lesser units is 
constantly demanding institutional recognition.
Thus, over the nation there is an urgent need for 
some kind of federal or imperial structure, which 
shall unite without destroying the nations, and 
under the nation for some institutional system 
through which the political and cultural 
consciousness of the lesser communities may 
achieve satisfaction. ...The latter ... might 
possibly be met by reconstruction on a regional 
basis, in other words, by the establishment under 
the greater nations of a scheme of local autonomy 
throughout Europe (91).
The main obstacle in building such as structure was the
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principle of national self-determination, which was regarded
by the 1919 Paris peacemakers as the moral and political
foundation of the post-World War I settlement. The theory of
self-determination based on national sovereignty suffered
from several flawed assumptions. For one, the western
democracies believed they were fighting the Axis powers for
the right of national independence which the latter were
said to have quashed. Second, the belief was widespread that
a nationality had a natural right to independent statehood.
In a new era of universal suffrage, national self-
determination was seen as a democratic principle based on
the "one nation, one state" formula. Third, when applied
in ethnically inter-mixed central and eastern Europe, where
the principle in practice favored the largest and most
dominant nationality, the new state invariably practiced
"national determinism" over so-called "minority" peoples
under its rule. In this process, the cultural idea of the
nation "slip(ped) into the background, and the nation
(became) a dominantly political concept, the embodiement of
40the power of the state."
As this was occuring in eastern Europe, the process in 
western Europe had moved in the opposite direction, namely, 
from the political to the cultural nation. The early modern 
dynasties of France, Spain, England, and Portugal, with 
their medieval origins, evolved into modern administrative 
states before the age of nationalism. Nationality was a 
subjective and psychological factor "in opposition to the 
objective and political fact of the state" (59). In the 1915 
words of Sir Alfred Zimmern, "'I have come to believe in
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nationality not as a political creed for oppressed peoples, 
but rather as an educational creed for the diverse national 
groups of which the industrialized and largely migratory 
democracies in our large modern States must be increasingly 
composed'” (Ibid,).
Cobban revised the concept of nationality by
emphasizing its variable and porous as against its imputed
exclusive character. Viewed beyond the nationalistic prism
of the last century or so, ethnic sentiment has in fact
differed in degree and kind from period to period, from
country to country, and even from individual to individual.
The theory of the nation state, however, was "built on the
assumption that national loyalties (were) exclusive” (60- 
4161). When applied in international relations, it imputed 
the erroneous "belief that the whole world (could) be 
divided agmonst separate homogeneous divisions of the human 
race...” (61).
Given the tragi-comic results of these assumptions 
about nationality since 1918, Cobban declared that "the idea 
of the nation-state as the one valid basis of political 
organization must be abandoned" (64). A first step required 
revising the principle of national sovereignty, which 
inauspiciously sanctioned the nation state as a "leviathan, 
fatal to the domestic liberties of individuals and groups," 
as well as a force for anarchy in international relations 
(67). National sovereignty had become "irreconcilable with 
any solution to the fundamental problems of the modern 
world" (71) . Both national self-determination and national
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sovereignty were no longer tenable as absolute rights.
The right of self-determination could no longer mean an
absolute right to national sovereignty, for the "true rights
of man are his liberties —  political, economic, national,
religious," which may or may not require some degree of
separate statehood under circumstances that may or may not
be objectively possible (74). As an alternative, Cobban saw
the region as the true expression of self-determination
within a federal political community. For beneath the veneer
of modern industrialized states, European society remained
more or less remained a mosaic of medieval fragments. In
central and eastern Europe, "the facts of medieval politics
(were) still the underlying realities" while the regional
communities in western Europe "have awoken to a sense of
42their separate identity" (148, 149).
The task of a realistic international policy would
begin by "construct(ing) a regional map of the world" that
was also be cognizant of a number of mixed population areas
such as Transylvania (149). The criterion for the existence
of a region was the sentiment of its population. When self-
determination is based not on separate statehood but the
principle of local and regional self-government,
a new and entirely different vista of possibili­
ties is opened up. The recognition of the right 
of local autonomy restores the alliance between 
democracy and national feeling, which centraliza­
tion ha(d) done so much to break. ...The principle 
of building from below is both more democratic 
and more realistic than the nation-state theory of 
1918. Where regions with a separate national 
consciousness exist, even if they are smaller than 
the communities we are accustomed to, they must be 
treated as the basic elements in the pattern of 
European society. This is the first principle of 
the new self-determination (151).
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Cobban next considered within what limits regional
autonomy was possible. What, for example, was an appropriate
distribution of powers between a central and regional
governments? He argued that a separation between culture
and politics, as proposed by Austro-Marxist Karl Renner in
his 1899 cultural autonomy plan to reform the Habsburg
44Empire, was untenable. Autonomous cultural associations of 
persons would give no scope to the "territorial sentiment" 
implicit in the idea of the (autochthonous) region and 
regional autonomy. The problem self-determination was 
addressed only where there was a "recognizable area, however 
small, which the nation, or sub-nation, (could) consider its 
own on the basis of occupation; and any attempt to satisfy 
true national demands must in some sense be political, that 
is, it must deal with the rights of government" (152-53).
As a decentralized political structure was the sine qua 
non of regionalism, regional control over the functions of 
local government, following the American and British models 
of self-government, would in itself be a step toward 
enhancing the importance of regional government. The central 
authorities would perforce be unable to manipulate a 
regional administration as if it were an artificial unit of 
the central government. But Cobban did not outline what 
powers the regional governments should have beyond cultural 
control over religion, education, and language. It was also 
unclear what the nature of the state, denuded of national 
sovereignty, was. The state's role, in what appeared to be a 
Swiss-like confederative structure, was essentially a
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functional one of providing for defense, preserving domestic
law and order, and promoting economic well-being (154-55).
His models for the larger federative community were not the
dissolved multinational empires of the Habsburgs,
Hohenzollerns, Romanovs, or Ottomans, who failed to contain
national sentiments. Rather,Jj^mbraced a form of hegemonial
regionalism in the international sphere. Experience
warranted looking at the existing federative patterns in the
"imperial boundaries or spheres of influence" of Britain,
45the United States, and the Soviet Union (156).
The strategic interests of the major powers were thus 
another limitation on smaller states organized on the basis 
of regional autonomy. But great power interests and regional 
autonomy were not in necessary conflict. Indeed, a 
consideration of military and economic factors suggested 
that "the survival of small states depends today, as in the 
past, on the policy the dominant great powers adopt" (171). 
With an eye fixed fixed more on the traditional balance of 
power principle than on a predatory power politics, Cobban 
suggested that the policies of the great powers —  strategic 
interests, prevention of war, domestic security, economic 
well-being —  were not "necessarily harmful to the 
independence or legitimate rights of the small states"
(173). In this respect, autochthonous and hegemonial 
regionalism were not mutually exclusive propositions. But in 
Cobban's earlier (January 1943) article on the "regional 
reconstruction of Europe," he emphasized not great power 
hegemony but federalism as an organizing principle that 
would operate "throughout the social fabric." In a
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reorganization of Europe based on regional autonomy and
local government, "the unitary nation state would disappear"
and be replaced by "a European order consisting of a number
46of greater or smaller federations... ."
Cobban's re-interpretation of self-determination was
partially echoed by E.H. Carr, who saw a need to place
limits on self-determination as an absolute right. He argued
along the line that
national self-determination became a standing 
invitation to secession. The movement which dis­
membered Austria-Hungary and created Yugoslavia 
and Czechoslovakia was bound to be succeeded by 
movements for the dismemberment of Yugoslavia and 
Czechoslovakia. Given the premises of nationalism, 
the process was nat^al and legitimate, and no end 
could be set to it.
Carr discredited the 19th century idea of a necessary
identity between the nation and state. "The existence of a
more or less homogeneous racial or linguistic group bound
together by a common tradition and the cultivation of a
common culture must cease to provide a prima facie case for
48the setting up of an independent political unit."
His remedy accorded only partial recognition to 
authochthonous regionalism as a principle of political 
organization. Carr suggested a system of divided but not 
incompatible loyalties. He contended there was "every reason 
to suppose that considerable numbers of Welshmen, Catalans 
and Uzbeks have quite satisfactorily solved the problem of 
regarding themselves as good Welshmen, Catalans, and Uzbeks 
for some purposes and good British, Spanish and Soviet 
citizens for others" (66). Given the reality of greater 
concentrations of power and centralization particularly in
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the military and economic fields, it was in the "interplay 
between centralisation and devolution, in this recognition 
that some human affairs require to be handled by larger, and 
others by smaller, groups than at present, that we must seek 
a solution to the baffling problem of self-determination" 
(Ibid.). If the 1919 peace settlement was planned in terms 
of national units, Carr believed planning in terms of a 
wider global framework was necessary in order to remove 
limitations on genuine self-determination. Only when an 
international order based on common military and economic 
power had been assured could "national aspirations for 
independence and self-government, for the development and 
maintainance of national institutions and national culture, 
receive their full and unrestricted expression" (279).
Authochthonous regionalism as a principle of political
organization applied as much to the decentralization of
large states as to the integration of smaller states into
larger regional units. The postwar futures of Germany and
the Danubian region were frequently cited as such examples
by both theorists and practitioners of the postwar order.
Political theorist Arnold Brecht's proposal to decentralize
Germany into federal units was an application of
autochthonous regionalism as a principle of power devolution
49in a large unitary state. He favored restoring the rights 
of the larger German provinces and breaking up Prussia into 
its thirteen original provinces. The provinces, or Lander, 
would be self-governing units accountable to a Federal 
Council, the highest legislative authority. Brecht's scheme,
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which was largely realized in the actual political structure
o£ postwar Germany, underlined the proposition of Odum and
others that (authochthonous) regionalism was not a
provincial version of nationalism but a manifestation of a
social reality-based unit cohering within a larger (viz.,
federal) unit. Brecht stated that "the marked regional
stratification of political opinions in Germany (offered) a
plausible argument for re-establishing some kind of federal
system, and perfecting it by the elimination of oversize
Prussia as a single state, in order to leave homogeneous
regions the possibility of shaping their pattern of life
differently in matters that can be locally differen- 
51tiated."
With regard to the ethnically intermixed Danubian
region, British historian C.A. Macartney looked to the
lapsed Habsburg monarchy for clues to a "constructive and
synthetic" plan that was not based on a policy of power
52balance of national states. He stressed the need to 
consider "the wishes and needs of the east European peoples 
as a whole, not only a favoured part of them" (151). He 
stated that a restructured east-central Europe "would 
probably be something which the world has not yet seen." In 
the meantime, the Monarchy was a model of a multinational 
polity that provided a large degree of protection and 
national security to all its peoples and maintained an 
attitude towards them that was based not on nationality, but 
loyalty to the supranational symbol of the crown.
Nationalist propaganda notwithstanding, the Habsburgs, 
Macartney argued
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had no wish, and never tried, to change the national 
individualities, as such, of their subjects. These 
were regarded as natural and ineradicable character- 
istics, and were accepted as such... Nor did the 
dynasty ever favour, in a positive sense, the 
national aspirations of any one nation among the 
politically active classes. In the negative sense, 
one nation might receive harsher treatment than 
another if it proved more truculent or more disloyal. 
But the object was to reduce all national feeling to 
a common level, to extirpate from anywhere any 
feelings except that of attachment to the dynasty 
(42, 43).
The conditions for a new eastern Europe required choosing
its external and internal natural limits, taking "separately
each of the great needs of security, national freedom and
economic welfare, in each case working with the appropriate
limits and through the appropriate organization" (157).
Macartney was deliberately vague on the form of such
organization —  he mentioned national and geographic units
—  but outlined the grounds for a common defense "entailing
a degree of common foreign policy" (153) and an economic
organization that would disregard ethnic frontiers:
Just as the smaller nations need security from 
their over-powerful neighbors, and cannot possibly 
obtain it without combining, so the best protection 
for them against economic exploitation by Germany, 
and also the best means of raising their standard 
of living, would be the creation of an intermediary 
economic unit between Germany and the U.S.S.R., 
planned, as are the German and Russian economic 
units, primarily for the benefit of its own inhabi­
tants, and sufficiently large, elastic and economi­
cally differentiated to preserve its economic 
independence (154).
Macartney emphasized the cultural diversity of the Danubian
region. Yet he claimed that behind the region's "mutually
irreconcilable ambitions and tedious quarrels" was a
"certain underlying Danubian culture" that gave credence
to a regionalism that was not only a sub-national but also
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multinational principle of political organization.
Historically, the region's "different races and cultures
have met not only to clash, but also to enrich and fructify
each other. Its special history and conditions have produced
something which does not easily fit into the pattern of the
world, but the world would be immeasurably the poorer
53without it," Macartney concluded (157).
For all the Anglo-Saxon theorizing on regionalism as a
principle of postwar political organization, what were the
thoughts of those most directly affected by and opposed to
the Nazi "New Order" in Europe, namely members of the
European resistance? For a study concerned with indigenous
forms of political organization, what were their ideas on
how postwar Europe should be organized? German historian
Walter Lipgens has maintained that the dominant postwar
theme of resistance movements in Europe was "a voluntary
54federation of Europe." Another writer has stated that the
intellectual resistance forces regarded themselves as a
forerunners of "a true federation founded on the shared
recognition that Europe's nation-states could no longer
afford the rivalries that had weakened their response to
55Hitler's aggression."
In 1941, imprisoned Italian resisters Altiero Spinelli 
and Ernest Rossi drafted the "Ventotene Manifesto," perhaps 
the first important Resistance declaration devoted to 
European unification. It was adopted as the program of the 
Movimento Federalista Europeo (MFE), the first federalist 
association in Europe, at its founding congress in Milan on
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August 27-28, 1943. The document was rooted In the
humanistic premise that "man is not a mere instrument to be
used by others but that every man must be an autonomous life
centre." The manifesto also charged that the nation state
had become a (Hegelian?) "divine entity" with an inherent
proclivity to dominate:
The absolute sovereignty of national states has 
given each the desire to dominate, since each 
one feels threatened by the strength of the others,
and considers as its living space an i n c r e a s i n g l y
vast territory wherein it will have the right of 
freedom of movement... The desire to dominate 
cannot be placated except by the predominance of 
the strongest state.
The manifesto voiced the fear that the British and 
Americans, with their imperial and balance of power 
interests would "seek to exploit ... the restoration of the 
national state" in Europe by appealing to national
sentiments. If this happened, it would be a matter of time
before "national jealousies would again develop, and (each) 
state would again express its satisfaction at its own 
existence in its armed strength" (478) . Accordingly, the 
first order of priority in planning the postwar settlement 
was "the abolition of the division of Europe into national, 
sovereign states" in favor of "a federal reorganization of 
Europe" (Ibid.).
The federal structure outlined by Spinelli in documents 
written in the months after the August 1941 manifesto 
affirmed interstate more than authochthonous regionalism.
The units of the federal system were states whose 
sovereignty would be restricted by international law. 
Spinelli's loyalties, however, were directed toward Europe
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and its "diversity." He hoped the catharsis of the war 
experience would reorient political loyalties from the 
nation state to Europe. The common suffering of the European 
people under the "German yoke" served as a "stimulus to all 
peoples to free themselves, not as a particular need of each 
nation but as a common European interest." The desire "to be 
spared future oppression" and to live in peace with one's 
neighbors meant shaking off "former idols." "The federal 
solution would satisfy these aspirations much better than 
the mere restoration of national sovereignty," he argued 
(487). The regional element in his thought was seen in his 
conception of the federal system as not being a "unitary 
European state" but rather, but as a protector of the 
diversity of Europe (488).
If the Ventotene federalists remained within the bounds 
of interstate regionalism, other groups and individuals 
ventured further afield by extending the federative 
principle within the existing states or advocating a 
federation of regions where the sovereign state as it was 
known disappeared altogether. Again, authochthonous 
regionalism and federalism join here as corollary or 
mutually inclusive ordering principles. Under such 
principles, political power both devolves into regional, or 
provincial, self-governing units and evolves into a 
supranational federal system that protects the regional 
autonomies. Quoting, respectively from Italian, French, 
German, Dutch, and Polish resistance documents, Lipgens 
stated that
the general theme was everywhere the same: to
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put into practice the 'democratic principle of 
self-government from below' and to set up 'strong 
guarantees against the absolutist, centralizing 
and bureaucratic power of the sovereign nation 
state'. Only 'local autonomies (communal, regional 
etc.)' could provide, within a 'wider supranational 
federal system', 'the guarantee of a sufficient 
decentralization of national states' (17-18).
Former French socialist Premier L&on Blum, in his A 
1'6chelle humaine (written in prison in 1941 and published 
in 1945), called for a federation along American or Swiss 
lines that maintained "the fires of local political life." 
Central authorities, no longer capable of dealing 
"adequately with all the aspects of life in a modern state," 
should only assume the tasks of functional coordination of 
"smaller satellite authorities with special fields of 
action, within which they have a limited independence"
(279). Yet Blum sought to reform, not displace the modern 
state, which for him remained the basic unit of 
international relations. Decentralization in the name of 
locally-based social democracy and the limitation of 
sovereignty were the heart of his reform of the state 
system. Externally, he applied this approach to the 
expansion of functional authorities like the International 
Labor Organization. But the League of Nations remained for 
him "a noble and magnificent creation," a model for both 
European and world organization (281). As with functional 
organizations, the remedy lay in providing international 
institutions real authority. Unlike Spinelli, he appeared 
not to shrink from the idea of a super-state. Blum favored 
an international body "boldly and openly set up as a super­
state on a level above national sovereignties... " (282).
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Others came closer to espousing autochthonous
regionalism in the international sphere by developing the
idea of supranational federation and regional autonomy as a
complementary whole. Inspired in part by their experiences
in the resistance, their model was
a network of local voluntary associations, vehicles 
of direct deomocracy, united within a European 
federation. The old nation-states, bellicose and 
unresponsive to the needs of their citizens, were 
to be superceded at both a lower and a ^gher 
level by more responsible institutions.
In his thirteen "Theses for a Third Front," published
anonymously in a Zurich newspaper in 1942, writer Ignazio
Silone argued that "political unification should express the
real unity of European society" and not be based on the
"reactionary system of national sovereignty" (emphasis 
58added). Voluntaristic socialism through people-centered
producers' associations coupled to a European-wide
federation were the essential ingredients of his "third
front" idea. Not dissimilar to the "third road" appeals of
the inter-war populists in eastern Europe, Silone argued
maintained that the new European federation should not be a
"limited and perpetually weak union of sovereign states, but
a grouping of free peoples, among whom associations directed
by the producers will have reabsorbed a good part of the
functions currently monopolized by big capital and by the
59state bureaucracy."
Giorgio Peyronel applied Silone's idea in the sphere
60of international relations. Peyronnel was a member of the 
Partito d'Azione (Action Party) that included the Ventotene 
federalists prior to the 1943 MFE congress. He began with
133
the premise that the centralized modern state, born of the
triumph of the bourgeoisie more than two centuries ago, had
now become burdened with the excesses of nationalism and
imperialism that have resulted in two world wars. The state
was no longer an adequate means through which relations
among peoples could be regulated. "The imperialist phase of
nationalism, with its overt violation of the rights of
nationalities, has destroyed the legal and historical
foundation on which the nation state claimed to base
itself," he declared. With the authority of the nation state
in question, he argued the case for a double-edged, or
"integral," federalism that effectively stripped the state
of its role as an actor in international relations:
Now that the false creed of nationalism has shown 
its totalitarian face and become discredited, 
international life must be adapted to new standards, 
which should be multiples or sub-multiples of the 
nation as we know it. The idea of federalism is 
being mooted, and there are two forms of it which 
should be distinguished. There is supranational 
federalism, which is what people generally under­
stand by the term, but there is also infranational 
federalism. This involves the effective internal 
decentralization of nation states, a reaffirmation 
of the cultural, political and administrative 
autonomy of regions and communes (regionalism and 
communalism), and protection of minorities which 
are distinct, racially or linguistically or for 
any historical reason, from the 'nation' to which 
they belong at the present day.
Peyronnel considered the danger of local oligarchies 
emerging in this decentralized federal structure. He claimed 
this eventuality would be averted by the system of graded 
federal linkages, whereby the admininistratively autonomous 
units would be politically responsible to a higher central 
power, which in turn would be "linked to a larger 
supranational federation." The source of power, however, for
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a system of integral federalism lay not at the top but in 
the local autonomies upon which the structure depended. The 
regional and local autonomies were not merely administrative 
instrumentalities through which the states would be 
decentralized. They were also crucial components in a 
"freely differentiated unity" that would provide a more 
"elastic means of solving European problems" by "above all 
respect(ing) the values of life and culture that have 
characterized Europe through the ages."^
As a contrast to the state-based regionalisms of the 
idealists and realists, authochthonous regionalism was a 
society-based, "regionalist" theory of political 
organization. It sought as a rule to structure world and 
European organization from below through recognition of the 
social repartition of the world into historical-cultural 
individualities, or indigenous regional human settlements 
that existed within or across the modern states. Such a 
model of a political organization pointed to both the 
internal transformation of the modern state through the 
devolution of state power to self-governing regional units 
and the external transformation of the state through its 
integration into larger multinational, federal polities. 
Autochthonous regionalism as a principle of political 
organization thus combined regional autonomy with regional 
integration to adumbrate a new type of political community. It 
raised the possibility institutionalizing the principle of 
unity in diversity through a system that replaced national 
soveriegnties with a federative system of shared sovereignty
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along regional lines. 
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(Journal d 'une 6poaue. 1926-1946 [Paris, 1968], p. 108.). 
During the Resistance, they and others frequently pointed to 
the Swiss model of local autonomy and federal rule. See, 
e.g.. Denis de Rougement, Mission ou dimission de la Suisse 
(Neuchatel, 1940) and Denis de Rougement and Charlotte 
Muret, "What Switzerland Teaches: Federalism and Regionalism 
for Man's Freedom," Commonweal. 34 (September 19, 1941).
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PART TWO
REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR WORLD ORGANIZATION
Any genuine world order must be inter- 
cultural as well as international. It 
must recognize the existence of the five 
or six world cultures and base its organ- 
sation upon them. But the world is not 
ripe for such an order. ...The interna­
tionalist assumes that once the pressure 
of European imperialism and economic 
exploitation is removed, the non-Euro­
pean peoples will spontaneously carry on 
the work of world organization according 
to the best traditions of Western demo­
cracy and humanitarianism.
Christopher Dawson, 1932
...this war, like the last war 
will produce nothing but destruction 
unless we prepare for the future now.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, November 5, 1941
Introduction
The theoretical debate on regionalism and postwar order 
did not take place in a vacuum. It was accompanied by a 
similar debate at the level of allied policy. This debate 
was again dominated by internationalists who were prepared 
to accept some forms of interstate regionalism and realists 
who thought in terms of hegemonial regionalism. Proponents 
of autochthonous regionalism found little hearing among the 
state actors involved in planning the postwar order. In 
practice, interstate, hegemonial, and autochthonous 
regionalisms did not fit into neat categories and at times 
merged or overlapped. At times, rationales for groups-of- 
states regionalism (interstate or hegemonial) were also 
expressed in terms of units that corresponded to culture 
areas. By war's end, however, the internationalists who 
favored a universal organization with limited regional 
features had won the upper hand in determining the structure 
of the postwar world organization.
The debate on the future world organization centered 
on the issue of whether regional or universal principles 
would inform the peacekeeping structure. Which kind of 
political organization could best maintain and promote the 
peace? In a world of legally equal and sovereign nation
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states, how could the imbalance between major powers and 
smaller be redressed? Should regional organizations have the 
right and freedom to deal with and queli disputes in its 
area without involvement or interference from the general 
organization? Would regions be islands or building blocks of 
of peace or power "blocs" that would increase global 
insecurity?
Between 1940 and 1943, the deliberations on regionalism 
were largely waged within and between the postwar planning 
councils of the State Department in Washington, Foreign 
Office in London, and, to a limited degree, the Foreign 
Commissariat in Moscow. These deliberations, with reference 
to their domestic underpinnings, are the subject of Chapter 
V. From the summer of 1943 to the spring of 1945, the debate 
broadened to become a multilateral issue at the allied war­
time conferences of the major powers —  the subject of 
Chapter VI. Of the three major powers, the United States, 
after hedging on the regionalist issue until August 1943, 
became the leading advocate of universalism in world 
organization and primary force in establishing the United 
Nations. Britain was the leading advocate among the Big 
Three for regionalist restructuring in world (and European) 
organization but invariably deferred to the American 
position. The Soviet Union, whose attitude toward 
regionalism was the most muted, belied an attachment to 
hegemonial regionalism in acquiescing to America's bid for a 
universal world organization.
The smaller allied and non-Axis states —  notably the 
Latin American nations, Arab states, the London-based
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governments-in-exile of Europe, as well as the members of 
the British Commonwealth —  were seen but seldom heard in 
the debate on postwar issues in general and the question of 
regionalism in particular. They raised their voices in San 
Francisco in the spring of 1945, when some fifty non-Axis 
states were invited to approve and establish the United 
Nations organization. Many of the smaller states acted 
through regional groupings to press demands for greater 
inclusion of regionalist principles in the U.N. Charter. 
This culmination of the debate on regionalism and world 
organization is the subject of Chapter VII.
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CHAPTER V
REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR WORLD ORDER 
PLANNING AMONG THE MAJOR POWERS f 
1940-1943
In the early war years, both the United States and 
Great Britain had developed postwar proposals favoring a 
regionally-structured world organization. Foreign Office 
and, in particular, State Department research between 1940 
and 1943 made cases for regionalism within a world 
organization guaranteed by the major powers as against a 
League-type universal organization. Inspired in part by the 
success of the inter-American system of states as a model of 
regional cooperation, President Roosevelt joined Prime 
Minister Churchill over the objections of their foreign 
ministers in favoring a major power-oriented 
regionalist approach to postwar organization. The basic 
structure which they envisaged was a "world council" led by 
the major powers —  the United States, Britain, Soviet 
Union, and (over British objections) China —  that 
partitioned the world into several regions of smaller and 
medium-sized states represented through "regional councils." 
The Soviet Union for its own geo-political reasons also 
favored a hegemonic regional over a strictly universal 
security framework.
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Before examining the positions of the three major 
powers on the place and role of regionalism in postwar 
world organization, it is helpful to review the domestic 
institutional contexts in which the planning for the future 
peace was conducted.
Planning for the Peace: the Actors and Institutions
Of the three major powers, the United States was the 
best organized and least unsure of itself when it came to 
planning for the postwar peace. Even before America's entry 
into the war, President Roosevelt voiced the need to create 
a structure for lasting peace. His tenacious Secretary of 
State, Cordell Hull, became the architect of that peace due 
in no small part to his organizational abilities within the 
State Department and negotiating skills with Congress and 
the White House. Hull was an unabashed Wilsonian 
internationalist whose strength of conviction, when added to 
his administrative skills, made American proposals the ones 
considered and invariably adopted at the allied war-time 
conferences.
In December 1939, Secretary Hull initiated discussions 
in the Department on "problems of peace and reconstruction" 
in to order to outline "the basic principles which should 
underlie a desireable world o r d e r . T h e  discussion group 
began work in January 1940 as the Advisory Committee on 
Problems of Foreign Relations under the chairmanship of 
Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles. Welles, who enjoyed 
a personal relationship and access to President Roosevelt,
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was an internationalist who became the administration's
leading voice for interstate regionalism in world
organization. In May 1940, on the heels of Germany's attack
on the Low Countries and Winston Churchill's induction as
Prime Minister, Hull broadened the Advisory Committee's
Subcommittee on Economic Problems into a separate informal
Inter-departmental Group to Consider Post-War International
Economic Problems and Policies. The group's chairman was Leo
Pasvolsky, an economist who had worked on the State
Department staff between 1930 to 1937 and whom Hull brought
back in September 1939 to be the Department's post-war
planning czar. He served as Hull's speechwriter and was,
with Hull, wary of regionalism as an approach to world
political organization. In 1928, he published a study on the
"economic nationalism of the Danubian states" in which he
argued that the Danubian problem was part of a more general
European problem and that a solution was to be sought on "a
2
European, rather than regional, scale."
In a departmental change in February 1941, Hull created
the Division of Special Research for the task, as he
declared in an April 24 speech, "of creating ultimate
3conditions of peace and justice." Pasvolsky was appointed 
as its chief. But it was not until after the Japanese attack 
on Pearl Harbor that postwar planning assumed an importance 
and momentum of its own in the Department. In December 1941, 
President Roosevelt approved the formation of a nonpartisan, 
presidential Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy, 
which was to comprise of more than 300 prominent Americans 
inside and outside the government. Under Hull's chairmanship
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and with Pasvolsky serving as executive officer and director 
of research, the work of the committee and its sub­
committees constituted the bulk of the U.S. government's
4
research on postwar planning. Key members of the committee 
included Sumner Welles, Vice Chairman, among eleven members 
of the State Department including Assistant Secretaries Dean 
Acheson and Adolf A. Berle; Senator Tom Connally, Chairman 
of the Foreign Relations Committee among five Senators and 
three Representatives; and assorted members drawn from 
government departments and agencies, including the White 
House. Among those who were drawn from private life were 
Norman H. Davies, President of the Council on Foreign 
Relations; Myron C. Taylor, an industrialist and, later in 
the war, Personal Representative of the President to the 
Vatican; Ann O'Hare McCormick of the editorial staff of The 
New York Times: Isaiah Bowman, geographer and President of 
Johns Hopkins University; Hamilton Fish Armstrong, editor of 
Foreign Affairs; and James T. Shotwell, historian and a 
Director of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.
The Advisory Committee's seven working subcommittees —  
Political Problems, Economic Policy and Reconstruction, 
Security Problems, Territorial Problems, Legal Problems, 
International Organization, and European Organization —  
held more than three hundred meetings between February 1942 
and July 1943. In January 1944, its work was taken over in a 
reorganization of the Department by a policy-making 
Committee on Postwar Programs, again under the leadership of 
Hull and Pasvolsky. The Division of International Security
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and Organization, with Pasvolsky's aide Harley Notter as
chief, was subsequently established to develop and implement
5plans for the United Nations organization.
In Britain, postwar planning was conducted by the 
Foreign Office under the authority of the War Cabinet 
chaired by Prime Minister Churchill. Churchill was the 
British government's strongest advocate of regional 
organization. The bulk of the British research effort was 
conducted by the Foreign Research and Press Service (FRPS) 
located in Balliol College, Oxford. It was established prior 
to the outbreak of the war as a semi-public undertaking 
between the Foreign Office and Chatham House, or Royal 
Institute for International Affairs. Its chief was historian 
Arnold Toynbee, who tended to hired its members from 
academe. Among them were C.A.W. Manning, the Montague Burton 
Professor of International Relations at the London School of 
Economics and the historian on Hungary and eastern Europe, 
C.A. Macartney. The FRPS produced a sizeable collection of 
policy-oriented studies. By the end of 1941, it had prepared 
a plan for the production of twenty volumes of background 
materials for ministers and senior postwar policymakers. But 
the project was not brought to fruition with the dissolution 
of FPRS in April 1943 and its merger with the Foreign 
Office's political intelligence division to form the Foreign 
Office Research Department (FORD) in London.
In the meantime, the Foreign Office had established an 
Economic and Reconstruction Department in June 1942 under 
the chairmanship of Foreign Office Counsellor Gladwyn Jebb. 
Jebb was the Foreign Office's counterpart of Leo Pasvolsky
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at the State Department. In 1940-41, he had served as 
Assistant Under Secretary in the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare. Postwar planning in Britain took a new turn after 
the Soviet victory in Stalingrad in early 1943. Differences 
between the War Cabinet and Foreign Office on the 
regionalist issue prompted Churchill, in July 1943, to set 
up a small War Cabinet committee on the postwar settlement 
that reported directly to him. Opposed by the Foreign 
Office, the committee proved short-lived (it held only four 
meetings) and gave way the next month to a War Cabinet 
Committee on Armistice Terms and Civil Administration on 
terms recommended by the Foreign Office. The committee's 
mandate was broadened by the Prime Minister in April 1944 
and its name changed to the Armistice and Post-War 
Committee. Its chairman was Deputy Prime Minister Clement 
Attlee with Gladwyn Jebb heading the Secretariat that
g
coordinated all major postwar political questions.
Of the three major powers, the Soviet Union devoted the 
least time and effort to postwar world order planning, 
preferring to react to American and British initiatives. It 
was not until early 1943, after their decisive military 
victory in the Caucasus, that the Soviets were able to 
diplomatically position themselves to consider questions of 
postwar order. In May 1943, Premier and Marshall Joseph 
Stalin ordered home ambassadors Ivan Maisky from London and 
Maxim Litvinov from Washington. Litvinov, a former Foreign 
Commissar fluent (as was Maisky) in the ways of western 
diplomacy, had in the mid-1930s promoted plans for regional
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security pacts in Europe within the framework of the League
of Nations. Stalin now appointed him Assistant Foreign
Commissar under Vyacheslav Molotov, who replaced Litvinov as
Foreign Commissar in 1939, with responsibility for postwar
planning in general and the world security organization in 
7particular. As if to pave the way for the coming 
negotiations on postwar issues, Stalin dissolved the 
Comintern, the arm of the international communist movement, 
following the ambassadors' recall to Moscow. It was a move 
which Secretary Hull welcomed as a sign of "a greater degree 
of trust ... for the winning of the war and for successful
o
postwar undertakings.” But it was not until September 
1943, a month before the Moscow Foreign Ministers' Meeting, 
that the Soviet government established a commission on the 
peace treaties and postwar organization. Little is known of 
this commission other than that its membership was composed 
of Soviet "political figures and statesmen" whose task was 
"to work out concrete proposals for the postwar arrangement 
of the world, including the question of creating an
9
international security organization."
Regionalism and the Postwar Policy Debate in the U.S. 
Government
The Wilsonian internationalism that came to dominate 
postwar planning in the United States in the last years of 
the war must be seen against a historical background of 
American isolationism, "non-entanglement," and neutrality. 
The March 1920 U.S. Senate rejection of the League of 
Nations that President Wilson had been instrumental in
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founding as part of 1919 Paris peace settlement proved a
reminder of this fact. The rejection was followed by
Wilson's landslide defeat in the elections later that year
amidst the promise of Republican candidate Warren G. Harding
to "return to normalcy."
After President Roosevelt's inauguration in 1933, his
"good neighbor" policy found an echo among the twenty-two
American republics in the western hemisphere. While
maintaining a policy of neutrality, the United States
promoted the idea of an inter-American system as a bulwark
of cooperation against the rising power of Germany. When the
Soviet Union signed the non-aggression pact with Germany in
August 1939, Roosevelt and his supporters promoted closer
collaboration with Britain. The idea of Anglo-American union
10became a source of academic and journalistic interest. Two
months after the fall of France, Prime Minister Churchill
stated in the House of Commons on August 20, 1940 that "the
British Empire and the United States will have to be
somewhat mixed up together in some of their affairs for
11mutual and general advantage." The movement toward Anglo- 
American union was symbolically affirmed in the Atlantic 
Charter issued "at sea" in August 1941 by Roosevelt and 
Churchill in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland. Coming at the 
heels of the German invasion of the Soviet Union, the eight- 
point declaration calling for cooperation among the free 
nations prefigured both the end of America's neutrality and 
isolation and its postwar attachment to the "Atlantic 
community." At the time, it provided the United States with
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a "broader and more definite basis for comprehensive
preparation of postwar policy within the United States
12Government than had existed heretofore... ."
A reference to postwar organization in the Charter
cited the need for "the establishment of a wider and
permanent system of general security." This phrase replaced
"an effective international organization" in the original
British draft which Roosevelt believed, given the League
experience, would not be supported by American public 
. . 13opinion. This caution reflected the "realist" strain m
Roosevelt's thinking in the early 1940s that led him to
support a postwar peace plan based in part on hegemonial
regionalism. The change of wording suggested that Roosevelt
"was again being haunted by the ghost of Woodrow Wilson. The
extreme internationalists, he felt, were lacking in
'realism,' which meant they did not take into account the
power of isolationist sentiment. He was afraid that even an
implication of another League of Nations would fill the
American people with memories of the First World War —
another A.E.F. [American Expeditionary Force], another false
'peace,' another age of disllusionment, of boom and bust,
A
14another opportunity for another Hitler."
In these early war years, the President received advice 
on postwar issues principally from Under Secretary of State 
Welles, who as an authority on Latin America had assisted 
Roosevelt in implementing the "Good Neighbor" policy.
Welles' theoretical objective in postwar organization was 
reconciling the tension between the sovereign equality of 
states and the security interests of the great powers. He
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sought this reconciliation in a formula for world 
organization that was based on a regional groupings of 
states and the combined might of the major powers.
Welles' starting assumption was that the foreign policy
of the United States, "like that of any other nation, should
15 .be based on enlightened selfishness." Given this, it was
unlikely for a great power to join or cooperate with a world
organization whose combined military power was greater than
its own. A world organization needed a structure that
recognized the security interests of the great powers while
simultaneously "making it impossible for any one power to
block the efforts of the organization to check aggression
16from whatever power." He envisaged regionally-organized
systems of states in which one or more great powers were
members. The regional systems would assume the "primary
responsibility for maintaining peace in their respective
17parts of the world." Only when regions failed to contain
conflict in their area would the universal organization be
required to act. "In that manner each state in every region,
no matter how weak it might be, would be required as well as
enabled to contribute in proportion to its resources the
assistance needed in maintaining regional, and world,
,.18peace.
Welles saw interstate regional systems as primary 
peacekeeping mechanisms in a larger system of security 
protected by the major powers. As the major powers were also 
members in the regional groupings, thus enhancing their 
influence in the region, Welles' system had hegemonial as
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well as interstate features. In addition, Welles saw
residual intra-regional advantages in such regional systems,
stating that they would also
greatly encourage the development of constructive 
economic and financial policies in each area. In 
Eastern Europe, in many parts of the Americas as 
well as Africa, Asia, and the more highly developed 
area of Western Europe, there is almost unlimited 
opportunity for co-operative measures to remove 
artificial and prejudicial trade barriers, to unify 
currencies, to distribute electric power... Over 
a period of years, regional systems would inevitably 
do away with the more restrictive forms of ultra­
nationalism in the economic and financial field.
In short, they are a device that in innumerable wayjg 
would make it far easier to maintain the peace... .
Secretary of State Hull was less sanguine about
regionalism. He invoked President Woodrow Wilson's oft
quoted warning and the rallying call for internationalists
that "there must be, not a balance of power, but a community
of power; not organized rivalries, but an organized common
peace; all nations henceforth (must) avoid entangling
alliances which would draw them into competitions of power."
Hull understood regionalism in terms of regional alliances
of states. He argued that organizing the world into such
regional "blocs" would be inherently unstable and lead to
potential inter-regional conflicts. The conflicts would in
turn engender power rivalries of a greater order and be more
difficult to contain by a world organization than conflicts
between smaller individual states. As regional groupings
solidified, Hull stated,
it might be possible that conflicts would spring 
up, not between nations but between regions. ...The 
more advanced regional ideas of President Roosevelt 
and Prime Minister Churchill ... might lead to 
questions of balance of power, and regional organi­
zations of the type they envisaged might deal arbi- 
' trarily with one another and in the internal affairs
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of their members, whether by military force or 
economic pressure... This would open the door to 
abuses and the exercise of undue privilieges by 
greedy, grasping nations possessing great military 
and economic strength.
Hull's views happened to be contrary to the direction
of the State Department's research under Welles' leadership
in 1942-43. Various sub-committees of the Advisory Committee
on Post-War Foreign Policy —  in particular, the Political
Committee and its Special Subcommittee on International
Organization, both chaired by Welles? the Economic Committee
presided over by Myron C. Taylor; the Territorial Committee
chaired by Isaiah Bowman; and the European Organization
Committee chaired by Hamilton Fish Armstrong —  confirmed
that regionalism within a relatively weak universalist
framework was favored for world (and European) organization
21prior to mid-1943.
The actual preparatory work for the new world
organization began with the establishment of a Special
Subcommittee on International Organization suggested by
Welles at a June 26, 1942 meeting of the Political
Subcommittee. Chaired by Welles, the subcommittee met 45
times between July 17, 1942 and July 26, 1943. Its mandate
according to Welles was to "put together in a preliminary
draft its views on organization which would then be taken up
22by the Political Subcommittee for discussion." Welles set
the tone for the subcommittee's work by suggesting the
feasability of combining world-wide and regional elements in
23a general security organization. Universal jurisdiction 
would be assumed for security and policing matters while 
most other problems would be left to the disposition of the
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regional organizations r who would be represented in the
general organization. The plan was developed at a subsequent
meeting, where "in viewing the total problem of postwar
international organization, Mr. Welles envisaged a
considerable devolution of function from a world-wide
24political authority to various regional bodies." The
meetings’ minutes did not indicate to what extent Welles
view was supported by other members of the subcommittee. As
things unfolded, it appeared that a regional grouping was
not a political unit possessed with legitimate authority and
power in the international arena but an association of
states whose members were also represented individually in
the world organization. At the December 4 meeting, there was
consensus that "'states' under the generally accepted
concept of sovereignty" would be the members of the new
world organization and that "the vitality of the national
state was regarded ... as of primary importance in the
25postwar world." At the same time, a consensus also existed
on the need to create an organization that was not a revival
26of League of Nations.
On March 26, 1943, Welles sent a draft of the 
subcommittee's recommendations to Secretary Hull. The report 
recommended a general security system in which peacekeeping 
and policing powers were vested in an eleven member 
Executive Council represented by the four major powers 
(including China) and five regional groupings of smaller and 
middle sized states. The regional members consisted of two 
representatives from Europe (including one from eastern
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Europe), two from the Americas, and one each from the Far
27East, the Near East and Africa, and the British Dominions.
In a final revised version of a "Draft Constitution of
International Organization," completed on July 14, 1943, the
subcommittee recommended five principal organs for the new
28world organization:
• an Executive Committee chaired by a General Secretary 
consisting of the four major powers powers and having 
"responsibility in matters of international security;"
• a Council chaired by the General Secretary consisting 
of the four major powers and seven regional representatives 
(as noted above) with "authority to supervise and 
coordinate" the work of the organization as well as "deal 
with any situation or condition which may threaten an 
impairment of the good relations among people;"
• a General Conference composed of all member states of 
the organization with "authority to act upon any matter of 
concern to the international community, and such special 
matters as may be referred to it by the Executive Committee 
or Council;"
• a General Security and Armaments Commission 
established by the Council as a "permanent advisory and 
administrative agency" composed of "military, naval, 
aviation, and civilian representatives of the states and 
groups of states represented on the Council";
• a permanent Secretariat established at the seat of 
the organization led by a General Secretary appointed by the 
Council with majority approval of the General Conference; 
and
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• a Judiciary or permanent court of international 
justice.
Welles' scheme at this time enjoyed the support of
President Roosevelt, who still spoke in terms of a "realist"
postwar peace maintained essentially by the major powers. A
day after submitting the March 26 report, Welles met with
the President and Hull for a meeting with visiting Foreign
Secretary Anthony Eden. Coming less than a week after
Churchill's March 1943 radio speech where he envisaged a
"Council of Europe" as the lynchpin of a postwar peace
structure, the Americans conveyed concern to Eden of a
European-centered peace plan. Presidential aide Harry
Hopkins, present at the meeting, described two points that
were conveyed to Eden by the Americans:
1. The President and Welles were very emphatic 
that the United States could not be a member of 
any independent regional body such as a European 
Council; they felt that all the United Nations 
should be members of one body for the purposes of 
recommending policy; that this body should be 
world-wide in scope. 2. That there would be under 
this body regional councils with similar advisory 
powers made up of nations geographically located 
in the regions; but, finally, that the real 
decisions should be made by the United States,
Great Britain, Russia and China, who would be the 
powers for many yg|rs to come that would have to 
police the world.
Secretary Hull reportedly said little or nothing at
the White House meeting. But he subsequently rejected
Welles' March 26 report in the Department's Political
Subcommittee because, as he put it, "I could not go along
30with the regional feature." The rejection reflected a 
simmering rivarly and feud between Hull and Welles 
attributed as much to clashing personal styles as policy
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differences. Hull, who chafed at Welles' access and
familiarity with the President, had begun to undercut
Welles' efforts and influence in late 1942-early 1943. In
January 1943, he replaced Welles as chairman of the pivotal
Political Subcommittee (while allowing him to continue to
serve as acting chairman until March). At the same time, he
weaned key members of the Special Subcommittee —  Myron C.
Taylor, Isaiah Bowman, Norman Davis, and Green Hackworth —
into an "informal agenda group" that served as an adjunct to
the Political Subcommittee and, in practice, as the general
31coordinating organ for the entire Advisory Committee.
Upon rejecting Welles' March 26 report, Hull gave the
Political Subcommittee and its so-called agenda group a new
mandate for a "detailed consideration of international
organization ... on the basis of the fundamental issues
rather than on the special sub-committee's draft." According
to Hull, the Political Subcommittee had by the summer,
"after thorough discussion, expressed itself as being
overwhelmingly in favor of a universal rather than a
32regional basis for international organization." In a
memorandum sent to the President on August 10th, Myron C.
Taylor summarized the new view o ^ subcommittee in the
following terms:
We have questioned how long such regional groups 
might escape the greed, rivalries, and ambitions 
of their component parts, or their utilization for 
selfish purposes by more powerful members; and we 
have queried whether those dangers could be avoided 
only through a strong world order. We have reached 
a consensus that the universal organization must 
not be founded upon regional structures and that 
such regional relationships or organizations should 
be primarily concerned with local problems, though
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they could perforin some functions by delegation 
from the general international organization.
This outcome was part of a successful effort during the
summmer by Hull and his agenda group to have Roosevelt "turn
34toward our point of view." Hull organized several meetings
at the White House with Welles usually absent. On July 23,
Hull suspended the work of the Advisory Committee and
charged the agenda group, under Leo Pasvolsky's
coordination, to draft a United Nations Charter "based on
the views of the Political Subcommittee that there should be
a universal rather than regional basis for the world 
35organization."
The issue of regionalism came to a head in August 1943
as the Department was preparing the draft of a Four-Power
Declaration and other papers for presentation to Roosevelt
and Churchill at the First Quebec Conference August 12-24.
As Acting Secretary of State on August 11 (Hull was
incapacitated by an illness), Welles submitted three papers
to the President which revealed the split within the
36Department on the question of regionalism. The proposed 
Four-Power Declaration prepared by the agenda group was 
decidedly internationalist in outlook. It had the major 
powers, in article four, "recognize the necessity of 
establishing at the earliest practicable date a general 
international organization. based on the principle of the 
sovereign egualitv of nations. and open to membership by all 
nations, large and small, for the maintenance of peace and 
security" (emphasis added). The second enclosure was a draft 
protocol for a Provisional United Nations Council prepared
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by Welles' Special Subcomittee on June 19 that was based on
a stronger regional representation structure than outlined
earlier. Members of the eleven member Council were now to
"represent the general interest of the region from which
they are designated rather than the particular interests of
37the states of which they are nationals."
The third enclosure, an August 11 memorandum by
Pasvolsky to the President, revealed the rupture in the
Department on regionalism issue. The memorandum summarized
the work on that day of the final meeting of the
Department's "Security Subcommittee," which had been asked
to respond to a July 16 British proposal for a "United
Nations Commission for Europe." In a passage to which Welles
took open issue, Pasvolsky wrote what in effect was to
become the U.S. policy:
The British Aide-M6moire raises again the whole 
issue of regionalism in connection with interna­
tional organization. ... The committee discussions 
have so far pointed to the following conclusions:
(1) that the basis of international organization 
should be world-wide rather than regional; (2) that 
there are grave dangers involved in having the world 
organization rest upon the foundation of previously 
created, full-fledged regional organizations; and 
(3) that while there may be advantages in setting 
up regional arrangements for some purposes, such 
arrangements should be subsidiary to £jje world 
organization and should flow from it.
On August 20, Secretary Hull personally brought the
documents to the President and Prime Minister Churchill
meeting at the First Quebec Conference. The draft Four-Power
Declaration prepared by the Informal Agenda Group was
accepted as the basis for further negotiation while the
Welles' committee documents, consisting of a slightly
revised draft United Nations Protocol and papers relating to
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dependent territories organized into regional commissions,
39were not acted upon. In addition to the draft Four-Power 
Declaration, the Political Subcommittee's agenda group had 
on August 14 completed a draft "Charter of the United 
Nations" that became the basis for the Department's 
preparatory work for the Dumbarton Oaks conference a year 
later. Regionalism was reduced in the draft to a minor 
subordinate role within a general membership organization of 
states. The single reference to regionalism (in Article 12) 
stated that "nothing is this Charter shall affect regional 
arrangements, agreements, or associations, now existing or 
which may be entered into between Members, which are
40consistent with the obligations under this Charter."
The gods were no longer with Welles, who felt the 
weight of the Department and, subsequently, the President's 
own support going against him. Outflanked and overpowered by 
Hull on this and other issues, Welles resigned from the 
Department on August 21. Hull and his principled 
internationalism prevailed in the end over Welles and the 
interstate regionalism suggested by him and perhaps the bulk 
of the Department's own research between 1940 and 1943. But 
the war-time debate on regionalism and world organization 
was far from over.
The Reaionalist Debate in the British Government
Next to the other major powers, Britain's commitment to 
regionalism in world organization was the least equivocal if 
also the most ineffectual. Less comfortable with the
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legalistic approach of the preponderantly American
internationalists than with the concept of balance, Britain
sought a postwar peace that was based on "creating an
effective European political unit which could hold a balance
41between Russian and American power." Britain directed 
world organization planning efforts to the two th eatres of 
conflict, Europe and the Far East, of which the former was 
clearly the more important. "The British felt that no scheme 
for international peace could survive if it were not based 
on a foundation of European security, coupled with 
safeguards against further outbreaks of aggression in the 
Far East."*^
A second and not unrelated postwar policy goal was
assuring United States participation in the postwar world.
With Britain's position as a world power in decline next to
ascendant American and Soviet powers, British policymakers
were satisfied if they "could bind the United States to
participate in world affairs as she had omitted to do in the
43years between the wars." In the early war years, when the 
Soviet Union was aligned with Germany in the 1939 non­
aggression pact, the idea of an Anglo-American condominium 
was favorably discussed among Foreign Office researchers. In 
a Foreign Research Press Service (FRPS) paper submitted to 
the Foreign Office on July 7, 1941, shortly after the German 
invasion of the Soviet Union, Arnold Toynbee argued for a 
peace settlement that integrated Europe with the rest of the 
world under the guarantee of Anglo-American power. The way 
toward a stable peaceful order, he argued, was
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not to insulate the overseas world from the main­
land of Europe either economically, politically, or 
strategically, but to try to bring the two regions 
into partnership under the auspices of Powers 
strong enough to guarantee peace and at the same 
time wise enough to use force underlying the 
guarantee with tact, justice and moderation. This 
is a partnership which Great Britain, as the bridge 
between Europe and the overseas countries, would be 
capable of bringing into being, and which the 
United Kingdom and the United States, acting in 
concert, would be capable.of protecting effectively 
by their joint guarantee.
The form of a British-American-led world order was outlined
in a brief prepared by a FPRS subcommittee and submitted to
the Foreign Office on the same date (July 7). The world
order was to be shouldered by "the English-speaking peoples,
who alone (would) possess the armed force needed for the
purpose," and organized into "four or five great blocs" that
included the British-American unit (with Latin America and
presumably Canada) along with a pan-European, Far Eastern,
45and Soviet blocs.
Postwar order planning in Britain effectively began in
October 1942, when the Foreign Office's Reconstruction
Department headed by Gladwyn Jebb outlined a "Four Power
Plan" for a regionally-organized world security 
46organization. Though viewed from the perspective of 
British interests, the plan was consonant with the 
regionalist American view at that time. Its basic idea was 
a major power-guaranteed peace through a "world council" 
comprised of "regional councils" that would "co-ordinate 
defence and economic arrangements" (7). On November 27, the 
War Cabinet approved a slightly revised version of such a 
plan. Four subsidiary regional councils —  for Europe, 
America, the Far East, and the British Commonwealth —  were
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represented on the World Council, with the United States,
Great Britain, and the Soviet Union also participating as
members of the European Council (12). Referring to a speech
on postwar issues by Sumner Welles four days earlier, the
War Cabinet "agreed that we should take advantage of this
situation" and approved Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's
motion to develop' the Jebb proposal along lines suggested
by Sir Stafford Cripps. Minister of Air and former Leader of
the House of Commons, Cripps urged the government "to take
the consideration of policy a stage further and to develop a
programme of common action by the Four Powers" (12).
With assistance from Cripps, Eden completed and
submitted on January 16, 1943 a "United Nations Plan" whose
preamble referred to Britain's two-fold foreign policy aims
as remaining a world power and preserving "the freedom of
Europe as essential to our own" (14) . The revised proposal
again favored regional bodies provided the great powers
acted in concert and with no single major power dominant in
any given region:
Generally speaking, regional groupings should be 
encouraged, subject always to the principle that 
there must not be a kind of "limited liability" 
system, whereby one Power is solely responsible 
for keeping the peace in any given area. ...In 
discussing "regionalism" therefore, we must assume 
that all the Four Powers (with the exception of 
China) are in principle equally interested in 
maintaining the peace everywhere in the world...
(17) .
Eden outlined a structure that divided the world into 
eight regional systems subordinate politically to a World 
council representing the major powers including, pro forma. 
China and possibly France. The eight regional groupings were:
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• the British Imperial Conference;
• a Pan-American Union;
• a European Council whose members included the U.K., 
U.S.? U.S.S.R., the European allies, and eventually neutrals 
and ex-enemy states;
• a Far Eastern Council with China playing the leading 
role but also including the U.K., U.S., U.S.S.R., Canada, 
?India, ?Australia, and eventually Japan;
• a Southeast Asia Council composed of France,
Thailand, U.K., U.S., Australia, Canada, New Zealand, China, 
The Netherlans, and ?India;
• a Middle East Council with the U.K., ?U.S., U.S.S.R., 
Turkey, Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, ?Palestine;
• an sub-Saharan Africa Council of the major colonial 
powers and Ethiopia;
• and a Caribbean Commission with the U.K., U.S., 
Canada, Holland, France, ?Mexico, Cuba, Puerto Rico, San 
Domingo, Venezuela (18-19). (interrogation points in 
original)
After the January 1943 Casablanca Conference talks
between Roosevelt and Churchill, the two leaders agreed that
Eden would soon follow up with consultations in Washington
on postwar issues. On his return leg via Cairo, where he met
with Turkish President Ismet Indnu, Churchill addressed a
paper entitled "Morning Thoughts: Note on Postwar Security"
to the President February 2. He expressed the intention of
the "leading Powers to prolong their honourable association"
in order to create a world organization in which
"governmental instruments" would be created in the two
47principal areas of conflict, Europe and the Far East. 
Churchill publically outlined his views on postwar order in 
his March 21, 1943 radio address in which he called on the 
three great powers to begin conferring on the future world 
organisation. While not seeking to preempt those
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discussions, he suggested that in the context of an 
organization composed of member states, "there should come 
into being a Council of Europe and a Council of Asia"
48distinct from, yet subsidiary to the world organization.
Europe had to take precendence over Asia, in part because
the end of the war was within sight there and in part
because "in Europe lie most of the causes which have led to
these two world wars."
The general problem of Europe for Churchill was
safeguarding the rights and interests of the small nations.
The problems of the small states, now overpowered by Germany,
could „be redressed through their representation in regional
groupings or councils which would exist as entities
alongside the larger powers. He called for consideration of
the proposition, "that side by side with the Great Powers
there should be a number of groupings of states or
confederations which would express themselves through their
own chosen representatives, the whole making a council of
49great States and groups of States."
The speech was coolly received in Washington, where the
50visiting Eden found himself on the defensive. In preparing
for his March 12 to 30 Washington trip, Eden, perhaps aware
of the rumblings in the State Department on the regionalism
issue, decided not to put "much emphasis on the 'regional 
51idea'." Regionalism had not only begun to lose favor m  
the State Department, but the Soviet Union had by this time 
begun to openly oppose Foreign Office-sponsored plans for 
regional federations in eastern Europe. In his memoirs, Eden
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indicated that he had begun to hedge on his support for
regionalism when in January 1943 he warned of the dangers of
"a kind of 'limited liability' system, whereby one power
would be responsible for keeping the peace in a given
region." Failing a common world policy on the part of the
great powers, Eden, echoing Hull's criticism of regionalism
as an essentialy crude form of hegemonial regionalism, said
"we shall be confronted by the prospect of a world in
precarious balance, with the great powers, each with its
circle of client States, facing each other in a rivalry
52which will merge imperceptibly into hostility."
In Washington, Eden chose to play the role of a
listener over that of an advocate on the postwar
organization issue. On March 24, he heared Welles' demurrals
on Churchill's plan for a Council of Europe as the apparent
centerpiece a the world organization. In a March 27 meeting
at the White House with the President, Hull, Welles,
presidential aide Harry Hopkins, and U.S. ambassador to
Britain John Winant, Eden distanced himself from Churchill's
speech and, according to Hopkins' minute, "rather felt that
Churchill spoke on the spur of the moment and that he, Eden,
agreed that the United Nations should be organized on a 
53global basis." But Roosevelt, as he also learned, was 
still the "realist" advocating a major power-centered 
regionalism within a world-wide organization. In a March 28 
cable to Churchill, he outlined Roosevelt's three-tier idea 
for a world organization that reflected Welles' regionalist 
thinking. On the top tier, an executive committee of the 
four major powers would be responsible for all important
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security and policing decisions. An advisory council would
occupy the middle and be composed of representatives of the
four powers plus six to eight representatives elected on a
regional basis, meeting to settle questions brought before
it. At the bottom was a general assembly composed of all
member nations which would meet annually to give the smaller
states the opportunity, as Roosevelt put it, "to blow off 
54steam."
Churchill had an opportunity to present his ideas
directly to American leaders during his visit to Washington 
55in May 1943. In a May 22 luncheon meeting at the British 
embassy, he accepted a request by Vice President Wallace, 
Secretary of War Stimson, Interior Secretary Ickes, Sumner 
Welles, and Senator Connally, chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, to hear out his views on postwar world 
organization. Churchill said he "attached great importance 
to the regional principle," for only countries whose 
interests were directly involved in a conflict could "be 
expected to apply themselves with sufficient vigour to 
secure settlement. If countries remote from a dispute were 
among those called upon in the first instance to achieve a 
settlement the result was likely to be merely vapid and 
academic discussion" (804).
Reacting perhaps to the American criticism of his 
European-centered proposal in March, he now outlined a plan 
for three autonomous "Regional Councils" —  in Europe, Asia, 
and the American hemisphere (including Canada as a member of 
the British Commonwealth) —  within a world organization
171
guaranteed by the major powers. Unlike Roosevelt's three- 
tier idea, he likened his postwar structure to a three- 
legged stool, with a Supreme World Council supported by the 
three Regional Councils. The regional councils were 
subordinate to the world council, which served as the 
highest court of appeals in settling disputes. The world 
council was based on an association of the three great 
powers (or four, if China had to be included), with regional 
council representation by election and on a rotating basis. 
The major powers would be members of regional councils in 
which they had interests. Churchill expressed hope that the 
United States would be represented in all three. As an 
enforcement mechanism in the world council, he suggested 
dividing the armed forces of each state into two 
contingents, one forming a national force, the other an 
international police force placed "at the disposal of the 
Regional Councils under the direction of the Supreme World 
Council" (805).
Churchill also revived the idea of an Anglo-American 
partnership, stating that a world organization could not 
exclude treaties of friendship "devoid of sinister purpose 
against others" (806). He doubted that a world security 
system could work unless the United States and the British 
Commonwealth joined forces in what he called "fraternal 
association." He not only favored free trade and movement, 
but looked forward to common military bases for a joint 
defense of common interests. Churchill even broached the 
idea of issuing common passports and "some common form of 
citizenship" (806)
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Although Churchill pointed out in closing that he was
"expressing only personal views" (807), he circulated the
written account of his remarks to the War Cabinet upon his
return in early June. And judging by the reaction of his
American hosts, British and American views on postwar
world organization seemed to be synchronous. On June 10,
Welles outlined his idea of a world council represented by
the four major powers and seven regional groupings of states
to British Ambassador Lord Halifax and visiting Foreign
57Office Under-Secretary Richard Law. From the Foreign
Office's perspective, it "welcomed American assent to the
idea of a Supreme World Council consisting of the four
5 8Powers and other members chosen on a regional basis."
Churchill's regional model was a seeming amalgam of 
interstate, hegemonial, and autochthonous forms (in that 
order of importance) that sought to weld smaller nations 
into larger entities which in turn were part of larger 
continental systems. The structure was to be held together 
by the major powers, including perhaps a partnership between 
the United States and Britain, in a world organization where 
states were represented individually and through regional 
groupings. Churchill remained committed to the regional 
idea but did not have the time to pursue its implementation 
into policy either with the Foreign Office, where the 
postwar planning effort was centered, or in the allied 
councils. The Foreign Office began to waver on the 
regionalism issue in 1943 as its policies were increasingly 
influenced by the thinking of the United States and Soviet
173
Union. As William McNeill has suggested, "the power of the
two vast nation-states, America and Russia, each newly aware
of its strength and full of self-confidence, clearly
surpassed Britain's unaided strength; and the British
Government saw their post-war problem primarily in terms of
salvaging as much of Britain's influence, wealth, and power
59as circumstances would permit." Neither Churchill nor Eden
were in a position to oppose the internationalist direction
in which Secretary of State Hull officially steered allied
policy on postwar world organization after the mid-1943.
This direction was assured by a Soviet Union that preferred
to leave "the field of post-war planning on the grand scale
60to the Americans."
Outlines of a Soviet Perspective
The Soviet Union, as we noted above, devoted the least 
effort among the major powers to postwar world order 
planning. At the same time, it nurtured a hegemonial policy 
towards its western neighbors that first revealed itself in 
1939-40 following the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression treaty.
A Soviet attitude and policy on regionalism and postwar 
order did not emerge until 1943, and even then it remained 
sketchy and derivative. If regionalism was a new term in the 
western political lexicon, it was all the more so in the 
Soviet's. Their dilemna can in part be explained by 
understanding some basic distinctions between the theory and 
practice of Soviet international relations.
As we noted in Chapter I, the Soviet Union's Marxist-
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Leninist metaphysic questioned the very legitimacy of the
western capitalist/nationalist, or "bourgeois," states-
system. Soviet theory countered "bourgeois internationalism"
with a "proletarian internationalism" that recognized the
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and its center in
Moscow as the fount of a revolutionary-socialist and,
ultimately, stateless world order which alone could
establish world peace. Based along class and not national
lines, the new socialist world was seen as the "camp of
peace" while the dying capitalist world of "encirclement"
was the "camp of war" that would some day be overcome. In
this framework, the modern state was considered an instrument
of class rule that appeared, historically, with the division
of society into classes. The state according to Marxist
theorists was a coercive mechanism of the exploiting class
whose development was tied to the period of capitalism and
nationalism. "A nation is not merely a historical category,"
Stalin wrote in 1913, "but a historical category belonging
to a definite period, the epoch of rising capitalism. The
process of elimination of feudalism and development of
capitalism was at the same time a process of amalgamation of
61people into nations." In western Europe, the formation of
nations coincided with their conversion into independent
national states. In eastern Europe, where feudal structures
still largely prevailed, nations were organized into large
multinational empires, but that the bourgeois-driven
national movements in the region "were bound to respond in
62the same fashion."
Just as capitalism was ineluctably moving toward
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socialism, the capitalist nation-states were destined by the
same historical laws to disappear under the rule of the
proletariat and be replaced by the higher, supranational
political authority of the socialist world state. Thus,
"since Stalin took it for granted that the bourgeoisie must
be destroyed, the world of sovereign nation-states which it
63had created was likewise doomed to oblivion." The state 
would expire ("wither away") with the construction of a 
classless society by a "dictatorship of the proletariat." The 
appointed agency for carrying out this change was the third 
Communist International, or Comintern, set up by Lenin in 
1919. At the Sixth Comintern Congress in 1928, the Comintern 
Program still asserted that the state, "being the
embodiement of class domination, dies out as classes die
_ „64 out."
This utopian vision, while it had theoretical merit in
the eyes CPSU General-Secretary Stalin, took a back seat in
the 1930s to the pragmatic needs of power and protecting
"socialism in one country." In 1930, Stalin artfully
"declared that the Communist state was to grow and reach the
greatest strength ever obtained by any state in history, and
65only then would it begin to 'wither away'." In 1939, at
the 18th Congress of the CPSU, he declared that the Soviet
state would continue to exist in the period of Communism as
6 6long as "capitalist encirclement" existed.
In the meantime, Premier Stalin led Soviet Russia back 
into the bourgeois community of nations. With Hitler's 
accession to power in January 1933, Germany as well as a
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militaristic Japan in the Pacific became a threat to Soviet
security. Using his able Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov,
he succeeded in obtaining diplomatic recognition from the
United States government in late 1933. This was followed by
the Soviet Union's trumpeted "return to Europe" and its 1934
admission to the League of Nations. It was here, that
Litvinov, with uncanny ability, labored to create regional
security pacts within the League framework in both Europe
67and the Pacific. In crafty and eloquent speeches to the
League between 1936 and 1938, he often criticized the
League's universalist conception of collective security as
6 8an impediment to peace. On September 28, 1936, he began a
campaign to promote a regional as against a universal
application of the collective security principle. He said
the chief function of the League was to uphold peace, not
"universalism at any price." He called on the League to act
on his regional proposals, among them the creation of an
"eastern Locarno," "without waiting for the advent of
universalism." In fact, he called on the members of the
League who wished to take part in regional, or, when this
was impossible, in bilateral pacts of mutual assistance to
"open diplomatic negotiations among themselves to achieve 
69this aim." The failure of these and other more lame
attempts to stop Hitler prompted Stalin to drop Litvinov and
opt for the Nazi-Soviet non-agression pact of August 1939,
which remained in force until Hitler's invasion of the
70Soviet Union in June 1941.
It was not until early 1943, when victory over the 
German army in the Caucasus seemed assured, that the Soviets
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began to consider the question of postwar world order. A
February 1943 despatch to the Foreign Office from British
ambassador Clark Kerr in Moscow indicated that "the Soviet
Government had not yet got beyond the merest preliminary
71study" in this area. It was at this time that Soviet
ambassador to London Ivan Maisky began discussions with
British officials, among them Brendan Bracken, Minister of
Information and a confidant of Churchill. In an April 1943
exchange, Bracken outlined Churchill's revised scheme of a
supreme world council of the three or four major powers and
the three subordinate regional councils responsible for
maintaining the peace in their regions. While Maisky voiced
"no objections" to the regional structure, which nonetheless
provided "for the representation of every country of that
region in its central body," he questioned "the setting up
of a three-member or four-member directorate which in the
long run will give orders to the whole world. This
undoubtedly will arouse serious and sufficiently justified
72objections by other States: what then?" Maisky's doubts
were in fact not shared by Stalin, who, as we shall see in
the following Chapter, had fewer qualms about a major power
condominium policing the world. As early as June 1, 1942,
Molotov had assured Roosevelt of Stalin's support for the
President's concept of a peace structure based on the major
73powers acting as "world policemen."
When both Maisky and Litvinov were recalled to Moscow 
in May 1943, both were later appointed deputy Foreign 
Commissars under Molotov to assist with postwar issues.
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Litvinov was given responsibilities for postwar planning
74with emphasis on the world security organization. The 
Soviets were to express views on regionalism and postwar 
world organization during the wartime inter-allied 
conferences between the end of 1943 and the spring of 1945, 
the subject of the following chapter.
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CHAPTER VI
THE DEBATE AMONG THE MAJOR POWERS 
AT THE INTER-ALLIED CONFERENCES,
1943-1945
Between 1940 and 1943, the United States favored a 
postwar world organization with marked regionalist features. 
In August 1943, Secretary of State Hull succeeded in pulling 
American thinking on world organization back toward 
Wilsonian internationalism. He considered regionalism, which 
he interpreted as potentially hostile "blocs" of states, as a 
threat to the very nature of universal organization. But 
Hull's success in turning both the State Department and 
White House to his view did not the foreclose debate on 
regionalism and world organization in the next phase of 
postwar planning, namely the inter-allied conferences of the 
major powers. In the 18 months between the first Quebec 
Conference August 12-24, 1943 and the Yalta conference 
February 4-12, 1945, the views and proposals on world 
organization advanced by the State Department carried the 
day, for the most part, with Britain and the Soviet Union. 
During this period, advocates of regionalism were on the 
largely on the defensive. But regionalism remained an issue 
on the postwar agendas. Like a jack-in-the-box, it kept
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coining back in the allied deliberations leading to and 
including the San Francisco Conference on International 
Organization between April 25-June 26, i945.
Regionalism on the Wane I: From Quebec to Teheran, August- 
December 1943
On August 21, 1943, Secretary of State Hull secured
preliminary approval of the State Department's "informal
agenda group" draft of a Four-Power Declaration on allied
war aims from President Roosevelt and Prime Minister
Churchill meeting at the First Quebec Conference. Article 4
of the Declaration devoted to the future world organization
obliged the governments of the United States, Great Britain,
the Soviet Union, and China to jointly declare that
they recognize the necessity of establishing at the 
earliest practicable date a general international 
organization, based on the principle of the sovereign 
equality of nations, and open to membership by all 
nations, large and small, for the^maintenance of 
international peace and security.
The draft declaration, which was to be acted upon at the
Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference in October, also stated
that until a general system of security was in place, the
four powers would act as the world's policemen. Article 5
mandated them during this interim period to "consult and act
jointly in behalf of the community of nations."
Churchill's agreement in principle to the declaration
contradicted his stated regionalist ideas on postwar order.
"Despite his earlier views," as Hull noted in his memoirs,
"Mr. Churchill did not object to the Four-Nation
o
Declaration." For a meeting devoted primarily to military
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affairs, Churchill the supreme strategist may have attached
little importance to the high-minded declaration (he did not
mention it in his six-volume wartime memoirs). This view was
reinforced by the Foreign Office, which regarded the
declaration "as less valuable than a document which the
3
Senate could have ratified at once." Churchill's
acquiescence may have also been impelled by a realization
that his idea for a Council of Europe was becoming a
pipedream in face of American and Soviet opposition and
that, under these circumstances, it was necessary to rely on
the United States as a counterpoise to Soviet power. "From
Churchill's point of view, there was much that seemed
unrealistic in American attitudes, but acceptance of
American leadership in post-war planning had the great
advantage of committing the United States to an active part
4m  post-war international affairs." Churchill assured the 
President on August 23 that there would be no serious 
differences of view on the text, but that he would 
nonetheless have to refer the document to the War Cabinet 
for consideration and approval.
With Churchill still in the United States, Eden 
presented the draft text to the War Cabinet on September 6. 
Members responded by taking exception to the "sovereign 
equality of nations" phrase and by seeking to give greater 
voice to the role of small nations. The Cabinet thought that 
the "sovereign equality of nations" might erroneously be 
taken "to mean that every nation should be given equal 
weight in the World Organisation." After consulting with the 
Dominion governments, they revised the wording of the draft
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into a separate document presented to the Moscow Foreign
Ministers' Conference. Article 4 was revised by adding to
the "sovereign equality of nations" the phrase, "for the
maintenance of international peace and security in which all
peace-loving nations, great and small, may play their part."
This wording left open the possibility of small nations
playing their part as regional actors, and hence as more
equal not only de jure, but also de facto to the larger
states. Concern for the small nations was also cause for
amending article 5 to read: "They [the four major powers]
will consult with one another, and as occasion requires with
other Members of the United Nations, with a view to joint
action on behalf of the community of nations."
At the Moscow conference October 19-30, 1943, Secretary
Hull succeeded in his main conference goal of securing
adoption of the "Four-Nation Declaration." The original
American text was approved with but minor changes on October
26. The only modification of article 4 was the substitution
of "peace-loving states" for "nations." Foreign Secretary
Eden did succeed, however, in amending article 5 with the
British wording lest the original "be taken to imply a four-
power dictatorship ... that the British Dominions,
5particularly Canada, objected to." The Soviet Union's only
objection to the declaration was the inclusion of China as a
signatory. Hull also circulated at this time but did not
place other, including the Welles' committee, documents
£
relating to world organization on the agenda.
Through Hull's persistence and skill, and the power of
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the United States, internationalism in general and a
universal international organization in particular had now
been formally adopted by the major powers as the guiding
principle and structure of postwar world organization. The
Moscow Declaration became the reference point for all
subsequent postwar planning. Hull admitted to no inherent
conflict between an internationalism recognizing the
"sovereign equality of all nations" and the big power
condominium that would guarantee if not impose peace on the
rest of the world. On one hand, he could tell Foreign
Affairs Commissar Molotov (on October 19) that he was
"convinced that our three countries would be engaged in
close cooperative international action not only during the
7
war but m  the post-war period as well... ." On the other, 
in his November 18 report on the Moscow conference to a 
joint session of Congress, he could lay "particular stress" 
on the Article 4 provision emphasizing that "the principle 
of sovereign equality of all peace-loving states, 
irrespective of size and strength, as partners in a future 
system of general security, will be the foundation upon 
which the future international organization will be 
constructed." In characteristic language fraught with as 
much wishful thinking as his comment to Molotov, Hull stated 
that as the provisions of declaration were "carried into 
effect, there will no longer be need for spheres of 
influence, for alliances, for balance of power, or any other 
special arrangements through which, in the unhappy past, the 
nations strove to safeguard their security or promote their 
interests.
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The Moscow conference prepared the way for the first 
joint meeting of the three allied heads of state in Teheran 
November 28-December 1. In their first war-time encounter, 
President Roosevelt broached Marshall Stalin with the 
question of postwar world organization in a private 
conversation on November 29. He spoke of a need for a world­
wide organization. But what he outlined to Stalin was his
regionalist plan for a three-tiered world organization which
9
he had also discussed with Churchill m  early September.
The organization would consist of a general assembly of some
40 nations which would discuss and make recommendations to a
10-member executive committee composed of the four major
powers and six representatives from five world regions. The
six regional representatives included "two additional
European states, one South American, one Near East, a Far
Eastern country, and one British D o m i n i o n . T h e  executive
committee would deal with all non-military questions. The
third and highest organ consisted of the four major powers,
or "Four Policemen," who "would have the power to deal
immediately with any threat to peace and any emergency which
11requires this action."
Although Roosevelt had apparently rallied to Hull's 
internationalism, it is apparent that the six smaller states 
on the executive committee were representatives of regions, 
not their respective states. The structure he outlined 
corresponded to Welles' July 14, 1943 "Draft Constitution of 
International Organization," which provided for an 
"executive committee" of the four major powers; an eleven-
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member "council" of the four powers and seven members
representing five regions (two each from Europe and the
12American states group); and a "general conference."
By contrast, Roosevelt's conception did not correspond to
the draft "Charter of the United Nations" completed by
Hull's Informal Agenda Group in the State Department on
August 14, 1943, which provided for an organization based on
universal membership in a "general conference" and a
"council" comprised of the four major powers and three
13member states elected by the general conference.
Roosevelt was not in his element in Teheran. When 
Stalin asked him whether the world body would have the right 
to make binding decisions on the nations of the world that 
may also require the sending of American troops to Europe, 
Roosevelt equivocated. He admitted that such an arrangement 
might be unacceptable to the U.S. Congress. Stalin then 
proceeded to challenge the idea of a world organization 
ruled by the "Four Policemen" by coming to the defense of 
the small nations of Europe and, while not stating so 
directly, endorsing Churchill's conception of postwar order. 
He imagined that the European nations would resent China's 
intervention in their affairs. Instead of a world 
organization based on the four major powers, Stalin 
envisaged an organization based on European and Far Eastern 
"commissions," with the three major powers as members of the 
European commission. Roosevelt replied that this idea was 
close to Churchill's idea of regional councils for Europe, 
the Far East, and the Americas. He also expressed doubts 
that Congress would agree to America's participation in an
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exclusively European committee "which might be able to force
14the dispatch of American troops to Europe." When Stalin
pointed out that a world organization run by the major
powers might also require the use of American troops,
Roosevelt again hedged, responding that he did not envisage
the use of troops, but only American planes and ships.
In a follow-up conversation on December 1, Stalin,
referring to the November 29 discussion, told Roosevelt that
on further reflection, "he had come to agree with the
President that it [the world organization] should be world-
15wide and not regional." But from what the President told
Senator Tom Connally upon returning to the United States,
Roosevelt still believed Stalin favored the regional plan.
"Stalin, Roosevelt concluded, favored Churchill's regional
plan," Connally wrote. "'I'll have to work on both of them,'
16Roosevelt told me." Churchill, who was not invited to take
part in the discussions, suggested later that Roosevelt
misrepresented his views. "He does not seem to have made it
clear that I also contemplated a Supreme United Nations
Council, of which the three regional committees would be the
components. As I was not informed until much later of what
had taken place, I was not able to correct this erroneous 
17presentation." The Teheran discussions on postwar world
organization proved inconclusive and premature, in large
part because "Roosevelt seems to have become hesitant as
18between the various, vaguely formulated possibilities." 
Stalin, on the other hand, no doubt took note of Roosevelt's 
remarks about the unavailability of American troops for
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postwar police duty in Europe in whatever hegemonial designs 
he may have entertained for the Soviet Union in postwar 
eastern Europe.
Regionalism Revived: the Road to the Dumbarton Oaks 
Conference (August 21-0ctober 7. 1944)
After a research and development phase between 1940 and
1943, the major powers, notably the United States and Great
Britain, engaged in a second or preparatory phase of postwar
world order planning in 1944. Armed with the Moscow
Declaration and a "topical outline" prepared by the Informal
Agenda Group, the three powers formulated separate proposals
for the new world organization that were considered at a
working conference in the Dumbarton Oaks estate near
19Washington D.C. between August 21-October 7. The "Topical
Outline" issued to Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and
China on February 17, 1944 essentially established the
20agenda and ensuing work. It consisted of questions 
relating to the general character, structure, and function 
of an international organization consisting of a General 
Assembly, Executive Council, and Court of Justice. It also 
sought proposals specific to security arrangements, economic 
and social cooperation, territorial trusteeships, and 
procedures for establishing all of the above.
The attitudes and policy objectives of the three major 
powers prior to the conference revealed substantial 
differences of emphasis and view. The British, guided by 
principles of a traditional and benign Realpolitik. 
continued to speak up, if in more muted tones, for the
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smaller states and their participation in world organization 
through regional groupings. Churchill hoped that a less 
"pulverized" Europe would enable Great Britain and European 
states to hold their own against the American and Soviet 
giants. The British continued to favor geographic "regional 
councils" as a key to world order. By contrast, the 
formally-minded Americans directed their energies to 
drafting a charter of the world organization based on a 
literal interpretation of Article 4 of the Moscow 
Declaration. In devising their legalistic blueprint for a 
universal organization, they accorded little room for 
regionalism. The Soviets, in a reversal of Stalin's negative 
view at Teheran of Roosevelt's "four policemen" idea and 
disguising power ambitions for hegemony in eastern Europe, 
outlined more or less hasty views for a world organization 
that was dependent on the major powers.
The Foreign Office coordinated the work and production 
of five memoranda on world organization that were submitted 
to the United States and Soviet Union in July 1944 as the 
British negotiating position for Dumbarton Oaks. Directed by 
Gladwyn Jebb, the memoranda were prepared by an 
interdepartmental committee chaired by Minister of State 
Richard Law and submitted to the Armistice and Post-War 
Committee and War Cabinet in April 1944. The memoranda, 
which were slightly revised between April and July, covered 
subjects relating to the scope and nature of the world 
organization (Memorandum A); settlement of disputes 
(Memorandum B); military aspects of a postwar security
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organization (Memorandum C); coordination of political and
economic mechanisms (Memorandum D); and the method and
procedure for establishing the world organization
21(Memorandum E).
Referring to the Moscow Declaration, the British 
proposals provided for a world-wide organization respecting 
the political independence and "sovereign equality" of its 
member states. On the surface, the memoranda and Law's April 
16 cover note to the War Cabinet were internationalist in 
tone and supportive of a three or four-power-led world 
organization. Law stated in his cover note that power 
resided in a World Council composed of the four major powers 
"and a number of other States" (91). A closer reading of the 
texts revealed an underlying preference for regional 
structures as a basis for both small state representation 
and international security within world organization. The 
British proposals attempted clearly to go beyond the 
internationalism plus "four-policemen" formula.
In addition to a universal organization, Memorandum A 
envisaged functional, or specialised technical organizations 
"through which States will combine for various purposes," 
and regional associations when there was "obvious advantage 
to be obtained by limitation of the sphere of action" (95). 
Such advantages were seen in matters relating to "security, 
for economic co-operation, for the promotion of welfare for 
colonial territories or for other purposes" (Ibid.). A 
coordinating mechanism would tie the functional 
organizations to "an economic and social secretariat
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attached to the World Council" and the regional 
organizations "should not (be in) conflict with the world­
wide organisation but rather assist to carry out its 
purposes" (Ibid.).
The World Council had to remain small in order to 
ensure effective action, but it also had to be "of such 
character as to possess the confidence of all Members of the 
Organization" (96). As the power, size, and status of states 
varied greatly and were unevenly distributed over the 
continents, a means had to "be found to ensure that the 
various regions of the world (were) adequately represented" 
(Ibid.). The proposition was made conditionally: "Should 
Regional Associations of sufficient importance be formed 
they might furnish the basis for representation on the 
Council" (97). The matter needed "careful examination —  not 
only amongst the Four Powers themselves but with the other 
States whose wishes must be taken into account" (Ibid.).
Regionalism was also an issue in the proposals for a 
security system (Memorandum C). The suggestion was made in 
Memorandum B that regional political organizations, in 
consort with the World Council, could serve in a dispute as 
the peace settlement agency of first resort (104) .
Memorandum C, which was approved by the Chiefs of Staff, was 
based on the assumption than an international police force, 
which implied the existence of a world government, was 
premature (108). A regional approach to security would be 
more feasable as this would serve to limit the military 
commitments of the smaller powers while increasing their 
efficiency and ability to act. Such an arrangement would
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"give the smaller nations a more direct concern in security 
problems, ...thus reducing the burden on the Four Powers" 
and facilitating cooperation in security matters between the 
states involved (Ibid.). A disadvantage lay in the military 
difficulty of dividing the world into more or less fixed 
geographical regions. But if a regional system were 
established, it was conceivable that the Military Staff 
Committee of the world organization could "coordinate the 
activities of the military staff attached to the regional 
organisations" (111) .
In the final memorandum (E) relating to the actual 
establishment of the world organization, it was suggested 
that if regional organizations came into being, they be set 
up "in accordance with a general plan after the outline of 
the World Organisation has been determined" (113). In sum, 
the postwar structure that emerged from the texts was a 
great power-based international organization with a pointed 
concern if not emphasis for interstate regional (and 
functional) forms of organization subordinate to a world 
organization. The draft texts were careful not to advocate 
regionalism as the organizing principle. Rather, it was 
presented as a possibility if the right (i.e., political) 
conditions existed.
Irked by the equivocal character of the proposals and 
the Foreign Office's apparent backsliding on the regional 
principle, Churchill returned to his idea of regional coun­
cils for Europe, America, and Asia at the April 27, 1944 War 
Cabinet meeting that considered the memoranda's conclusions.
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He expounded on his regional concept in a separate May 8
memorandum that accompanied the five Foreign Office
memoranda to the Dominion Prime Ministers meeting in London.
Each regional council was to consist of twelve to twenty
representatives who would select a single member as
representative to a seven-member World Peace Council
consisting of the four major powers and three regional
councils. The nationality of the regional representative
could not be that of any of the four major powers
permanently represented. It was also expected that one or
more of the four permanent members of the council also be
members of regional councils. The regional councils were
charged with real security and functional economic and
social welfare duties. The other institutions of the world
organization were be a consultative Assembly and World
Court. The only contemplated derogations of national
22sovereignty lay in the area of war prevention.
The Dominion Prime Ministers, led by New Zealand's
Peter Fraser, objected both to the idea of organizing the
world into three continental hemispheric "blocs” and being
represented in the World Council by the United Kingdom as
part of the British Empire or Commonwealth. As Eden later
noted of the May 11 meeting, the Dominion representatives
"all took my line and not W.'s [Winston Churchill's] about
the future world set-up. ...they were nervous about regional 
23councils... ." Faced with this opposition, Churchill 
withdrew his memorandum from consideration. Following the 
conference, Eden "diplomatically concluded that regional 
councils . . . should be de-emphasized as an integral part of
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24the international organization's structure.” Churchill,
however, fought back and chose to put uncharacteristic
pressure on Eden to "revise" the Foreign Office cover note
to the Dominion Foreign Ministers along with certain
passages in memorandas A and B "'in the sense of weighing
the alternatives of regional organisations under the supreme
25body versus general mob.'"
The revised May 15 cover note contained ten new
paragraphs that represented perhaps the strongest official
major power language for regional organization that was to
26appear during war. It also exposed the splits between the 
War Cabinet and Foreign Office on the one hand and British 
and American positions on the other. The note began by 
acknowledging articles 4 and 5 of the Moscow Declaration as 
laying down the principle for a world-wide organization that 
reserved a special position for the major powers during an 
interim period. It then asserted that world organzation only 
made concrete sense if it was seen in terms of a combination 
of the great powers linked to "the continental organisations 
in which other States find their due place" (120). The 
advantages of a world organized into "three continental 
blocs of Europe, Asia and the Western Hemisphere each with 
its own special machinery adapted to its own needs" were 
four-fold (Ibid.). One, it would foster needed European 
unification. Two, continental representation on the World 
Council would make that body more representative of the 
whole world while remaining sufficiently small in membership 
to allow it act with promptness and efficiency. Three, it
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would encourage smaller states to form contiguous groupings 
within the continental organizations to prevent absorption 
by stronger neighboring states. Finally, it would contribute 
to economic development and the solution of other including 
technical problems such as those of transport and power.
The revised note declared that a ’’fully developed 
regional system" would take time to build and cited the 
proposed "United Nations Commission for Europe" as a vehicle 
for the gradual establishment of regional and functional 
bodies within the framework of the world organization. 
Similar integration processes were foreseen for Southeast 
Asia and the Southwest Pacific within a wider area sharing 
common institutions with China and in which the British 
Commonwealth would be represented. Such a framework already 
existed in the Western Hemisphere in the Pan-American Union. 
While great power involvement for the maintainance of peace 
could require military interventions in Europe or Asia, it 
would be done with the purpose of encouraging "the other 
States to cooperate together in the settlement of their own 
problems in such a manner as finally to reach the objectives 
of a 'United States of Europe' and its equivalents in the 
other continents" (121) .
The cover note then acknowledged the writing on the 
political wall, namely the near certainty that the British 
proposals would not be acceptable to the United States of 
the Soviet Union. It instructed that the above objective 
"should be constantly in the mind of our delegation at 
Washington," but that it was "not possible to state it there 
explicitly or include it in the papers" to be exchanged
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before the meeting with United States and Soviet Union. The
reason was that "Mr. Hull has committed himself publically
to a world organisation of a quite different kind" (121). If
Britain forced the issue, it risked the consequence of the
United States refusing "any permanent responsibility outside
its own hemisphere" (Ibid.). Given this possibility,
Britain's official approach at the Dumbarton Oaks conference
"was to be able to report that the British proposal was
27similar to the American plan in all essentials." As if to
underscore the lack of British leverage on the issue,
Churchill, in a May 24 speech to the House of Commons cited
the need for a world structured into "great entities" not in
conflict with a world organization. He qualified this by
stating that "it would be presumption for any one Power to
prescribe in detail exactly what solution will be found.
Anyone can see how many alternatives there are. A mere
attempt on our part to do so ... might prejudice us in
gaining consideration for our arguments when the time 
..28comes... ."
In the long months between the Moscow and Dumbarton 
Oaks conferences, the United States developed a draft 
charter for a universal world organization whose structure 
resembled a revised League of Nations. After returning from 
the Moscow conference in November, Hull and his advisors, 
organized into a somewhat more formalized "Informal Political 
Agenda Group," wasted little time in getting to work. On 
November 18, the Department sought concurrance from the 
three other signatories of the Moscow Declaration to
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"welcome adherence by all peace-loving states to the
29statement in paragraph 4 of the Declaration... ." Only the
Soviet government responded, in the affirmative. On December
23, the Department had completed a draft "Plan for the
Establishment of an International Organization for the
Maintenance of International Peace and Security" which
30contained no provisions for regional arrangements.
Referred to as the "Possible Plan," it provided for an
Executive Council with powers "to repress acts or threats of
agression" and was comprosed of the four major powers and at
least three other members states chosen by a General
Assembly. The third organ of the organization was an
International Court of Justice. On December 29, Hull sent
the plan to the President, who had returned from Teheran and
Cairo a week before. Roosevelt initialled his approval of
the plan on February 3, 1944. As Hull stated, "practically
all the points contained in this draft were later embodied
in the proposals we submitted to the Dumbarton Oaks 
31Conference."
Perhaps in anticipation of the British position, Hull
and his advisors perceived a need to refute regionalism as
principle and structure for world organization. A Department
memo on regional organization written by the Political
Studies Division chief Harley A. Notter, whose supervisor,
Pasvolsky, was Hulls' special assistant for postwar
32planning, apparently filled this need. The succint nine- 
paragraph memo indicated the extent to which regionalism 
was perceived by Hull and his advisors as a threat to the
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international system as it was known. The memo began by
rhetorically asking what role if any regional organization
could play in the universal international organization that
had been agreed upon as the basis for the postwar world
organization. Notter cited several arguments in favor of
regional organization:
Regional organization could satisfy the obvious 
need for the application of such principles as 
might be accepted in common by the peoples and 
states in each region. It could facilitate peaceful 
adjustments locally. It would provide between the 
states and universal organization a structure of 
political, economic, and legal buffers to absorb 
the shocks of many of the controversies which will 
arise, and would also free the universal organi­
zation for the performance of higher functions.
And it would offer an intermediate type of inter­
national organization to fall back upon if the 
universal is crippled by the defection of a great 
power.
The remainder of the memo was devoted to a critique of 
these arguments. In a regionally organized world, a 
universal organization would be faced with the prospect of 
dealing less with individual states than with groups of 
states. Viable regional organizations would therefore run 
the risk of creating "a profound change in the relationship 
as well as the functions of universal organization." Second, 
well established regional groupings could weaken or strip 
the security functions of the universal organization. This 
could lead to inter-regional conflicts, which "might be 
beyond the competence of any universal organization to 
master." It was easier to deal with a single state alone 
than a state that was tied to a region. Third, regionalism 
and the relationship between great powers and small states 
in the area of economic relations may result in the
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"development of closed trade areas or discriminatory systems 
which could defy universal organization and create grave 
inter-regional struggles." Major powers may not choose to 
exercise their economic power with the same restraint as the 
United States had done in the inter-American system. Fourth, 
although the above could be prevented by the representation 
of more than one major power in a given region, this in turn 
creates other risks. It could commit the United States to a 
role in the Europe or the Pacific which it may not otherwise 
have desired. The United States would "be held responsible 
for the local and world effects of decisions taken in those 
(regional) councils." Furthermore, in an American hemisphere 
council, the United States would be representing the other 
American republics without election by or instructions from 
them, a factor that may render existing inter-American 
relations more difficult. Fifth, if the relationship between 
a regional and universal organization is not appellate, that 
is, regional subordinate to universal, then the very nature 
of international organization is altered. It would increase 
the chances for domination by great powers in some regions. 
Sixth and last, the memo stated that it was doubtful whether 
the American people would approve U.S. participation in 
European, Far Eastern, and American regional councils as 
well as in a universal organization. "They might feel that 
the United States would be stronger in dealing with other 
major powers directly and only in a universal organization."
Apart from the last argument, which was based on 
domestic political considerations, Notter's objections to 
regionalism were at least as hypothetical as arguments in
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its favor. What Hull and his advisors had in their favor was
the tried and, in their view, true experience of the
existing international system and body of law. Experimenting
with a new structure meant taking unnecessary risks. A more
realistic challenge lay in expanding the scope and reach of
(western) international law in the framework of an evolving
international organization. Hull stated in a major policy
speech on April 9, 1944 that a universal organization
must be based upon firm and binding obligations 
that the member nations will not use force against 
each other and against any other nations except in 
accordance with the arrangements made. It must 
provide for the maintenance of adequate forces to 
preserve peace and it must provide the institutions 
and procedures for calling this force into action 
to preserve peace. ...It must provide for an inter­
national court for the development and application 
of law to the settlement of international contro­
versies which fall within the realm of law, for 
the development of machinery for adjusting contro­
versies to which the field of law has not yet been 
extended, and for other institutions for the 
development of new rules to keep abreast of a ^3
changing world with new problems and new interests.
Hull's speech coincided with a series of consultations
which he initiated with members of Congress to ensure broad
support for the Department's work. But it was in the course
of these consultations that regionalism, which had received
little or no mention, bounced back into the picture. An
April 24, 1944 draft of the "Possible Plan" was presented by
Hull on the following day to the consultative group of
Senators appointed by the Foreign Relations Committee at
34Hull's request. At a follow-up meeting on May 2, two of 
the four substantive queries raised by the Senators were 
regional in nature: "a) regional representation as a basis 
for council membership; b) the need to consult with South
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American countries and to weight the effect of the proposed
35international organization in the inter-American system."
As if to preempt debate on these questions, Hull distributed
a revised "Possible Plan" on April 29, which contained
significant additions endorsing regional measures within
universal organization. Chapter I, Section A, Article 4,
devoted to the "Nature of the Organization," read:
The organization should be so constituted as to 
make possible the existence of regional organiza­
tions or other arrangements not inconsistent with 
its purposes, and to enable such organizations and 
arrangements to function on their own initiation 
or by reference from the general organization on 
matters of security and peace which are appropriate 
for regional adjustment. The general organization 
should at all times be informed of the activities 
in matters of security and peace undertaken by 
regional organizations or under regional or other 
arrangements.
Additionally, Chapter IV of the draft, devoted to the
"Pacific Settlement of Disputes," acknowledged the
feasability of using regional arrangements as a means of
first resort in the settlement of local or regional
disputes. Article 3 stated that, "where feasable regional or
other arrangements should be employed to bring about
adjustment or settlement of local or regional
controversies." Article 4 stipulated that "if the parties
fail to effect a settlement of such a dispute, by the means
above indicated, they should be obligated to refer to the
37executive council for a just and equitable settlement." 
Finally, with regard to the use of military forces and 
facilities in enforcing the peace, Chapter VI 
("Determination of Threats to the Peace or Breaches of the 
Peace and Action with Respect Thereto"), Section D, Article
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1 read: "In formulating plans for the agreement and in
carrying out operations under the agreement, the council
should take account of the geographical position of the
member states, their regional or special obligations, their
38population, and their relative resources."
The draf.t plan went a long way to assuaging the 
Senators' desire to protect the inter-American regional 
system in the world organization. The scope and role of 
regional organization received wider acceptance, 
particularly in the area of regional settlement of disputes. 
But it stopped short of accepting the second concern, 
namely regional representation on the Executive Council. As 
indicated by the State Department memo cited above, this 
involved the risk of changing the very nature of 
international organization based on individual state 
membership and representation. This was a line which Hull 
and his advisors were not prepared to cross.
With minor changes in areas not affecting the three 
passages on regionalism, the April 29 draft was adopted as 
the " [United States] Tentative Proposals for a General 
International Organization" circulated by the United States 
on July 18, 1944 to Britain, the Soviet Union, and China. 
Resembling a League of Nations with regional features, the 
four principal institutions of the organization were a 
General Assembly of all member states, an 11-member 
Executive Council, an International Court of Justice, and 
Secretariat. The Executive Council was comprised of the four 
major powers and possibly France with permanent seats, with 
the remaining seats filled on a rotating basis by individual
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39states elected by the General Assembly.
Accepting the legitimacy of regional organizations and
regional peacekeeping measures became a cause for concern
within the State Department after the official American
draft was issued. Officials were faced with the question, to
what extent could or should the general organization maintain
control over the regional groupings? An August 4 internal
memorandum interpreting Chapter I, Section A, Article 4
declared that regional groupings "can be continued or
created, provided they are not judged by the executive
council to be inconsistent with the purposes of the general 
40organization." Also, could regional organizations
undertake actions, including military, in their region
without consultation or approval from the general
organization? Here, the memorandum interpreted Chapter V,
Article 3 as providing regional groupings freedom of action
in the peaceful settlement of disputes in their area: "Each
group or organization should be able act in such cases on
the initiative of any member of the group or organization,
on its own intiative, or by reference from the general
international organization." But when it came to applying
military enforcement measures, this could only be done "with
the prior specific or general authorization of the general
41organization or at the council's request."
The Department's acceptance in the spring of 1944 of 
limited forms of interstate regionalism within a general 
international organization was more than Hull and his 
advisors had hoped to bargain for. Their concessions were
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the price of Senate support and cognizance of the British
position. Lower-level consultations took place with Britain,
who was more eager in this preparatory stage to exchange
information on plans for world organization than the United 
42States. According to the Department's official history,
the earlier universalist drafts were "supplemented and
modified in the light of congressional and other
consultations then in progress and of the [Informal
Political Agenda] Group's own re-examination of the major
problems it believed likely to arise in the then imminent
43Dumbarton Oaks negotiations."
The Soviet Union did not openly address issue of
postwar world organization until just prior to the Dumbarton
Oaks conference. Assistant Foreign Commissar Litvinov only
became intimately involved with the world organization
project in the summer of 1944, perhaps upon receiving the
44British and American Dumbarton Oaks proposals. In July 
1944, he informed a U.S. Embassy official in Moscow of an 
article entitled "Regarding International Security
45Organization" in the Leningrad literary magazine Zvezda. 
Written by Litvinov under the pseudonym "N.Malinin," the 
article departed from the theme of earlier statements by 
Maisky and Stalin on the need to safeguard the interests of 
small states. Rather, Litvinov stressed the need for a 
general security organization in which the major powers, who 
have proven themselves in the war, would share the burden of 
power in a directive body operating on the principle of 
unanimity. Smaller nations were in fact now obliged to
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assist the great powers, as the responsibility for
maintaining the peace was to be a league of the major powers
and not shared among member states assembled in an
46"impersonal organization." The issue of regionalism was 
not addressed in the article.
It was not until August 12, or nine days before the 
convening of the Dumbarton Oaks conference, that the Soviet 
Union despatched its outline for a world organization, 
"Memorandum on an International Security Organization," to 
Britain and the United States. The document adhered to the 
"topical outline" and was an abbreviated if not hastily
prepared version of the main American (and British)
47 . .proposals. The aims, composition, and principal organs of
the world organization were in basic harmony with the agenda
established by the State Department. The document did not
emhasize or seek to institutionalize the privileged "world
policemen" role ascribed earlier to the great powers. It in
fact conflicted with Stalin's statement on August 9, when he
"praised the 'sword' about to forged at Dumbarton Oaks...,
alluding to a prospective concert of the giants rather than
to any cacophany of the dwarfs filling the halls of the
48United Nations be virtue of their sheer numbers." As if to
confirm this, Radio Moscow's English-language service
declared at the opening of the Dumbarton Oaks talks that it
was "clear that the primary responsibility of ensuring
lasting peace after the war rests with those countries whose
49power is securing victory." The Soviet memorandum again 
witheld comment on the issue of regionalism, stating that 
the "question of regional organisation (was) subject to
50further study." The results of this study were to appear 
in a second revealing "Malinin" article two months after the 
Dumbarton Oaks discussions.
Regionalism on the Wane II: From Dumbarton Oaks to San 
Francisco
After seven working weeks at Georgetown's Dumbarton Oaks
estate, representatives of the United States, Britain,
Soviet Union, and China completed a joint proposal for a
51United Nations organization on October 7, 1944. Interstate 
regionalism emerged from this work with a profile 
considerably reduced from the original British and even 
American proposals. Provisions relating to regionalism were 
relegated to a section (C) called "Regional Arrangements" in 
Chapter VIII, "Arrangements for the Maintenance of 
International Peace and Security Including Prevention and 
Suppression of Aggression." The three paragraphs in VIII (C) 
read:
1. Nothing in the Charter should preclude the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies for 
dealing with such matters relating to the mainten­
ance of international peace and security as are 
appropriate for regional action, provided such 
arrangements or agencies and their activities are 
consistent with the purposes and principles of the 
Organization. The Security Council should encourage 
settlement of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies, either 
on the initiative of the states concerned or by 
reference from the Security Council.
2. The Security Council should, where appropriate, 
utilize such arrangements or agencies for enforce­
ment action under its authority, but no enforce­
ment action should be taken under regional arrange­
ments or bv regional agencies without the authori­
zation of the Security Council.
211
3. The Security Council should at all times be kept 
fully informed of activities undertaken or in 
contemplation under regional arrangements or by 
regional agencies for the maintenance of inter­
national peace and security, (emphasis added)
A Formulation Group responsible for the drafting of the
document was led by Leo Pasvolsky for the United States,
Gladwyn Jebb for Great Britain, and Arkadi Sobolev for the
Soviet Union. Sobolev was a Minister Counsellor of the
Soviet Embassy in London and the Deputy Chairman of the
Soviet delegation to the conference. The Formulation Group
was the highest expert-level group at the conference. A
Joint Steering Committeee, of which Pasvolsky, Jebb, and
Sobolev were associate members, established the policy. But
it was the Formulation Group "in which not only the precise
drafting and most of the exacting process of weighing the
meaning and effect of each word and phrase in all proposals
were carried out, but in which, with the sole exception of
the Joint Steering Committee, the most detailed and
analytical consideration was systematically given to all the
provisions advanced for the international organization
52during the Dumbarton Oaks Conversations."
As the Formulation Group by its own wishes kept no
minutes, it is difficult to determine how and why the role
of regionalism was reduced at Dumbarton Oaks. It has been
established that Section C "was largely formulated by
Pasvolsky on the basis of the U.S. document on Regional
53Arrangements (ISO 43)." Instead of stating positively, as 
did Chapter I of the United States' July 18 proposal on the 
general character of the world organization, that the 
organization should "be so constituted as to make possible
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the existence of regional organizations," the Dumbarton Oaks
proposal stated negatively in a chapter dealing with
international security arrangements, that "nothing in the
Charter should preclude the existence of regional
arrangements or agencies." Whereas the British and American
proposals for the conference favored actions initiated by
regional authorities in the settlement of disputes and their
enforcement in cooperation with the general organization,
paragraph 2 of the Dumbarton proposal stipulated that "no
enforcement action should be taken under regional
arrangements or by regional agencies without the
authorization of the Security Council." It was indicated
that both the British and Soviet representatives took
exception before agreeing to this wording of paragraph 2 as
they favored "military enforcement action to take place
54largely on a regional basis."
The next meeting of the major powers prior to San 
Francisco was the Yalta conference February 4-11, 1945. 
Substantive issues on international organization remained 
outside the scope of the talks, but the three powers agreed 
that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals would serve as the basis 
for a United Nations Charter. They also agreed on plans to 
proceed with the establishment of the organization before 
the end of the war and that invitations be sent to all 
allied states. A principal issue at Yalta was agreement on a 
veto voting formula for the Security Council sought by the 
Soviet Union. According to this forumla, the proposed 11- 
member Council could act by concurrance of at least seven
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members but with unanimity among the major powers as 
permanent members. The difficulty of this voting method was 
that if a permanent member objected to any Council 
enforcement measure, a war could hypothetically run its full 
course without action by the general organization. The 
formula also made it practically possible for any permanent 
member to veto an enforcement action under a regional 
arrangement to which it was not a party. This aspect became 
the subject of heated debate at San Francisco.
The veto prerogative pointed to a new Soviet attitude 
favoring a "loose" general organization. As the likelihood 
of comity among the major powers was at best uncertain, it 
seemed unrealistic to harbor high expectations for strong 
general organization. A signal of a Soviet preference for a 
decentralized world organization was provided six weeks 
before the Yalta conference in the Soviet Union's first 
public statement on regionalism. It appeared in a "Malinin" 
article entitled "On the Establishment of an International 
Security Organization" in the December 15, 1944 issue of War 
and the Working Class, a time when eastern Europe was 
rapidly coming under Soviet military control. The article 
baldly endorsed forms of both hegemonial and interstate 
regionalism as the bases for world organization. While it 
declared regional "blocs" and "spheres of influence" as 
undesireable, so-called "security zones" entailing mutually 
beneficial military arrangements between great and small 
powers were a different matter. The article "advocated the 
creation of regional groupings within the framework of the
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United Nations but under the aegis of the great powers that
55had paramount interests in the respective regions." The
article also made a case for interstate regionalism by
proposing to divide of the General Assembly into four —
European, American, Asiatic-Pacific, African —  sections or
regional assembly committees. States, territories, and
possessions within the limits of the respective continents
and ocean bases would be included in the sections. These
regional subdivisions would exist under the roof of the
general organization but would also have their own
organization structure served by the Secretariat and other
56United Nations agencies. The article was a trial balloon 
that seized on the regionalist literature and controversy to 
serve Soviet objectives. The sudden embrace of regionalism 
appeared designed to provide the Soviet Union with the 
justification for its hegemony over eastern Europe and a 
world organization that would be powerless to control its 
actions.
This Soviet trial balloon favoring a world organization 
structured into regional security zones and interstate 
assemblies did not fail to unsettle the State Department. On 
January 27, 1945, Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew 
sent a despatch to Ambassador Averill Harriman in Moscow, 
with a summary transmitted to Seceretary of State Stettinus 
in Yalta (Hull had resigned as Secretary of State in 
November 1944). Grew declared that the Soviet proposals 
would be violation of "the intent of the Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals." He argued further that
the founding of general international organization
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upon regional substructures would be of doubtful 
service to security. ...The Department's primary 
concern is the creation of a strong and effective 
overall international organization. It is to be 
feared that the proposal of plans for a decentrali­
zation of the international organization or its 
organs along the lines advanced in the article 
under discussion would complicate the problem of 
achieving the establishment of the g^ganization 
and would impair its effectiveness.
Secretary Grew's admonition for Moscow to "postpone any 
discussion of moves toward decentralization until after the 
international organization (was) firmly established" was 
apparently heeded in letter if not in spirit. But while the 
Soviets did not directly pursue the matter, dissatisfaction 
among the smaller allied states, helped by splits in major 
power unity on other issues, led to substantial revisions of 
the Dumbarton Oaks proposals on regional arrangements at the 
upcoming San Francisco conference.
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CHAPTER VII
REGIONALISM AND THE SMALLER ALLIED 
STATES AT THE SAN FRANCISCO CONFERENCE,
SPRING 1945
The six months between the Dumbarton Oaks conference 
and the United Nations Conference on International 
Organization at San Francisco was a period of relative calm 
before the storm, at least as far as the major powers were 
concerned. For many of the smaller allied nations of Europe, 
the Near East, and, in particular, Latin America, the 
universalist and major power-centered Dumbarton Oaks 
proposals were a disappointment. Feeling ignored and under­
represented in the movement to establish the world 
organization, they in part responded by intensifying efforts 
to form or develop regional associations. With major power 
unity under some stress, their concerted activities led to 
some changes in favor of regionalism at San Francisco.
Before unravelling the debate on regionalism at the 
conference, an examination of their attitudes and policies 
will provide some background with which to understand 
the dynamic process that drove the debate. For next to 
displays of Soviet intransigence, the debate on regionalism 
constituted one of the dramatic high points of the 
conference.
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Regionalism and the Small States Prior to San Francisco
Eastern, western, or all-European regional groupings of 
states were constant postwar themes, official and 
unoofficial, during the war. Britain in particular promoted 
European unification in her postwar planning and regional 
integration efforts among allied governments-in-exile based 
for the most part in London. When the prospect for east 
European regional federations died in 1943 with voiced 
public opposition to them by the Soviet Union, efforts to 
unify west European states intensifed. As if to capture the 
spirit of the times, General Charles de Gaulle, president of 
the French Committee of National Liberation declared at an 
April 21, 1944 press conference in Algiers, "I believe we 
live in a period of concentration of states."* He called for 
the formation of a west European "bloc" bounded by the 
Mediterranean, the English Channel, and the Rhine River.
Other, perhaps more consistent advocates of small state
integration were members of the so-called "Oslo Group"
representating the Scandinavian states and Low Countries.
Its leading members, ministers of foreign affairs Trygve
Lie of Norway, E.N. van Kieffens of The Netherlands, and
Paul van Zeeland and, towards the end of the war, Paul-Henri
Spaak of Belgium, lobbied the American and British
governments throughout the war for recognition of regional
economic and security needs that safeguarded the interests
2
of the smaller nations. Commenting on Churchill's March 21, 
1943 broadcast, van Kieffens wrote in a March 25 letter to 
The Times that if the democratic idea in international
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affairs were to prevail, "we cannot proclaim democracy, and 
practice the rule of the few." He challenged the idea that 
"the views of the lesser states ... would carry less weight, 
the decisive criterion appearing to be size and power." In 
an earlier November 25, 1942 broadcast to The Netherlands, 
van Kleffens made a case for a world security organization 
not based on the universal League of Nations model. While 
not "neglecting the universal element of the indivisible 
peace," he believed that an "organisation based on regions"
A
was "perhaps most to the purpose... ." In 1944, Paul-Henri 
Spaak initiated discussions with the Foreign Office to 
create a west European bloc beginning with the Low Countries
5
and France. A concrete outcome of his and van Zeeland's 
efforts was the September 1944 customs agreement signed in 
London by the exiled governments of Belgium, The Netherlands, 
and Luxembourg. BENELUX became the forerunner of the postwar 
regional integration movement in western Europe.
The Arab states led by Egypt received similar 
encouragement, if not prodding, from the British government. 
In July 1943, they began high-level negotiations for a 
regional association of Arab states. In September 1944, the 
leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Transjordan, Lebanon, 
Syria, and Yemen met in Alexandria to agree on a loose 
confederation, or League of Arab States. The pact of union 
known as the Alexandria Protocol, was signed by all the 
states on March 22, 1945 (excepting Yemen, which signed on 
May 5) and entered into force on May 10.^ Though informed 
by western international law, the treaty was written in 
Arabic (dated the eighth day of Rabi' II, 1364) and
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conceived in the spirit of Arab cultural unity. The treaty
placed emphasis on regional cooperation in social, economic,
and cultural affairs. Its main purpose, at least as far as
the states were concerned, was to safeguard the independence
and sovereignty of the member states through a system of
regional collective security. The League was a prime example
of interstate regionalism. In anticipation of the San
Francisco conference, the League's main organ, a Council
composed of single representatives from each member state,
was instructed "to decide upon the means by which the League
is to cooperate with the international bodies to be created
7in the future... ." In San Francisco, the League sought 
recognition within the United Nations as a legitimate 
regional organization.
If the European and Arab regionalist initiatives rested 
more on will than a tradition of regional cooperation in the 
spring of 1945, then the American republics could lay some 
claim to what Sumner Welles submitted was "the most advanced
g
regional system ever to have been evolved." The Latin 
states could point to a pattern of relations that began with 
their emergence as independent political units in the late 
18th and early 19th centuries. The political idea of a 
"Western Hemisphere" representing a "New World" of peoples 
and nations distinct from the rest of the world, Europe in 
particular, can in part be traced to thinking that found 
political expression in the 1823 Monroe Doctrine. In an 1811 
letter, Thomas Jefferson distinguished the New World from 
Europe as "one hemisphere of the earth, separated from the
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other by wide seas on both sides, having a different system 
of interests flowing from different climates, different 
soils, different productions, different modes of existence.
9
and its own local relations and duties.(emphasis added).
But initiatives for a inter-American regional system 
more often than not came from the Latin states. Through much 
of the 19th century, the United States viewed the Western 
Hemisphere as a shield (or metaphor) for its own isolation 
and continental expansion. The United States chose not to 
participate in the first eleven Pan-American conferences 
held between 1826 and 1889. The 1826 congress convened by 
Simon Bolivar was the first international conference held in 
the Americas. Using western international and constitutional 
law language, the congress approved treaties for 
multilateral cooperation in defense and other matters and 
thereby "established at the outset the principle of the 
continuity of inter-American co-operation."10
A new phase in inter-American relations began in the 
late 1880's with the partial entry of the United States into 
world arena. For the next several decades, United States 
policy toward Latin America was guided by an undisguised 
form of hegemonial regionalism. The 1889-90 Pan-American 
conference, in which also Canada participated, was convened 
through bipartisan Congressional action in Washington, D.C. 
to press for a Zollverein. or custom's union, ostensibly to 
prevent European economic penetration of Latin America. 
Although the custom's project failed, the conference adopted 
an arbitration convention "which paved the way for the
11elaborate inter-American peace system of the present day."
225
A permanent organ, the Commercial Bureau of the American
Republics, was established and evolved in 1910 into the Pan
American Union. The "pan" in the Pan-American movement was,
however, more "identified with United States intervention
and attempts to control the area than with genuine
12aspirations of cooperation." At the 1890 and subsequent
Pan-American conferences, which were held approximately
every five years, the United States vetoed political
questions that would have limited its freedom of action, or
"civilizing mission," in the hemisphere. The 1904 Roosevelt
Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine, which gave legal sanction
for interventionism and "claimed for the United States a
13monopoly of the right to engage in it," became the symbol 
of American hegemony in the Western Hemisphere.
Inter-American relations improved in the late 1920's 
when the Hoover administration endorsed Pan-Americanism as a 
supranational concept. But the shift from hegemonial to 
interstate regionalism, or perhaps to a benign combination 
of the two, did not begin in earnest until, at his 1933 
inauguration, Franklin Roosevelt announced his "good 
neighbor" policy. While intended as a global policy, it 
soon came to be practiced and identified in the inter- 
American context. For the next ten years, inter-American 
relations entered a period of growth toward the new 
administration's foreign policy goal of "hemispheric 
unity."14
An architect of that policy was Sumner Welles, who was 
appointed Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American
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Affairs in December 1933. Welles had served in diplomatic
posts in the Caribbean and authored a voluminous study that
15denied hegemonic intentions in the Monroe Doctrine. The
transition from interventionism to a period of interstate
regional cooperation began at 7th Pan-American Conference in
Montevideo in December 1933, when Secretary of State Cordell
Hull agreed to a qualified ban on interventionism. In
December 1936, President Roosevelt himself convened and
attended an extraordinary Inter-American Conference on Peace
and Security in Buenos Aires, where he announced an
unqualified ban on all forms of intervention. The conference
also embraced the principle of collective security and
adopted a mechanism for consultation through periodic
meetings of the hemisphere's foreign ministers. The meeting
was interpreted by one observer as the "continentalization"
or pan-Americanization of the Monroe Doctrine.^ With
Europe, in this case Nazi Germany, once again threatening
hemispheric security, "regional links which set the
countries of the Western Hemisphere apart from the rest of
the world were emphasized by both the United States and
17Latin America... ." By 1940, "the underlying Western
Hemisphere idea was more popular throughout the Americas and
apparently closer to realization that at any previous period 
18in history."
The movement toward an inter-American regional system 
peaked, however, at a point in early 1943 as Under Secretary 
of State Welles was seeking to include Canada among the 
twenty-two independent democracies of the new world. In a 
February 1943 speech in Toronto, Welles provided a case
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definition of interstate regionalism and American foreign
policy objectives when he declared that;
The inter-American system, as it had now developed 
in the Americas, has its roots in the common 
recognition of the sovereign equality of all the 
American states, and in their joint belief that 
they find individual advantage in cooperation. The 
good neighbor policy had made it possible for this 
regional system to be developed. Continued parti­
cipation by the United States in this system should 
become the permanent cornerstone of American 
foreign policy.
Welles saw a distinct place for the inter-American system in
the future world organization. He stated
that the regional system of the Americas must be 
an indispensable part of any international 
organization which may be established after the 
war. The ideals of the Western Hemisphere, our 
liberties, and our democratic institutions can 
all plaY a vitally important part in that new World 
Order.
As Welles was speaking, the pan-American idea was in
eclipse. State Department policy under Secretary of State
Hull was shifting to stress universal over regional
preferences as a basis for world organization. Hull believed
it unlikely that "the people of the United States would
support this {country's participation in a European council
and a Pacific council, in addition to a Western Hemisphere
21council, and also in a universal organization." Apart from 
this shift in the Department's thinking, America's entry 
into the war brought her policy of neutrality and quasi­
isolationism to a abrupt end and catapulted her from a 
regional to global power. Involved militarily in both Europe 
and the Pacific, the United States had perforce become a 
global actor. As if to reinforce this fact, foreign policy 
interventionists joined internationalists in attacking the
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isolationist "Maginot mentality” of the western hemisphere 
22idea. Finally, what perhaps sealed the fate of the Pan- 
American movement was the fissure in inter-American 
solidarity sparked by the Department's refusal to recognize 
a dictatorial Argentine government and its application of
23pressure on the other American governments to follow suit.
These developments threw the Latin republics back on
themselves. Analogous to the period before the 1880s, the
Latin states pursued their regional efforts with at best
passive United States interest. No Pan-American conferences
or consultative meetings of foreign ministers took place
between the January 1942 meeting in Rio de Janeiro, where
Argentina refused to sever diplomatic relations with the
Axis nations, and the Mexico City, or Chapultepec Conference
in February 1945. Unlike Britain, who consulted with her
Dominion partners before and following the Dumbarton Oaks
conference, the United States declined requests by the Latin
American states for inter-American consultations. Rather,
they were provided "clarifications” from low-ranking
officials in the State Department on the issue of the future
24world organization.
Unsuccessful in convening an inter-American 
consultative meeting, the nineteen Latin allied countries 
(excluding Argentina) organized a special "Inter-American 
Conference on Problems of War and Peace” in Chapultepec 
February 21-March 9, 1945. Its main purpose was to evaluate 
and take a position on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals before 
the San Francisco conference. With Argentina absent, the
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United States somewhat grudgingly accepted the Mexican
government's invitation to attend. Faced with a restive and
determined Latin bloc, the United States sought to forestall
discussions on regionalism and other major issues until the
25San Francisco conference. The North Americans were 
appeared outmaneuvered and were obliged to accept 
resolutions in favor of: more power for the General Assembly 
of the world organization; Latin American representation in 
the Security Council; and recognition of the inter-American 
system as a regional system capable of settling its own 
disputes within the framework of a world organization.
The Act of Chapultepec, to which Argentina acceded on
April 4 after its March 27 declaration of war on Germany,
created an instrumentality in Chapter I, Article 3 that
provided for mutual defense. It stated that "every attack of
a State against the integrity or inviolability of the
territory, or against the sovereignty or political
independence of an America State, shall...be considered as
an act of agression against the other States which sign this
Act." Additionally, the parties were bound by Chapter I,
Article 4 to consult among themselves "in order to agree
upon the measures" needed, including the use of armed force,
26to meet threats or acts of agression in their region. At 
the conclusion of the conference, the United States agreed 
that a treaty to this effect would be concluded between the 
American states as soon as peace was restored. In the 
meantime, the dynamic of the Chapultepec encounter, which 
put the United States delegation on the defensive, carried 
over into the work that produced the final version of the
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United Nations Charter in San Francisco.
Regionalism at San Francisco
Emboldened by their success at Chapultepec, the Latin 
states played an important if not pivotal role in strength­
ening the regional features of the world organization 
promulgated in San Francisco. This outcome was helped by a 
split in the United States delegation and at best cordial 
relations among the major powers. The United States was torn 
between a renewed commitment to the inter-American regional 
system and a universalism that it saw guaranteed in the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals. This split the United States 
delegation in San Francisco into a State Department 
contingent led by Leo Pasvolsky seeking to implement the 
Dumbarton Oaks proposals and a smaller Congressional group 
led by Senator Vandenberg sympathetic to the Latin states 
and inter-American regional system.
Questions relating to regionalism "were among the most
27basic issues faced in the Conference." Nearly all of the 
fifty participating states presented amendments that touched 
on regional issues. A special subcommittee of Committee 
III/4 devoted to "regional arrangements" was formed merely 
to assemble, classify, and analyze the proposals. The main 
issue raised by the proposed amendements was the autonomy of 
regional action within the world organization. Of particular 
concern was the question of a great power veto of regional 
action in the Security Council. At the time, Senator 
Vandenberg articulated the issue which was at stake as
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follows:
It speedily developed that not only are the South 
Americans hot about protecting Chapultepec but 
the Australians are equally anxious not to be left 
unprotected in their far corner of the earth. They 
want liberty of regional action if some one of the 
Big Powers vetoes Organization action on the 
Council. Other potential groups are forming and 
they could be highly dangerous —  particularly the 
Arabian bloc and its impact on Palestine. Our 
great problem is to find a rule which protects 
legitimate existing groups (like Pan-Am) without 
opening up the opportunity for regional balance- 
of-power groups."
An initial set of amendments in Committee III/4 dealt
with attempts to define the nature and status of regional
organizations. Egypt sought to have the conference adopt a
definition of regionalism that went beyond the narrow
security terms expressed the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The
Egyptian definition stressed the importance of indigenous
cultural and socio-economic factors and came perhaps as
close as any official position articulated by a state during
the war to a statement of autochthonous regionalism. The
definition, which did not even use the term "state," read:
There shall be considered as regional arrangements 
organizations of a permanent nature, grouping in a 
given geographical area several countries which, 
by reason of their proximity, community of 
interests or cultural, linguistic, historical or 
spiritual affinities, make themselves jointly 
responsible for the peaceful settlement of disputes 
which may arise between them and for the maintenance 
of peace and security in their region, as well as 
for the safeguarding of their interests and the 
developmentgOf their economic and cultural 
relations.
After considerable wrangling and debate, the conference 
decided not to adopt any specific definition of regionalism 
and retained the Dumbarton Oaks understanding of "regional 
arrangements" as pertaining to security measures taken by
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two or more states for the peaceful settlement of disputes
in their area. But this decision did not inhibit the Arab
and, in particular, Latin American states from lobbying to
have their regional organizations recognized by name in the
30United Nations Charter. Mexican Foreign Minister Ezequiel
Padilla sought in fact to include mention of the Act of
Chapultepec in the Charter's preamble.
The early substantive debate at the conference centered
on Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 of the Dumbarton
Oaks proposal on "Regional Arrangements," which forbade
enforcement action by regional bodies without Security
Council authorization. A number of European countries,
France in particular, were joined by the Soviet Union in
expressing concern about possible renewed threats from
Germany or other enemy countries and sought the right to act
against such threats without prior approval by the Council.
The French argued for the need to safeguard the December 10,
1944 Franco-Soviet Treaty of Alliance directed against
Germany as a regional arrangement capable of immediate
action in the event of renewed aggression. France's
amendment to Paragraph 2 called for the right to use
regional enforcement measures until such time as the United
Nations was strong enough to deal with aggression. French
delegate and acting chairman of the French delegation Joseph
Paul-Boncourt stressed the time delay factor if an act of
aggression had to be referred to the Security Council before
any action could be taken:
Whatever precautions may be taken...in order to 
assure swift and effective action by the Security 
Council, it is impossible to prevent delays
233
resulting from its meetings, its discussion, from 
the transport from countries often distant of 
material and men assigned to those who are 
attacked. And this, coupled with the lightening 
rapidity which aggression in modern war is capable 
of, ...may-subject a country to the risk of . 
death... .
France received support from the Soviet Union. And as 
if to up the ante, the Soviet Union sought to prevent the 
bilateral pacts it had concluded during the war not only 
with with France, but Britain, Poland, Czechoslovakia, and
32Yugoslavia from becoming subject to a veto in the Council.
Foreign Commissar Molotov, chairman of the Soviet
delegation, argued on May 4 that his country and France "had
twice been objects of German aggression" and that it was up
to the parties of the treaties to decide when the United
Nations was "strong enough to assume the responsibility for
dealing with such agression" and for the mutual pact
33treaties to lapse. An amendment was drafted that provided 
regional agencies in the form of mutual assistance pacts 
with the right to act after informing, but not requiring the 
approval of, the Council.
On May 5, the four major powers, who were the sponsors 
of the conference, agreed to amend Paragraph 2 with an 
exemption which became Article 53 in a new, separate chapter 
on "Regional Arrangements" in the Charter. In wording 
drafted by Leo Pasvolsky, the article declared that no 
enforcement action by regional arrangements or agencies 
could be undertaken without authorization of the Security 
Council with the exception of measures directed against 
renewal of aggressive policies by an enemy state until such 
time as the world organization was capable of assuming
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34responsibility for preventing further aggression.
While the exemption in the admendment was restricted to
actions against enemy states over a limited period, this
concession to the European allies opened the gates for a
similar, if bolder, exemption sought by the Latin American
35states under the Act of Chapultepec. In the same Hay 6th
message to President Harry Truman and former Secretary Hull
(who, as senior advisor to the United States delegation, was
incapacitated in a Washington hospital during most of the
conference) announcing the above agreement. Secretary of
State Edward Stettinus, chairman of the United States
delegation, reported that it had become
evident that the other American Republics are 
insistent on greater freedom for the Inter-American 
system to act in matters of hemispheric concern. 
...Strong sentiment exists for sharply restricting 
the scope of action of the general organization in 
this hemisphere and for permitting action under the 
Act of Chapultepec without authorization from the 
Council.
Senator Vandenberg served as the United States
representative on Committee III/4 and spoke on behalf of the
Latin American states. Hee noted in his diary on May 5th that
the Amendment opened up serious collateral consider­
ations as we thought it over today. Europe would 
have freedom of action for her defensive regional 
arrangements (pending the time when the Peace 
League shall prove its dependability as a 
substitute policeman) but the Western Hemisphere 
would not have similar freedom of action under 
its Pan-American agreements which have a back­
ground of a century behind them and which were 
specifically implemented again by our 21 Republics 
a few weeks ago at Chapultepec. Therefore, in the 
event of trouble in the Americas, we could not act 
ourselves; we would have to depend exclusively on 
the Security Council; and any one permanent member 
of the Council could veto the latter action (getting 
us at the mercy of Britain, Russia or China).
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With support from the Latin states, Vandenberg, in a letter
that evening to the United States delegation, proposed
attaching a second amendment to the future Article 53. He
sought to add the words
and with the exception of measures which may be 
taken under ... the Act of Chapultepec of the Inter- 
American Conference on Problems of Peace and War, 
signed a Mexico City on March 8, 1945, until such 
time as the Organization may, by consent of the 
Governing Board of the Pan American Union, be 
charged with this function.
As Vandenberg noted, "hell broke loose" in the American
delegation when it met. on May 7 to discuss his proposed
amendment. Assistant Secretary of State James C. Dunn,
adviser to the United States delegation, questioned whether
it would be possible to "avoid opening up the old question
of the exclusion of all regional arrangements from the
39jurisdiction of the Organization." But Leo Pasvolsky spoke 
up bluntly on behalf of the Department's viewpoint in the 
United States delegation. He argued that (hegemonial) 
regionalism would mean the end of a general, or universal 
organization:
If we open up the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals to allow 
for regional enforcement action on a collective 
basis, the world organization is finished. ...We 
then move into a system in which we rely for our 
security on regional groups, large states with their 
spheres of influence surrounded by groups of smaller 
states. We will convert the world into armed camps 
and end up with a world war unlike any we have seen 
(634-35).
Vandenberg received support from other Congressional 
delegates, among them Representatives Sol Bloom, Chairman of 
the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and Charles A. Eaton 
of New Jersey. He threatened a U.S. Senate floor fight on
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the Charter if the issues of freedom of regional action 
under Chapultepec and the Security Council major power veto 
of regional action were not resolved. The Latin states in 
turn threatened to withold their support for other aspects 
of the Charter if their regional demands were not met. 
Moreover, they were visibly losing faith in the entire 
United Nations project. At a May 8 meeting of the United 
States delegation, James C. Dunn reported that some Latin 
representatives "were saying there was no use for the 
international organization." Assistant Secretary of State 
for Inter-American Affairs Nelson A. Rockefeller, as an 
adviser to the U.S. delegation, said the Latin states had 
become fearful in particular of Soviet motives and given the 
uncertainty following Roosevelt's death (April 12), they 
"were coming around to the position that, until the world 
organization proved its effectiveness, the Western 
Hemisphere system should be free from the necessity of any 
authorization for action by the Security Council" (646) .
The United States delegates were split between the 
desire to build a strong and effective global security 
system and to recognize the regional Act of Chapultepec in 
the spirit of the Monroe Doctrine and hemispheric 
solidarity. The impasse broke on May 11 when the principle 
was accepted that a state possessed an inherent right of 
self-defense without any necessary regard to regional 
arrangements. "The concept is that an attack against one 
state in any part of the world is an act against all," 
stated Harley A. Notter, an adviser to the United States 
delegation and to the State Department's Office of Special
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Political Affairs. "This is the concept of world security,
not of regional security" (667). But a state's inherent
right of self-defense could not logically preclude the use
of regional action in pursuit of that right. A draft
amendment was thus attached not to the "regional
arrangements" chapter but in a new, twelfth paragraph to
Section B of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals dealing with
threats to peace or acts of aggression. In a gesture to
the Latin American states and in recognition of the
existence of regional arrangements, the proposed amendment
cited the Act of Chapultepec by name. The paragraph
unanimously approved on May 12 for President Truman's
approval read as follows:
Should the Security Council not succeed in prevent­
ing aggression and should aggression occur by any 
state against any member state, such member state 
possesses the inherent right to take necessary 
measures of self-defense. The right to take such 
measures for self-defense against armed attack shall 
apply to understandings or arrangements like those 
embodied in the Act of Chapultepec, under which all 
members of a group of states agree to consider an 
attack against any one of them as an attack against 
all of them. The taking of such measures shall be 
reported immediately to the Security Council and 
shall not in any way affect the authority and respon­
sibility of the Security Council under this Charter 
to take at any time such action as it may deem 
necessary in order to maintain or restore inter­
national peace and security (685-86) (emphasis added).
The May 12 five-power (France had been added as the fifth
major power sponsor) consultative meeting of foreign
ministers to discuss the amendment produced a wide range of
views that found the United States as the sponsor at one end
and, uncharacteristically, the British in opposition at
other. Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, who had during the
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course of the war become increasingly disenchanted by the 
regional idea pushed on him by Prime Minister Churchill, 
attacked the draft as a Latin American inspired move "that 
would result in regionalism of the worst kind" (692). He 
stated that he did not come to San Francisco "for the 
purpose of signing a regional agreement" (693). Rather, he 
emphasized "that the entire concept which had been in 
prospect in calling this Conference was that of a world 
Organization. Did we want a world Organization, recognizing 
the existence of some treaties and agreements or did we want 
a concept of regional organization topped by a world 
Organization with very limited powers[?]" (695). Eden's view 
was shared by former Secretary Hull, who was reported by 
Secretary Stettinus on May 12 to have "felt that the 
proposed new wording on regional arrangements would impair 
the strength of the international organization" and "that 
the American position was veering away from a strong 
international organization" (677). It was also held by Eden 
and others that mention of the Act of Chapultepec would lead 
to efforts to mention other regional associations such as 
the Arab League.
The chairman of the French delegation. Foreign Minister 
Georges Bidault, disagreed with Eden and saw value in the 
"immediate reliance on group or regional agreements" barring 
the existence of an effective world organization. But he 
asked for more time to study the American text (694). The 
acting chairman of the Chinese delegation, Ambassador to the 
United Kingdom Wellington V.K. Koo, did not contribute in a 
substantive way to the discussion. The Soviet position was
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presented by Andrei Gromyko, Soviet Ambassador to the United
States and acting chairman of the Soviet delegation.
Reserved and non-commital, he asked for clarifications and
also requested time to study the draft. At the same time, he
indirectly endorsed Eden's position. The Latin American
states were asking for the right of independent action,
which "might well result in a series of regional
organizations acting independently of the Council; one for
Latin America, one for Europe and others elsewhere" (695).
He also pointed out that while the amendment safeguarding
mutual aid treaty arrangements in Europe proposed for
Chapter VIII, Section C, Paragraph 2 was limited in scope
and time, "in the United States draft there was no time
40limit to the exception proposed" (Ibid.).
After the consultative meeting, the American delegation 
met to discuss the admendment^ridge divisions within its 
own ranks. Of the twelve members, led by Secretary 
Stettinius, that comprised the American delegation, Senators 
Connally and Vandenberg were joined by Commander Harold E. 
Stassen, U.S.N.R., a delegate, in leading the defense for 
the proposed amendment. Both Connally and Vandenberg began 
by arguing for reciprocity between the exception agreed upon 
for Europe and the similar need for special recognition to 
safeguard the security of the American republics. They cited 
the long history of the inter-American system and the 
principle of the inherent right to self-defense. Connally 
maintained that the exception sought in the American 
proposal was not at great variance from the exception agreed
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upon for Europe in that the treaties in both cases were 
aimed at resistance to armed aggression. But it was 
Commander Stassen, a former governor of Minnesota, who 
untied the Gordian knot in outlining a three-tiered world 
security structure (and process) recognizing the intent of 
the American draft, namely that of the right of self- 
defense. The first tier dealt with the peaceful settlement 
of disputes, that is, in cases where no aggression had been 
commited, where "no one questioned the propriety of emphasis 
on regional a c t i o n . (693). The second tier concerned 
enforcement or the application of sanctions, where the 
"world Organization should have complete and exlcusive 
jurisdiction..." (Ibid.). The third tier related to action 
in the event of the failure or absence of enforcement. He 
argued that "the right of self defense must be reserved to 
meet such a situation” and that recognition had to 
"be given to the right of joint action in self defense"
(694)• The compromise represented in the American amendment 
recognized the validity of both individual and collective 
self-defense measures.
The amendment found expression in Article 51 of the 
United Nations Charter under "Chapter VII: Action with 
Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and 
Acts of Agression.” Owing to British opposition, specific 
mention of the Act of Chapultepec was omitted in the article 
(or anywhere in Charter). The article's provision for the 
right of "collective self-defense" permitted groups of 
states, acting through regional arrangements, to act 
independently of the Security Council if a member of that
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group was a victim of an armed attack. This represented the
legal escape clause sought by the Latin states and other
regional groupings to Article 53 which, except in the
limited case of former enemy states, prohibited enforcement
action by regional agencies without prior authorization of
the Security council. This sanction, now nullified by the
right to collective self-defense clearly weakened the role
of the Security Council as envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks
plan. After the vote on the draft amendment, the Colombian
delegate Alberto Lleras Camargo, who was chairman of the
Committee III/4, took pains to interpret Act of
Chapultepec's collective self-defense role as being
compatible with the general organization:
The Act of Chapultepec provides for the collective 
self-defense of the hemisphere and establishes that 
if an American nation is attacked all the rest 
consider themselves attacked. Consequently such 
action as they may take to repel aggression, 
authorized by the article which was discussed 
in the subommittee yesterday, is legitimate for 
all of them. Such action would be in accord with 
the Charter, by the approval of the article; and a 
regional arrangement may take action, provided it 
does not have improper purposes... From this, it 
may be deduced that the approval of this article 
implies that the Act of Chapultepec is not in 
contravention of the Charter.
In deference to the Latin states, Secretary Stettinius
informed their delegation chairmen as Secretary of State
(and not as head of the United States delegation) in a Hay
15 consultative meeting of assurances received by phone that
day from President Truman. He was instructed to say "there
would be no change in the Good Neighbor policy" and that the
United States was prepared, as informally requested by the
Latin states, to implement the Act of Chapultepec in the
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form of a treaty within the framework of the world
organization which would be negotiated and signed "not later
42than autumn of this year (i.e., 1945).”
While Britain now backed the draft amendment at the 
five-power consultative meeting on May 16, Soviet 
representative Gromyko stated he was still awaiting 
instructions from Moscow. On procedural grounds, he objected 
to its presentation as a United States amendment, arguing 
that formal amendments could only be presented after 
consultation among the major powers. On substantive grounds, 
he noted at the five-power consultative meeting on May 16 
that there were "certain deviations in it from the 
principles agreed upon at Dumbarton Oaks" (760). The Soviets 
appeared wary about extending their support for regional 
arrangements too far. It may legitimize other possible 
independent regional coalitions such as in eastern Europe.
At the same time, they served to weaken the power of the 
general organization. After Gromyko received his Moscow 
instructions on May 19, he merely suggested insignificant 
wording changes for both future articles 53 and 51 (812-14). 
The Soviet accomodation to the regional amendments did not 
extend to other issues faced at the conference. The Soviets 
remained adamant in preventing the extension of the major 
power veto obtained at Yalta to even a mandatory 
"consideration" of a question brought to the Security 
Council. They also sought to limit the powers of the General 
Assembly. The Soviet support for the recognition of regional 
arrangements was re-confirmed at a June 19 five-power
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consultative meeting discussing the denial of the right of
enemy states to have recourse to the Security Council or
General Assembly. It is interesting to note that Gromyko's
attempt to include a phrase on "regional arrangements” was
overruled by the other four powers, who did not wish to
43reopen the regional question.
Regionalism in the United Nations Charter
When the dust had settled in San Francisco, the United
Nations Charter had been modified to recognize the growing
reality of interstate regionalism in international
relations and the need to institutionalize it in
international organization. "The provisions in the Charter
respecting both (individual and collective) self-defense in
the event of armed attack and the role of regional
arrangements in relation to the functioning of the world
security organization were among the most basic issues faced
44in the Conference... .” In the compromises required to 
produce the final Charter, the three-paragraph section (C) 
on "Regional Arrangements" in Chapter VIII of the Dumbarton 
Oaks proposals was expanded into a separate chapter (VIII) 
of three articles (52-54) and seven paragraphs as well as a 
new article (51) added in Chapter VII relating to breaches 
of the peace. The phrase, "resort to regional agencies or 
arrangements," was also added to Article 33 of chapter VI 
relating to the pacific settlement of disputes.
The limited exemption to Chapter VIII, Section C, 
Paragraph 2 in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals that became the 
revised Article 53 opened the lid for the inclusion of the
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other regional measures which served to weaken the authority
of the general organization. The original text and added
exemption (underlined) read:
The Security Council shall, where appropriate, 
utilize such regional arrangements or agencies 
for enforcement action under it authority. But no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional 
arrangements or by regional agencies without 
authorization of the Security Council, with the 
exception of measures against anv enemv state 
or in regional arrangements directed against the 
renewal of aggressive policy on the part of anv 
such state, until such time as the Organization mav. 
on the reguest of the Governments concerned, be 
charged with the responsibility for.preventing 
further aggression bv such a state.
The "regional arrangements directed against renewal of 
aggressive policy," based on bilateral mutual defense 
treaties between the Soviet Union and several European 
allied states (and the Republic of China), were to have 
functioned for a transitional period until the general 
organization could assume responsibility for preventing 
further aggression. While this stripped at least some short­
term power from the Security Council, the Council's 
authority was further weakened by the provision that the 
responsibility for deciding whether these special 
arrangements could operate outside the control of the 
Council was placed on the governments themselves. The 
original amendment read "by consent of" in place of the 
adopted wording "on the request of" the governments 
concerned. ^
The revision of that article led to the adoption of an 
additional paragraph to Chapter VIII, Section B of the 
Dumbarton proposal that became Article 51 in the Charter:
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Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the 
right of individual or collective self-defense if 
an armed attack occurs against a Member of the 
United Nations, until the Security Council has 
taken the measures necessary to maintain interna­
tional peace and security. Measures taken by 
Members in the exercise of this right of self- 
defense shall be immediately reported to the 
Security Council and shall not in any way effect 
the authority and responsibility of the Security 
Council under the present Charter to take at any 
time such action as it deems necessary in order 
to maintain or restore international peace and 
security.
The right of "collective self-defense" sanctioned
enforcement action by a regional arrangement or agency
without prior authorization from the Security Council. This
helped to legitimize regional groupings as entities and
provided "at least a partial basis for the continued
,,47
application of ... the Monroe Doctrine. This limited the
Security Council's ability to maintain peace and security
and made political obligation depend on the good faith of
the organization's members.
The recognition of regional arrangements or agencies in
the Charter raised questions about the relationship between
regional organizations and the general organization. The
first paragraph of Article 52, adopted virtually unchanged
from the Dumbarton Oaks document, recognized regional
arrangements and agencies as a reality and define their
relationship to the unversal organization as subsidiary:
Nothing in this present Charter precludes the 
existence of regional arrangements or agencies 
for dealing with such matters relating to the 
maintenance of international peace and security 
as appropriate for regional action provided that 
such arrangements or agencies and their activities 
are consistent with the Purposes and Principles 
of the United Nations.
The second paragraph was added in San Francisco to give
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priority to the resort to regional arrangements in the
peaceful settlement of disputes affecting states that were
parties to regional arrangements:
The Members of the United Nations entering into 
such arrangements or constituting such agencies 
shall make every effort to achieve pacific settle­
ment of local disputes through such regional 
arrangements or by such regional agencies before 
referring to the Security Council.
Paragraph three, adopted almost verbatim from the
second sentence of Paragraph 1, Section C of the Dumbarton
Oaks proposal, obliged the Security council to encourage the
peaceful settlement of disputes through regional
arrangements or agencies. The intent of this paragraph was
reinforced in Chapter VI ("Pacific Settlement of Disputes"),
Article 33, paragraph 1 of the Charter (Chapter VIII,
Section A, paragraph 3 in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals),
which encouraged parties to a dispute to resort in the first
instance to regional and other means to settle disputes:
The parties to any dispute, the continuance of
which is likely to endanger the maintenance of
international peace and security, shall, first of 
all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, 
mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial 
settlement, resort to regional agencies or ar­
rangements . or other peaceful means of their own 
choice. (emphasis added)
To counter the regionalist offensive in San Francisco, 
advocates of universalism sought meaures to retain the 
primacy of Security Council authority in the maintenance of 
peace and security. The 4th and final paragraph of Article
33, "This Article in no way impairs the application of the
Article 34 and 35," was an attempt to safeguard the power of 
the Council to investigate a dispute on its own initiative
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or on the initiative of a state to determine whether the
dispute would endanger the maintenance of peace and 
49security. An attempt to affirm the supremacy of the
Security Council was also made in Article 54, which was
transferred with a single word change —  "should" to "shall"
—  from Section C, Paragraph 3 of the Dumbarton Oaks
proposal. It required that "[t]he Security Council shall at
all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or
in contemplation under regional arrangements or be regional
agencies for the maintenance of international peace and
security." But the article lacked provisions for
implementation and was in fact weakened more by the right
provided under Artcle 51 for parties to regional
arrangements to report to the Council after regional action
had been taken. The placidly worded universalism of Article
54 was reinforced, it was believed, by the stronger wording
of Article 103:
In the event of a conflict between the obligations 
of the Members of the United Nations under the 
present Charter and their obligations under any 
other international agreement, their obligations 
under the present Charter shall prevail.
Here, the Charter invoked "the character of basic law of the
international community" by applying the principle of
international law which infers that "a later agreement
between the same parties supersedes and earlier 
50agreement." But again, the article did not provide any 
implementation measures for the nullification of obligations 
that were deemed inconsistent with the Charter.
The United Nations Charter has been described as a
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"theoretical reconciliation of universalism and 
52regionalism." It would perhaps be more accurate to decribe
it with Inis Claude as a compromise between a "theoretical
preference for universalism and political pressures for 
52regionalism." The regionalist measures adopted in San 
Francisco provided states more freedom to act under regional 
arrangements without the prior sanction of the Security 
Council. In spite of these regional features, the United 
Nations Charter provided for an essentially univeralist 
structure in world organization that left the relationship 
between regionalism and universalism unclear. Regionalism 
was never defined as a concept or organizing principle 
beyond that of a security arrangement between two or more 
states. Regionalism was understood in terms of interstate 
"arrangements and agencies" that ranged from treaties of 
alliance between two non-contiguous states to the inter- 
American regional system. Nonetheless, the regional measures 
recognized in the United Nations Charter were steps that 
introduced interstate regionalism as a principle in 
international relations and concept in international 
organization.
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PART THREE
REGIONALISM AND POSTWAR EUROPEAN ORGANIZATION
In a matter of months or years —  and 
this is no prophecy but a statement of 
fact —  the whole of Europe will have 
to be reconstructed. By that I do not 
merely refer to boundaries, but to 
internal reconstruction as well, since 
the moral foundations and political 
structures of the whole of Europe have 
been shaken.
Karel Capek, 1938
Past attempts to organize this strife- 
torn continent have failed largely ... 
because they were not founded on a 
thorough knowledge of (regional) 
realities.
Adda B. Bozeman, 1941
Introduction
If the United States took the lead among the three 
major powers in establishing a world organization, then 
Britain assumed a similar if unsuccessful initiative with 
regard to Europe. Throughout the war, Prime Minister 
Churchill believed that a united Europe of more or less 
equal-size political units would be the best guarantee 
for a postwar settlement not only for Europe, but also the 
world. By contrast, President Roosevelt expressed America's 
historical fear of political and military involvement in 
European affairs and was less convinced of the wisdom of 
this path. He was supported by American realists who favored 
a weak if not splintered Europe and internationalists who 
feared that United States participation in a European 
council may require the stationing of American troops on the 
continent. The Soviet Union was in principle opposed to 
regional arrangements in Europe in which it did not have a 
controlling voice. Stalin played a low profile role on the 
question of European organization and urged the restoration 
of the sovereign nation states after the war. As with the 
issue of world organization, the Soviets preferred to react 
to Anglo-American proposals on Europe as they acquired 
regional hegemony over eastern Europe through military 
occupation in the last two years of the war.
The third and final part of this study examines the
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allied debate on regionalism and the future structure of 
Europe. When the Soviet Union and United States became 
belligerents in the war in 1941, it became clear that the 
Big Three —  in particular, the two extra-European powers —  
would be the main arbiters of the postwar peace in Europe. 
When the allied coalition was formed on January 1, 1942, the 
influence of the several London-based European governments- 
in-exile began to wane. With support from Britain, virtually 
all of these governments publically favored regional 
integration schemes ranging from cooperation to federation 
on an all-European or, in most cases, sub-regional basis. 
Chapter VIII unravels the positions of the three major 
powers on the question of an all-European settlement and the 
debate this issue engendered between them. In Chapter IX, 
the study focusses on what perhaps was, apart from the 
BENELUX agreement, the most historically significant 
integration attempt among the European governments-in-exile 
during the war, namely, the efforts between 1940 and 1943 by 
the Polish, Czechoslovak, and also Yugoslav and Greek 
governments to create interstate regional confederations in 
eastern Europe.
What precedents if any existed for a united Europe? 
Together with Japan's "co-prosperity sphere" in Asia, Nazi 
Germany's "new order" was a palpable if also crude example 
of hegemonial regionalism in war-time Europe. German 
propaganda did not refrain from invoking the symbol of 
"Europe" for its imperial design to unify the continent. The 
German invasion of the Soviet Union in June 1941 was
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heralded as a European crusade against Bolshevism and the
"despotic" East. The propaganda, which was bought by
significant segments of the European public at the time,
hailed the invasion as an "all-European campaign against
Bolshevism" led by Hitler, the "supreme commander in the
battle for European civilization."^ Minister of Propaganda
Josef Goebbels made the case for an amoral hegemonial
regionalism clear when, in a 1943 speech to a meeting of
Gauleiters, he declared,
The Fuhrer drew the conclusion that all the clutter 
of small nations (Kleinstaatengerumpel) still 
existing in Europe must be liquidated as soon as 
possible. The aim of our struggle must be to create 
a unified Europe. Only the Germans can really 
organize Europe. ...To dominate Europe will be to 
assume the leadership of the world. In this 
connection we naturally cannot accept questions of 
right and wrong even as a basis of discussion.
The Nazi ideas on Europe are only historically
significant in so far as they were also accompanied by more
pragmatic statements by German economists of the need for
economic integration. Reich Economic Minister Walther Funk's
statement in a July 25, 1940 speech that a "stronger sense
of economic community among European nations must be aroused
by collaboration in all spheres of economic policy..." was
argued in part on rational grounds not dissimilar to the
Mitteleuropa ideas developed by Friedrich Naumann and others
3
during World War I. In both cases, a vast central European 
economic and cultural area was conceived under German 
leadership. But if the spirit of Neumann's hegemonial 
regionalism remained within a beneficent liberal European 
tradition, the economists of the Third Reich were servants 
of a pathological national imperialism.
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For so-called good Europeans, the idea of European
unity had a history as long as the sovereign European
iy
states' system itself. While never political'unified, Europe
A
was as much a state of mind as a geographical and cultural
reality. The "European idea” has been traced by some
contemporary Europeanists to the late medieval attempts,
most notably Dante's On Monarchy, to revive a disintegrating
4
"respublica Christiana,” or western Christian empire. Denis
Hay has pointed out that the term "Europe" only entered the
vocabulary in adjectival form in the mid-15th century and
was used interchangeably with "Western Christendom" until
5
the beginning of the 18th century. The decline of the 
western medieval imperial and feudal order was thus 
addressed by a corresponding rise in the "idea of Europe." 
Between the 18th century and the turn of the 20th, the idea 
assumed the form of a modern, secular civilization known in 
contemporary history books as the European Age. As believers 
in science and industry as the path to Enlightenment, Europeans 
self-understood themselves and the world in Eurocentric 
terms. As John Lukacs has suggested, the idea of Europe was 
thus "the historical development of the idea of Europe."^
With the passing of the European Age after World War I, 
the idea of Europe as a condition of historical 
consciousness assumed another form. It now received 
expression as a European "movement" designed to rescue the 
continent from its own decline. The "Pan-European Union" 
was launched in 1923 by Count Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi as 
a "non-party mass movement for the unification of Europe."
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While it never attracted popular support, the initiative 
received political attention in May 1930, when French 
Foreign Minister Auguste Briand sent his European 
counterparts a plan for a European federal union of
7sovereign states that was inspired by the movement.
During World War II, the non-communist European exile 
and resistance movements became the inheritors of the idea 
of Europe. As we have seen, members of the resistance tended 
to advocate forms of interstate and autochthonous regional-
o
ism within a federative framework. This part of the study 
deals in particular with diplomatic initiatives by state 
actors, led or encouraged by the British, to unify the 
continent or parts of it as the basis for a postwar European 
settlement.
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CHAPTER VIII
THE MAJOR POWERS AND THE QUESTION 
OF AN ALL-EUROPEAN REGIONAL SETTLEMENT
Differing historical-ideological perspectives and 
pragmatic political concerns marked the diverging approaches 
of the three major powers on the question of postwar 
European organization. As with the debate over world 
organization, the differences between the Big Three were a 
function of national interests as shaped by their respective 
worldviews. The domestic and inter-allied policy debates 
among the three powers on the question of regionalism and 
European organization are explored in this chapter. The main 
issue at stake was Britain's attempt to cast the planned 
allied post-armistice commission for Europe into a postwar 
European organization, a plan which foundered on American 
and Soviet opposition. An examination of how this unfolded 
is preceded by an analysis of the attitudes and policies of 
the three major powers on regionalism and postwar European 
political organization.
The British Initiatives
Prime Minister Churchill's idea for a postwar Council
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of Europe was consonant with past British policy toward 
Europe. Since Philip of Spain's incursions in the 16th 
century, Britain opposed attempts by a single European power 
to acquire hegemony over the continent. After the turn of 
the 20th century, preserving the independence of the smaller 
nations of Europe became a cornerstone of that policy. In 
1907, the policy was defined in the following terms: 
"England, more than any other non-insular power, has a 
direct and positive interest in the maintenance of the 
independence of nations, and therefore must be the natural 
enemy of any country threatening the independence of others 
and the natural protector of the weaker communities."^
Churchill's concern and preoccupation with Europe was 
a mark of his loyalty to the British Empire which he sought 
against hope to preserve during his war-time tenure. His 
actions as a statesman were guided as much by cultural- 
historical considerations as by pragmatic strategic 
interests. His acute geo-political sense reminded him, 
particularly after 1941, that the relationship of world 
forces had changed. The British maritime-based Empire was 
ceding its pre-eminence in maintaining the global and 
European balance to the United States and Soviet Union.
While clinging to the idea of the Empire, Churchill's 
complex nature led him to try to anchor Britain 
alternatively to the United States or a united Europe and 
even, if possible, to both.
One of his first preoccupations upon becoming Prime 
Minister on May 10, 1940 was pursuit of an Anglo-French 
association as a short-run attempt to save France from
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German occupation and as a longer-term nucleus for a future
united Europe. Britain and France, whose policies toward
Germany had collided in the inter-war period, now
collaborated through joint economic and military committees.
A political union was first considered in March 1940, when
Churchill, who was serving as the First Lord of the
Admiralty, and Premier Paul Reynaud agreed that neither
country would conclude a separate armistice or peace treaty.
On June 13, the War Cabinet had Churchill send a formal
message to a retreating French government under Reynaud in
which he proclaimed an "indissoluble union of our two
2
peoples and of our two Empires." By June 16, a draft 
"Declaration of Union" was sent to Reynaud which provided 
for mutual citizenship and a political union with "a single 
War Cabinet" and "joint organs of defence, foreign,
3
financial, and economic policies." When Reynaud's defeatist 
ministers balked, fearing among other things that it would 
relegate France to the position of a Dominion, Reynaud
4
resigned, whereupon the government fell into German hands.
After the fall of France, Churchill shifted his 
thoughts to the United States amidst growing public 
sentiment on both sides of the Atlantic for closer Anglo- 
American association. If the events in Europe pushed him in 
this direction, his shift was not a mere realoolitik 
calculation. Before the outbreak of the war, Churchill had 
completed a multi-volume manuscript on A History of the 
English-Speaking Peoples. which was not to be published 
until 1956. Aside from his American mother, it was the
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common conceptions of English-speaking peoples to law,
language, history, and literature drew Churchill to
America. He spoke of a "common citizenship" in an Anglo-
American association to U.S. leaders in Washington in May
1943. At his September 6, 1943 speech at Harvard University,
he assured his audience that "throughout all this ordeal and
struggle which is characteristic of our age, you will find
in the British Commonwealth and Empire good comrades to whom
you are united by other ties besides those of State policy
5and public need."
But a union of Britain and North America never 
developed beyond extension of American aid and secret Anglo- 
American military staff talks and remained the subject of 
publicists. Churchill's draft of the August 1941 "Atlantic 
Charter" declaration contained only a vague, symbolic hint 
of unity between the two powers. He said the Charter's 
preamble sought "to make known certain common principles in 
the national policies of their respective countries on which 
they base their hopes for a better future for the world.
For all the affinities, Churchill's attitude towards America 
was tempered in part by disagreement with a United States 
policy that was commited to ending Britain's colonial rule. 
In an October 21, 1942 minute to Foreign Secretary Eden,
- Churchill confided that Roosevelt's desire to include China 
among the major powers represented "a faggot vote on the
side of the United States in any attempt to liquidate the
. . . 7British overseas Empire."
Churchill's attachments to America and the Empire were
not overshadowed his by commitment to Europe and European
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unity. In the fall of 1942, he feared Europe's demise in the
face of both Prussian and a menacing Soviet power. In his
October 1942 message to Eden, where he commented on the War
Cabinet's "Four Power Plan," he stated that "my thoughts
rest primarily in Europe —  the revival of the glory of
Europe, the parent continent of the modern nations and of
civilization. It would be a measureless disaster if Russian
barbarism overlaid the culture and independence of the
8ancient States of Europe." He then proceeded to outline his
thinking on the postwar structure of Europe:
Hard as it is to say now, I trust that the European 
family may act unitedly as one under a Council of 
Europe. I look forward to a United States of Europe 
in which barriers between the nations will be 
greatly minimised and unrestricted travel will be 
possible. I hope to see the economy of Europe 
studied as a whole. I hope to see a Council 
consisting of perhaps ten units, including the 
former Great Powers, with several confederations —  
Scandinavian, Danubian, Balkan, etc. —  which would 
possess an international police and be charged with 
keeping Prussia disarmed.
A. European-wide organization became the goal of Britain's
wartime policy on postwar Europe. A supporting objective was
solidarity with the smaller nations of Europe. Churchill
envis aged their consolidation into larger regional
groupings as a way of protecting their independence and
maintaining the European balance. He believed the smaller
powers should play a role alongside the great powers in the
postwar world:
Of course we shall have to work with the Americans 
in many ways, and in the greatest ways, but Europe 
is our prime care, and we certainly do not wish to 
be shut up with the Russians and the Chinese when 
Swedes, Norwegians, Danes, Dutch, Belgians,
Frenchman, Spaniards, Poles, Czechs, and Turks 
will have their burning questions, their desire
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for our aid, and their very great power of making 
their voices heard.
In his "Morning Thoughts" memo of February 2, 1943 to
President Roosevelt, in which he introduced his idea of
regional councils for Europe and the Far East as constituent
elements in a world organization, Churchill conceived of the
9
European council as "an instrument of European government." 
He saw the old League without its weaknesses as a model, 
modified by integrating the smaller states into larger 
representative units that would be comparable in size and 
power and size to the larger states. The units of the 
European council would, he stated, be the "great nations of 
Europe and Asia Minor [i.e., Turkey] as long established" as 
well as "a number of Confederations formed among the smaller 
States, among which a Scandinavian Bloc, Danubian Bloc, and 
a Balkan Bloc appear obvious." Churchill also stressed in 
his message the importance of a continuing great power 
coalition that would guarantee a postwar arrangement in 
Europe.
Churchill aired his views on postwar European (and 
world) organization in his March 21, 1943 radio broadcast.^ 
He called on the allies, led by the three major powers, to 
begin conferring on the future world organization and to 
consider.creating within that framework "a Council of Europe 
and a Council of Asia." With the end of the war in Europe in 
sight and in view of the fact that "in Europe lie most of 
the causes which have led to these two world wars," the task 
at hand was to build an "effective league" embracing the 
whole of Europe. Europe was to be an interstate unit
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comprised of "great States and groups of States.” Grouping
the smaller states into larger interstate regions, or
"confederations which would express themselves through their
own chosen representatives," was advocated in order to
safeguard "the rights and interests (of) the large number of
small nations... ." Using a military analogy, he described
the fate of small nations if they were not formed into
larger units:
What is to happen to the large number of small 
nations whose rights and interests must be safe­
guarded? Here let me ask what would be thought of 
an army that consisted only of battalions and 
brigades, and which never formed any of the larger 
and higher organisations like army corps. It would 
soon get mopped up.
Churchill's larger goal was, as he put it, "to restore the
true greatness of Europe," whose task he realized was
contingent on great power cooperation. At the same time, he
recognized the importance of preserving the historical-
cultural diversity of Europe:
It is my earnest hope, though I can hardly expect 
to see it fulfulled in my lifetime, that we shall 
see achieve the largest common measure of the 
integrated life of Europe that is possible without 
destroying the individual characteristics and 
traditions of its many ancient and historic races.
All this will, I believe, be found to harmonise 
with the high permanent interests of Britain, the 
United States, and Russia. It certainly cannot be 
accomplished without their cordial and concerted 
agreement and participation. Thus, and only thus, 
will the glory of Europe rise again.
Churchill seemed to prefer casting Britain's lot with 
Europe to create a power between the United States and 
Soviet Union. In practice, however, his allegiances swung 
between Europe and the U.S. At his May 22, 1943 Washington 
discussion on the postwar issues with American leaders.
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Churchill argued both for a United States of Europe and an
11Anglo-American association. He spoke of Europe as an 
entity consisting of twelve units of states and groups of 
states that would appoint representatives to a common 
council. The older, established west European states would 
remain intact while the central, eastern, and northern 
European states would combine into confederations. It was 
important to create a strong French state that would act as 
a buffer between the Soviet Union and England. Spain and 
Italy would also remain as single states. Prussia was to be 
severed from the rest of Germany and constitute a separate 
state with some 40 million inhabitants. Catholic Bavaria 
would possibly join a Danubian federation "based on Vienna 
and doing something to fill the gap caused by the 
disappearance of the Austro-Hungarian Empire." Turkey, he 
hoped, was to cooperate with Greece in a larger Balkan 
union, while he hoped Poland and Czechoslovakia, whose 
governments in exile had entered negotiations for a 
confederation "would stand together in friendly relations 
with Russia." The Scandinavian states and the Low Countries 
(including Denmark) were also seen as distinct regional 
units.
Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden's views on postwar order 
in Europe lacked Churchill's sense of resolve and principle. 
He shared the Prime Minister's position until the Americans
and Soviets began to voice opposition to regionally
A
organized Europe. In the course of 1943, he gradually turned 
the Foreign Office away from regionalism as an approach to 
political organization until, at the San Francisco
268
conference in the spring of 1945, he was its uncompromising 
opponent.
Eden, as head of the Dominions Office at the outbreak
of the war, first outlined his views on British war aims in
Europe in a letter to Foreign Secretary Viscount Halifax.
It was not enough to accomplish the negative aim of
destroying Nazi rule and returning to a status quo ante. A
positive aim, he suggested, would be a solution "on the
lines of some form of European federation. This would
comprise a European defence scheme, a European customs union
12and common currency." While such projects seemed "somewhat
wild," they were in fact variations on the theme of "[French
Prime Minister] Briand's conception of a European union."
Eden did not propose that a united Europe be included in
Britain's war aims, but he wished to underline the need to
say in public that "we were fighting for something more than
our own interests, 'or even the re-creation of the world as
13we knew it two months ago.'" In these early war years, he 
saw Britain playing a central role in deciding Europe's 
future as Britain was the most qualified and informed among 
the major powers on the subject. While appearing to be 
sensitive to Soviet views, he showed little patience with 
American opinion about the future of Europe. After a July 
1942 unofficial visit from John Foster Dulles, of the World 
Council of Churches, where Dulles reported that the United 
States was favoring blocs resulting from a confederation of 
equals and not of smaller states concentrated around a big 
power, Eden minuted:
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American views are of interest, but ours are even 
more important where Europe is concerned. ...[W]e 
should always consult U.S. Government, but our 
object should be to bring them along with us.
They know very little of Europe and it would be 
unfortunate for the future of the world if U.S. 
uninstructed views were to decide the future of 
the European continent-.Our diplomacy should be 
equal to the task... .
Unlike Churchill's European council idea, which was
an example of interstate regionalism, the Foreign Office's
"Four-Power Plan" drafted by Gladwyn Jebb in October 1942
outlined a peace structure that leaned toward hegemonial
regionalism. Drafted in the months following the May 26,
1942 Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance, the proposal held
that, "In many areas, one particular Power would be expected
at the outset to provide the chief physical means of keeping 
15the peace." Eden, who on his own initiative had proposed 
the alliance treaty to Foreign Commissar Molotov, toyed with 
the idea of a i Europe divided into British and Soviet 
spheres, with the United States as the dominant power in the 
Far Eastern regional council. According to the British 
draft, "the greatest responsibility for the restoration of 
(the) western European area would rest with us" (7). Eden 
added in a November 8 memorandum that while a wider 
organization and United States participation was necessary 
for permanent stability in Europe, the latter was a 
commitment whose prospects were less than certain. Thus, he 
argued, "if we refused the leadership of Europe, the smaller 
powers would inevitably drift into the German orbit" (10).
The first reference in British postwar plans to a 
"council of Europe" came with War Cabinet member Sir 
Stafford Cripps' November 19 minute to the "Four-Power
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Plan." In urging the War Cabinet to take bolder action, he 
regarded Europe as the focal point of such action. The 
greatest danger to peace was the "strong central position of 
Germany" in Europe (11). In place of an Anglo-Soviet 
condominium in Europe, he proposed reducing the economic 
power of, Germany while strengthening the smaller neighboring 
states, which should be formed "into larger federal units" 
(12). Responding to Churchill's favorable comments on the 
plan, he raised the idea of a "Council of Europe to deal 
with political, economic and social issues (including 
minority issues) likely to disturb the peace" (Ibid.). 
Britain, the United States, and the Soviet Union would be 
members of the Council, one of five similar world regional 
councils led by one or more of the great powers. A "Supreme 
World Council" would embody the councils of: Europe, the 
Americas, where the United States was dominant; the Far 
East, led by China; the British Commonwealth; and, "owing to 
its great size and multiplicity of republics,” the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics (Ibid.).
On January 16, 1943, Eden, assisted by Cripps, combined
t
the Jebb memorandum and Cripps minute into a new "United 
Nations Plan" that backed away from hegemonial regionalism 
in Europe and embraced the idea of an international 
organization maintained by a concert of the four major 
powers. In that framework, Britain was to continue to bear 
the responsibilities of a world power and to prevent 
Europe's domination by any single power, preserving "the 
freedom of Europe as essential to our own." The revised
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memorandum admitted that Britain could not realize these 
objectives through her own unaided efforts. "We can only 
hope to play our part either as a European Power or as a 
World Power if we ourselves form part of a wider 
organization" (14).
In the planned transition period to a permanent 
European settlement, Eden proposed an inter-allied Armistice 
and Reconstruction Commission for Europe on which the 
smaller European allies would be represented along with the 
Big Three and the cooperation of any remaining neutral 
states. It would have wide powers, including police 
enforcement powers, to coordinate essential services both 
inside and outside Germany. The commission would also 
provide a "unifying political framework" for an eventual 
"'Council of Europe' on which all European States should be 
represented, including the United Kingdon, the Soviet Union, 
and, if possible the United States" (24). The Council of 
Europe would be part of a world-wide system of five 
interstate regional councils as envisaged by Cripps in 
addition to regional "commissions" for the colonial 
dependencies (17).
Shortly after these deliberations, Eden began to 
backpedal on his support for interstate regionalism in 
European (and world) organization. With the Soviet Union now 
on a westward march and voicing opposition to regional 
federations in eastern Europe and the State Department 
disputing the very idea of regionalism in postwar 
organization, Eden began to hedge on the issue. Believing at 
this time that "the key lay in Moscow," Eden underscored the
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need to obtain the Soviet Union's agreement for a common
3.6postwar policy on Europe. In a February 4, 1943 despatch
to the British ambassador to Moscow, he instructed the
ambassador to emphasize
the desireability of the three major Allies 
pursuing an agreed policy in regard to Europe 
as a whole. His Majesty's Government would, in 
fact, propose that Three-Power consultations should 
in due course take place on post-war arrangements 
alike in Western, Central and Eastern Europe. Only 
if this principle is accepted will there be any 
hope of getting some real European order estab­
lished when Germany collapses, and it should be 
excluded that any one of the three Great Powers 
should run a policy of its own in opposition to, 
or behind the backs of, the others. Moreover, only 
if it is accepted will any joint planning be either 
possible or desireable. Some assurance from M.
Molotov that the principle is accepted by the Soviet 
Union will accordingly be of great value as a-first 
step towards real Three-Power collaboration.
In preparing for his March 12-30 United States trip for
exploratory discussions on postwar issues with American
leaders, Eden decided "not (to) put too much emphasis on the
'regional idea' (except to the extent to which it was
implicit in the initial treatment of Europe...)" and a
18proposed declaration on colonial administration. Before 
leaving London, Eden was informed by Soviet ambassador Ivan 
Maisky "that the Soviet Government was not enthusiastic 
about the proposal for a future federation of Europe" and 
was asked not to make any binding commitments with regard to 
Europe. Eden disagreed with Maisky's assertion that a 
federation combining the small European countries would have 
"negligible" political and military significance, "saying 
the very fact of the smallness of some of the countries made 
federation all the more desirable, politically and
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19militarily as well as economically." Although Maisky
stated that he was speaking for himself and not with
specific instructions from Moscow, his words were not taken
lightly by Eden, who assured Maisky that his talks with the
20Americans would be exploratory.
Eden focussed his exploratory Washington discussions on
postwar questions on problems of world security and the
future of Germany. Much of his time was spent discussing
technical issues relating to shipping and the postwar
organization of civil aviation. When Churchill's March 21
radio broadcast advocating regional organization had, as
presidential aide Harry Hopkins put it, "a very unfortunate
effect over here," Eden disassociated himself from the Prime
21Minister's remarks. Apart from expressing a desire for
United States participation in postwar Europe, Eden and his
associates, William Strang and Gladwyn Jebb, did not push
the British plan for a post-armistice "United Nations
Commission for Europe" during their March 24-25 discussions
22at the State Department. Discussions on the future of
Europe as a whole at both the White House on March 15 and
with Welles at the State Department on the 16th was confined
23to questions of boundaries, geography, and strategy. On
March 29, at the conclusion of his visit, Eden reported to
Hopkins that "he thought that he and Hull did see eye to eye
24on the major world problems."
Under Gladwyn Jebb's hand, Eden's "United Nations Plan" 
went through two further revisions before it was presented 
to the War Cabinet on July 7. The new "United Nations Plan 
for Organising Peace" still envisaged an all-European plan
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guaranteed by the three major power. Including allied and 
neutral European states, Europe would be organized to 
contain a resurgent Germany and restore the continent to 
social and political health. The means lay in developing the 
armistice-related United Nations Commission for Europe into 
a Council for Europe. The revised plan emphasized that in 
order
[t]o provide a political framework for the various 
military and economic measures contemplated, it is 
to be hoped that the United Nations Commission for 
Europe ... may at some stage become a 'Council of 
Europe', on which all European States should be 
represented, including the United Kingdom and the 
Soviet Union, with the addition, it is to be hoped, 
of the United States. ...A Council of Europe in 
which the [Big Three] did not play an active part 
might become in course of time an instrument through 
which Germany could recover peacefully that hegemony 
over Europe which she had momentarily2gstablished by 
force of arms during the present war.
The plan still provided for the creation of sub-regional
groupings of smaller states as units within the all-European
organization. While seeking to guard against the "attempt to
force European nations into unions against their will, ... it
might be possible for the United Nations Commission for
Europe, for instance, to encourage 'regional' tendencies by
centralising certain services in certain specified areas"
(57) .
Eden presented the British views on the transition 
phase for Europe in the form of a ten-point "Aide M6moire" 
to the Americans on July 16, 1943. In addition to armistice 
and control commissions for enemy states administered by an 
Inter-Allied Armistice Commission of the three major powers, 
the plan provided for a high-profile, supervisory European
275
organization. "There should be established a supervisory 
body entitled 'United Nations Commission for Europe,' 
composed of high ranking political representatives of the 
United Kingdom, the United States of America and the 
U.S.S.R., of France and other minor European Allies, and, if 
so desired, of any Dominion prepared to contribute to the 
policing of Europe" (46) (emphasis in original). The 
Commission, located at "some convenient point" on the 
continent, would be directed by a steering committee 
comprised of representatives of the three major powers (and 
possibly France) and operate under the rule of unanimity.
The Commission would have several functions, acting as 
supreme allied authority in Europe to "direct and co­
ordinate" the activities of the several armistice commis­
sions, the allied commanders-in-chief, and any allied 
civilian authorities that may be established. It would also 
deal with current problems, "military, political and
26economic, connected with the maintenance of order" (47-8).
On the eve of great power deliberations on postwar 
organization, beginning with the October 1943 Foreign Ministers 
Conference in Moscow, Britain was still poised to negotiate on 
behalf of an interstate regional settlement for Europe.
United States' Views
Eden's July 16, 1943 aide m6moire elicited an 
unenthusiastic reponse in the State Department. With the 
imminent departure from the Department of Under Secretary 
Welles, the tide had turned against regionalism as a basis
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for postwar political organization. In an August 11
memorandum on the aide mfemoire to the President, Leo
Pasvolsy, Secretary Hull's special assistant for postwar
organization matters, questioned the desirability of
combining armistice-related activities in individual states
with postwar questions of a general and long-term character.
Pasvolsky cited comments of the Subcommittee on Security of
the Advisory Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy:
It is the feeling of the Subcommitte that the 
decision to create an agency, which would 
essentially be a kind of super-government for 
Europe, should be made exclusively on its own 
merits... It is felt that the political reaction 
in this country would be unfavorable if the United 
States were to take such a major step involving 
general and long-run commitments, under the guise 
of making a settlement with the enemy. These ^  
policy issues should be determined separately.
The Pasvolsky memorandum also informed the President that
the discussions in the State Department on postwar
organization had concluded that postwar organization was
28to have a universal and not a regional character.
Pasvolsky invoked the traditional American fear of
long-term commitments abroad, particularly in Europe, as an
\
argument against a regional organization in Europe that 
would involve the United States. Although it seemed ironic 
that this otherwise isolationist argument was being advanced 
by an internationalist, this fear of "entanglingalliances" 
was nonetheless a constant theme in the annals of American 
foreign relations. The United States, while itself a 
federation of states and a unification of (primarily 
European) nationalties, never presented itself as a model 
for the old world during the war. Europe's controversies
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were, as George Washington pointed out in his Farewell 
Address, "essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence 
therefore it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves, by 
artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her 
politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her 
friendships and enmities." This attitude was reinforced by 
generations of Europeans who migrated to the new world from 
lives in the old world which many wished to leave behind. In 
foreign affairs, the United States preferred as a matter of 
habit to rest behind the protective contours of the Monroe 
Doctrine.
American isolationism thawed at turn of the 20th
century and in the wake of European colonial ventures and
unrest. Apart from her own imperial adventures in the
Caribbean and the Philippines, America's international
involvement was highlighted by her 1917-18 military
intervention in Europe. But three months after the Harding
administration's inaugural in 1921, United States ambassador
to London George Harvey announced to a stunned Europe that
the United States government "could not, without the
betrayal of its creators and masters, and will not, I assure
you, have anything whatsoever to do with the League, or with
any commission or committee appointed by it or responsible
29to it, directly or indirectly, openly or furtively."
America's return to "normalcy" ended in 1933 with 
President Roosevelt's inaugural pledge that "in the field of 
world policy I would dedicate this Nation to the policy of 
the good neighbor... ," thus opening a new phase of American 
foreign relations that had a particular echo in Latin
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America. Although Roosevelt was knowledgable in particular
about the geography of Europe, he did not share Churchill's
emotional ties to the continent. His non-involvement in
European affairs was largely determined, however, by a
neutrality-minded Congress. Roosevelt's efforts to avert war
in Europe did not extend beyond effective rhetorical appeals
and material assistance to Britain. At the outbreak of World
War II, the isolationist lobby, which had more than residual
support in the American public, obtained the President's
signature to the Neutrality Act which he proclaimed on
September 5, 1939. In assessing the decade of the 1930s,
Sumner Welles wrote in 1944 that
many of us have gained the conviction that the 
United States might even then have changed the 
trend of events had public opinion in this country 
grasped more clearly how desperately serious the 
world situation had become, and that in its own 
interest alone this country should share actively 
and effectively in international affairs. ...During 
those years among the highest officials of this 
Government only the President himself clearly^and 
emphatically sounded the note of danger... .
America's official neutrality remained in effect until
the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941. In the
meantime, preliminary postwar planning had begun in January
1940 in the State Department with the establishment of the
Advisory Committee on Problems of Foreign Relations. Under
Secretary of State Sumner Welles was appointed chairman with
Hugh R. Wilson, former ambassador to Germany, as vice-
chairman. Though an internationalist, Welles had become an
advocate of interstate regionalism in both world and
European organization. Upon assuming the chairmanship of the
Advisory Council, he emphasized "the necessity of basic
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31research as the foundation for policy recommendationsr"
and for the next three years, shaped the administration's
policy debate on questions of postwar organization.
Soon after convening in January 1940, the Subcommittee
on Political Problems which Welles also chaired raised
questions with regard to the feasability of regional
organization in Europe:
Should the United States, apart from cooperation 
with Europe in matters of economic reconstruction, 
commit itself to any international cooperation on 
purely political matters? Perhaps in view of the 
failure of the League of Nations and the success 
of the inter-American system, a number or regional 
leagues —  each under an individual, rather than a 
representative of a government, as president and 
each having a direct relationship to the others —  
should be favored. Still another possibility was 
that the League of Nations might be continued, with 
modifications, to represent primarily the states of 
Europe and Africa; a regional group might be formed 
for Asia; and a collaborating relationship estab­
lished between these regional^arrangements and the 
inter-American organization.
Welles drew on his February-March 1940 fact-finding trip to
Europe to devise a regionally-based proposal for a major
33power-sponsored postwar European settlement. He outlined a 
Europe consisting of eight or nine regional sub-units 
represented in a single political unit. The executive of 
this body was a presidency that rotated annually in the 
manner of Switzerland's Federal Council. The plan favored 
"such derogation of the sovereignty of states as (would) 
make for quick and decisive action by the body" (458). 
Practical power would remain in the hands of the major 
powers except in the unlikely event of a federal union along 
the lines of a United States of Europe.
The nine blocs of the political unit, whose decisions
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"for the purposes of European administration" would be based 
on either majority or two-thirds rule, retained Great 
Britain, France, Germany, and Italy as political units (if 
France and Britain did not choose to form a single bloc, as 
was being considered at the time). The smaller states were 
to be grouped into five regional units consisting of 
Scandinavia; the Iberian peninsula; the eastern Baltic 
states and Poland; the Danubian states (Bohemia-Moravia, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Yugoslavia); and the Balkan states 
(Rumania, Bulgaria, Greece). In addition to the political 
body, the Welles proposal also outlined provisions for a 
permanent court of justice; an international force that was 
"regional in character”; a disarmament commission that was 
"primarily regional but with possible participation, for 
limited purposes, of states of the world”; a technical 
commission that was "worldwide in scope"; and a "Permanent 
Group" of non-governmental ombudsmen "recognized for their 
wisdom, character and experience" and who would monitor and 
report on actual or likely world trouble spots to the 
political body (459-60).
Riding on growing public support for internationalism 
in 1943, Secretary of State Hull rejected proposals for 
interstate regionalism in European organization that were 
not firmly subordinated to a general world organization. In 
August, at the time of Welles' resignation, the State 
Department had "reached a consensus" that international 
organization was to be structured on a univeral, not 
regional, basis. Regional organizations, concerned primarily
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with local problems, "could perform some function by
34delegation from the general international organization." 
While not opposed on principle to European unification, the 
Department did not wish to see it guaranteed by the three 
major powers participating in a Council of Europe but by a 
world organization that would include the major powers. As 
Myron C. Taylor, a member of Secretary Hull's "informal 
agenda group" stated in an August 1943 memo to the 
President:
With respect to the proposed Council of Europe, 
we have questioned whether the United States 
should join Great Britain and Russia in guarante­
eing the security of that group of states. We 
have examined this problem in light of Western 
Hemisphere relationships under the Monroe Doctrine 
and in terms of the more recent Good Neighbor 
policies. As an alternative to Mr. Churchill's 
proposal, we have discussed a union of all European 
states, excluding Great Britain and Russia, which 
would be placed under the protection of a world ^5 
organization that would include Britain and Russia.
If the State Department opposed the British plan to
develop transitional armistice and control machinery into a
European organization, it did not preclude the possibility
of some kind of European-wide organization after the
war. Secretary Hull suspended the work of the Advisory
Committee on Post-War Foreign Policy in July 1943, but he
allowed the work of the Special Subcommittee on Problems of
European Organization, formed in May, to continue its work.
The committee was chaired by Foreign Affairs editor Hamilton
Fish Armstrong and included Leo Pasvolsky, Isaiah Bowen,
Adolf A. Berle, Jr., Harley A. Notter, Cyril Black, and
Philip E. Mosley among its twenty or so members. After some
preliminary organizational meetings in May, it met at the
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State Department sixteen times on a bimonthly basis between
June 4, 1943 and March 31, 1944.36
At its first formal meeting, the subcommittee agreed
that it had been "formed to study the possibility of a
unification of the European continent, as well as that of
37more limited regional arrangements." It acknowledged
various types of regional arrangements, ranging from
bilateral agreements involving two states to an all-European
confederation. Its primary stated objective was to assess
the effects of European regional organization on United
States interests. In this context, it set out to study a
list of ten possible regional groups of states, noting that
there was greater interest among European allied statesmen
for sub-regional groupings than for an all-European 
38organization. The ten possible groupings were:
• the Continent as a whole;
• the Low Countries, w/ or w/o the Rhineland;
• the Low Countries and France;
• a Scandinavian federation;
• a Balkan federation;
• a Polish-Czechoslovak federation;
• an East European federation;
• a Danubian federation;
• a South Slav federation; and perhaps
• an Iberian bloc.
The results of the subcommittee's work by fall 1943 
were summarized in an internal memorandum on the
40Department's work on postwar international organization. 
While apprehensive about the potential economic and 
political impact of a united Europe, the Department gave 
conditional support to the idea of European unification. "It 
was found that a full European customs union would not 
necessarily be either advantageous or detrimental to the
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long-run interests of the United States, but that its
effects would depend on economic developments within the
union and the external commercial policy pursued," the 
41report stated. It held that closer economic and political
rapprochement would carry potentialities both for peace and
war. It nonetheless recommended that the United States
tentatively favor regional groupings provided they were
freely arrived at and its members remained state units
capable of being diplomatically represented in a larger,
world-wide organization. In the event Europe did not move
toward greater economic and political regional integration,
the report recommended that the United States support
functional organization "for such unification of technical
42services as might be feasable."
The entry of Soviet troops into eastern Europe in the
spring of 1944 changed the political variables favoring
interstate regionalism in Europe. On Leo Pasvolsky's
suggestion, Hamilton Fish Armstrong suspended the work of
the subcommittee at its last meeting on March 31, 1944 on
grounds that "some of the schemes studied by the
subcommittee had been rendered academic" by the changed
43world situation. At a February meeting, committee member
Adolf A. Berle pointed to the likelihood of hegemonial
regionalism in eastern Europe in stating that "as a working
assumption, the Subcommitte might study the hypothetical
case of a group of states extending as far west as the
western frontier of Czechoslovakia, and to Trieste in the
44south, dominated by the Soviet Union."
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Soviet Attitudes
Since the Bolshevik revolution, Soviet policy toward
Europe fluctuated uneasily between engagement and
withdrawal, internationalism and isolation. The very rules
and methods of engagement and the meaning of
internationalism added confusion to the picture. The
existence of the new socialist regime and its universal
claims for a world socialist revolution challenged the
traditional (i.e., European) assumptions about the conduct
of international relations based on a system of sovereign
states. As noted above, the modern state for Marxist-
Leninists was an instrument of bourgeois-national class
rule. It was not in need of reform but replacement by a
"dictatorship of the proletariat" that would usher in the
Marxian realm of freedom (full communism) based on a
classless society organized into a federation of nations.
In the years prior to and immediately following the October
1917, Lenin and in particular, Leon Trotsky, advanced
federalist slogans of the "union of the oppressed
everywhere" in the form of a "United Soviet States of
Europe" as a precursor for the "United States of the 
45World." In the constitution of the Russian Soviet 
Federated Socialist Republic, introduced in July 1918, it 
was proclaimed that the Russian socialist experiment augured
a new future for the federal organization of Europe and the
/
world:
Our Constitution is of world-wide significance.
As the workers and peasants from different 
countries take advantage of favorable circum­
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stances and follow the example of Soviet Russia 
... the Russian Soviet Republic sooner or later 
will be surrounded by daughter and sister 
Republics, which uniting will lay the basis for 
a federation,.first of Europe, and then of the 
entire world.
For tactical reasons, Lenin embraced the popular idea
of "national self-determination" as a means of solving a
festering nationality problem in eastern Europe. He declared
independent nations as units of political organization. But
Lenin and other left-wing socialists attached no instrinsic
value to the nation, which they viewed with the state as a
transitory category that would disappear with the advent of
socialism. Socialism alone could reconcile the class and
national differences that separated men. The real basis of
national self-determination lay in the nation being "under
the leadership of a cadre drawn from a class-conscious
proletariat" in which the principal task of the party of the
protelariat "was to further the self-determination of the
proletariat in each national group rather than the self-
47determination of the entire national group itself."
Nations and not states were seen as the units of 
organization although it was not clear how the "nations” 
were constituted other than being soviet, or "council," 
republics. Lenin claimed that he wanted a "voluntary union 
of nations in fraternal u n i t y . A t  the founding congress 
of the Communist International (Comintern) in March 1919, 
the manifesto of the congress cited the inadequacy of the 
sovereign state as a form of political organization. The 
platform of the congress called for the proletariat to "wipe 
out boundaries between states, transform the whole world
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into one cooperative commonwealth, and realize the freedom
49and brotherhood of nations."
When it became evident in 1920 that a European 
revolution was not imminent, the Soviet Union turned inward
to survive a civil war and develop "socialism in one
country." At the same time, the "two-camp" thesis was 
developed and the Comintern maintained as a world-wide party 
instrument to carry on the work of the revolution. Communist 
cadres in whatever nation or state were required to show 
loyalty to the Soviet Union. "The (proletarian)
internationalist," as Stalin proclaimed in 1927, "is one who
unreservedly, without hesitation, without conditions, is 
prepared to defend the Soviet Union, because the Soviet 
Union is the base of the world revolutionary movement and it
is impossible to defend or advance this movement without
50defending the Soviet Union."
Hitler's rise to power in 1933 and Germany's subsequent
exit from the League of Nations disquieted the security
conscious Soviet goverment. For the next five to six years,
the Soviets pursued an unorthodox policy of attempting to
contain Germany through regional security pacts within the
League of Nations structure. Foreign Affairs Commissar Maxim
Litvinov, as the cosmopolitan-minded architect of this
policy, persuaded Stalin and the Central Committee Politburo
in December 1933 for the Soviets to join the League in order
51to pursue this policy. The new direction was based on the 
assumption that security could best be assured through 
collective commitments undertaken on a regional basis. Both 
bilateral and mulitlateral mutual assistance pacts were seen
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as the most reliable security guarantees. As a rule, the
Soviet regime had on principle opposed regional arrangements
in Europe in which it was not represented. In May 1933,
Litvinov told the French that "anything done without us ...
52can only be something done against us." The Soviets viewed 
both Briand's plan for a United States of Europe and the 
Little Entente as cordon sanitaires hostile to the Soviet 
Union. The regional agreements which were now being proposed 
had, according to the Soviets, "nothing in common with blocs 
directed against definite states or groups of states and 
pursuing the purpose of encircling and isolating these 
states. The significance of such agreements was that they 
embraced all the states of a given geographical region and 
provided their members with identical guarantees of
53assistance in the event of aggression by any country.”
With the Soviet Union's entry into the League of
Nations in September 1934, Litvinov emerged as a leading
advocate of League action on a regional basis. In his
inaugural speech to the League, he stated that while the
Soviet Union represented "a new form of state" opposed by
"old state formations," it had nonetheless "never excluded
the possibility of some form or other of association with
states having a different political or social system, so
long as there is no mutual hositility and if it is for the
54attainment of common aims.” Regional security arrangements 
were seen as a means of strengthening the League's Covenant, 
in particular Article 16, which provided for the application 
of military sanctions against states that violated the
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peace. Regional pacts were described as supplementary
guarantees of security within the League system. In
September 1935, Litvinov placed regional pacts within a
broader a European union of states capable of inter-acting
with other regional systems:
It seems to me sometimes that, with the univer­
sality of the League, ...the voices of European 
countries in the League may sometimes be drowned 
in the universal chorus, or not find an adequate 
expression corresponding to the specific weight 
of Europe in international life. Some remedy to 
this state of affairs would be the more justified 
as the possibility of interference of the League 
in the affairs of some of the other continents is 
in some cases limited beforehand, or even excluded.
This question might be considered together with the 
question on the agenda regarding the relations 
between the League of Nations and the Pan-American 
Union. The creation of a European organisation with 
the League of Nations might in time lead to a wide 
European regional agreement embracing and linking 
up regional pacts of a more limited scope.
Surprising as it may seem, Litvinov advocated on behalf
of an interstate regionalism where each member state would
preserve its sovereignty in regional pacts within the League
framework. At the League's 16th Assembly in July 1936, he
asserted that it was necessary
that all continents, for a start, the continent 
of Europe, at least, (be) covered with a network 
of regional pacts, under which individual groups 
of states would be committed to the defence of 
definite regions against aggression, and the ful­
fillment of these regional commitments is regarded 
as fulfillment of the commitments under the pact 
[i.e., the League of Nations Convenant— Ed.1 
and has the full support of all the members of the 
League of Nations. Far from replacing the League 
Convenant these regional pacts^gust complement 
it..." (brackets in original).
Stalin's main foreign policy concern was security along 
Soviet Russia's western frontier. While he approved or 
tolerated Litvinov's initiatives in the League, he also had
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Deputy Foreign Affairs Commissar Vyacheslav Molotov play the
57German card in Berlin. In the mid-1930sr Litvinov
negotiated principally with the French, supporters of the
Little Entente, for the creation of a Locarno-type "Eastern
Pact." While he was unsuccessful in obtaining a trilateral
pact between France and Czechoslovakia, he did succeed in
concluding bilateral mutual assistance treaties with those
states in May 1935. The pact with Czechoslovakia contained a
fateful escape clause which obligated the Soviet Union to
aid Czechoslovakia only if France also acted in fulfillment
of its responsibility. Litvinov's inability by the spring of
1936 to conclude the requisite military conventions rendered
the treaties ineffective even if they were still in force at
the time of the capitulation and collapse of Czechoslovakia 
58in 1938. According to Anthony Eden, "had the Eastern Pact
come into being, it would have ... influenced German policy
towards Czechoslovakia, not in its intention but in its
59execution. It might even have averted Munich." The failure 
of Litvinov's efforts was less the result of diplomatic 
posturing or naive assumptions than of a latent, if 
understandable, western mistrust of the Soviet Union that 
was fed by incredulous news of internal events in Russia 
(purges, famine, forced collectivization).60 Hitler also 
succeeded in confusing western diplomats. The denouemenent 
of Litvinov's scheme was his replacement as Foreign 
Commissar by Vycheslav Molotov, who three months later 
signed the Nazi-Soviet non-agression pact whose secret 
protocol created a German-Soviet condominium in eastern 
Europe. The experiment in interstate regionalism under the
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rules of bourgeois internationalism failed and gave way to
hegemonial regionalism by two despotic powers who divided
eastern Europe between them.
When the wartime allied coalition was formed on January
1, 1942, the Soviets were again obliged to deal with the
West. In spite or because of Stalin's cynical and perhaps
xenophobic attitude toward the West, the Soviet Union
formally adhered to the Atlantic Charter at the September
1941 Inter-Allied Conference in London and in May 1942
signed a twenty-year treaty of alliance with Britain. In the
early war years, and particularly when Soviet territory was
under seize, the Soviets did not voice opposition to the
British postwar ideas for regional reorganization in Europe.
During Eden's December 1941 meeting with Stalin in Moscow,
Stalin, while pressing for recognition of the Soviet
territorial gains of 1939 and 1940, raised no objections "if
61some European countries wished to federate." In the fall
of 1942, as the Red Army began to turn the tide against the
Germans, the Soviets began to give mixed signals about the
regional confederation plans for eastern Europe. Soviet
Ambassador in London Maisky told Eden as late as March 1943
that the Soviet government may not oppose regional
federations in northern and southeastern Europe if certain
62security guarantees were met. But the Soviet Union's 
London ambassador accredited to the European governments-in- 
exile, A.Y. Bogomolov, was particularly active in later 1942 
and 1943 in cajoling the east Europeans to drop their plans 
for union. Themes of national self-determination and state
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sovereignty were increasingly invoked as part of a campaign
to restore the structure of the prewar system (excepting the
63Baltic states). This attitude was to prevail at Moscow 
Foreign Ministers' Conference in October 1943.
The Moscow Foreign Ministers' Conference and Beyond
The die for the postwar structure of Europe was cast at 
the Moscow Conference of Foreign Ministers in October 18-31, 
1943. British Foreign Secretary Eden placed four items on 
the conference agenda which would have substantially altered 
the organization of postwar Europe along interstate regional 
lines. But the Americans and Russians were not terribly 
interested and had their own "agendas" at the conference. 
Secretary of State Hull was concerned above all with allied 
adhesion to the Four-Power Declaration assuring universalism 
in international political organization while Foreign Affairs 
Commissar Molotov considered issues other than military ones 
of secondary importance.
Masking perhaps his own changing views or pessimism 
about the regional alternative favored by Churchill, Eden 
was unassertive in arguing the British case. Eden's hand was 
also weakened by the lack of Anglo-American cooperation at 
the conference. Secretary of State Hull's refusal to meet 
with him prior to the tripartite meeting was intended to 
show the host power that no special relationship existed 
between Britain and the United States. In spite of America's 
growing strength, the U.S. government had begun to play, as 
one observer put it, "the role of suitor to Stalin's coy
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mistress. ...Churchill and Eden, thinking largely in terms 
of a balance of power, wanted to bargain with Stalin, 
whereas Roosevelt and Hull thought in terms of abstract 
principles to which they hoped Stalin could, if treated
64indulgently enough by his war-time allies, be committed."
The British proposals sought to introduce interstate
regionalism in Europe as a means of preventing a large
power's hegemony on the continent. Although directed
officially against Germany, the British position also sought
to forestall the division of postwar Europe into Soviet and
possibly American spheres of influence. Toward this end,
they sought to table a proposal concerning "The Question of
Joint Responsibility for Europe as Against Separate Spheres
of Influence." Although Hull and other internationalists
shared an anathema for "spheres of influence," they asked
the British before the conference to change the wording of
"Spheres of Influence" to the less offensive "Areas of
65Resppnsibility." The four-article proposal, after
acknowledging the draft Four-Power Declaration, would have 
committed the three governments to accept:
2. That all States are accordingly free to asso­
ciate themselves with other states in order to 
increase their mutual welfare by the establishment 
of institutions on a wider scale that each can 
separately maintain, provided that such associa­
tions shall not be directed against the the welfare 
or stability of other States and are approved by 
any general international organization that may be 
set up in accordance with paragraph 4 of the Four 
Power Declaration adopted at......  on.........
3. That, subject to the considerations advanced in 
paragraph 2 above, they regard it as their duty and 
interest, so far as lies in their power, to assist 
other European States for form any associations 
designed to increase their mutual welfare and the
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general prosperity of the Continent;
4. That for their own part they will not seek to 
create any separate areas of responsibility in 
Europe and will not recognize such for others, but 
rather affirm their common interest in the well- 
being of Europe as a whole.
Hull and Molotov responded to the proposal at the 
eighth tripartite negotiating session on October 26. Hull 
argued that the conference should first agree on general 
principles as a basis for agreement on particular issues. It 
was the U.S. government's view "that the first step was to 
agree upon and adopt a broad set of principles capable of 
world-wide application which would then guide our three 
countries in our consideration of separate and specific 
questions, of which the British proposal was one" (638). 
Foreign Commissar Molotov agreed with Hull, adding perhaps 
defensively that he "knew of no reason, to believe that the 
Soviet Government would be interested in separate zones or 
spheres of influence." He "could guarantee that there was no 
disposition on the part of the Soviet Government to divide 
Europe into such separate zones" (638-39). Foreign Secretary 
Eden did not pursue the issue and, as a result, no action 
was taken on the document.
In a more concrete second measure, Eden presented a 
version of the Foreign Office's July 7 memorandum on "The 
United Nations Plan for Organising Peace." It had called for 
a "United Nations Commission for Europe" with wide political 
authority that would "at some stage become a 'Council of 
Europe'." In face of American opposition, Eden scaled down 
the proposal for the Moscow conference and merely called for 
a "form of clearing house ... with broad consultative powers
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to deal with general questions arising out of the war"
67(607). In the course of negotiations,, both the Soviets and
Americans further reduced the role and scope of what became
formalized at the conference as the European Advisory
Commission (EAC). The Commission was to be based in London
with a rotating presidency of the three powers and a
secretariat. Its mandate, in the end, was to "study and make
joint recommendations to the three Governments upon European
questions connected with the termination of hositilities
which the three Governments may consider appropriate to 
68refer to it.” Authorized merely to make studies and
recommendations, the EAC was a far cry from what the British
had originally bargained for. The EAC's authority was
further reduced by Hull in the spring of 1944 and abolished
altogether in July 1945 in favor an inter-governmental
69Council of Foreign Ministers.
The third and fourth British proposals on behalf of 
interstate regionalism were directed at central and eastern 
Europe. The issues concerned the future of Austria and sub­
regional confederation(s) in eastern Europe. The latter 
proposal, which was also sidetracked by the Soviet Union and 
United States, is dealt with in the following chapter. The 
most Eden was able to salvage in Moscow was a "Declaration 
on Liberated Austria” calling for the restoration of 
Austrian independence after the war. The future of Austria 
was the subject of intense deliberation throughout 1943 in 
the Foreign Office and War Cabinet. On June 16, the War 
Cabinet approved a two-stage policy that combined
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restoration of Austrian independence with "the fitting of
Austria into some form of Central or Southeast European
Confederation. ...The Cabinet considered that the larger
grouping should be established soon after the war ended
before there had been time for opinion to harden on other 
70lines." In Moscow, it was the United States revision of
the British draft of the declaration, in which the word
"association" with neighboring states was deleted, that was
adopted as the official conference document on October 30.
The outcome of the Moscow conference opened the way for
the division of Europe into American and Soviet spheres of
influence. At the time, however, it was perceived as a
success in the medias of the three powers, each of them in
terms of their governments' main negotiating interests.
While all three states hailed the results, "American
newspapers generally seized upon the Four-Power Declaration
as the most important decision of the Conference; British
newspapers tended to emphasize the value of the European
Advisory Council...; while the Russian newspapers put the
71greatest emphasis upon the military repercussions... ."
The setback in Moscow for Britain's proposals for 
postwar Europe, while not unexpected, forced the Foreign 
Office into further retreat on the issue of regional 
organization. This was reflected in the preparations for the 
Dumbarton Oaks conference. Churchill, preoccupied with war­
time issues, including plans for the cross-Channel invasion, 
had not kept up with the Foreign Office's preparations for 
the meeting. He demurred, however, when he examined the 
draft memoranda for the conference in early May 1944. In a
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May 21 minute, he demanded that Eden to "revise" the
position taken on Europe, which had essentially ignored his
concept of a European council. Churchill stated that "'the
only thing I am pressing for is a United States of Europe in
some for or other, with a Council of its own of which I
trust Russia, Great Britain and the United States will be 
72members.'” The redrafted paragraph 18 of the first
memorandum (Memorandum A) of five memoranda submitted to the
major powers emphasized the need for a European
organization. The paragraph, of which the addition is
underlined, read as follows:
Just as there are functional organisations, so 
there may be regional associations for various 
purposes when there is obvious advantage to be 
obtained by limitation of the sphere of action.
In particular there should be some regional organ­
isation for the Continent of Europe if only to 
prevent a repetition of the circumstances which 
have caused two World Wars to originate in that 
area. The condition of Europe at the close of this 
war will demand the special care and assistance of 
the three Great Powers and means must be found to 
prevent its becoming the centre of a third world 
tragedy. It is possible that out of some 'United 
Nations Commission for Europe'...there might grow 
a European organisation which under the guidance 
of the three major allies. might foster peaceful 
tendencies. heal the wounds of Europe. and at the 
same time prevent Germany from again dominating the 
Continent. Such regional associations might also 
come into existence for [...] economic co-operation, 
for the promotion of welfare in colonial territories, 
etc. It is, however, essential that they should not 
conflict with the world-wide organisation but rather 
assist it to carry out its purposes (125). (brackets 
contained the word "security" in the original draft)
Eden placated the Prime Minister but received support
from the Dominion governments in de-emphasizing regional
councils in general and a European organization in
particular when it came to instructing the British
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73delegation to Dumbarton Oaks. Eden prevented Churchill's 
regionalism from becoming an issue at Dumbarton Oaks as 
prospects for a European regional organization or 
organizations were vanishing under American reservations and 
the presence of Soviet troops in eastern Europe. The United 
States never felt comfortable with the idea of a European- 
wide organization. But the State Department did not in 
principle oppose intra-European regional groupings after
1943. In considering the "treatment of Austria" in June
1944, the Department's Committee on Postwar Programs
acknowledged that Austria's viability as a political unit
would best be served in a economic and political
74relationship with its Danubian neighbors. Its memorandum,
which was approved by Roosevelt and forwarded by Secretary
Hull to the American ambassador to the European Advisory
Commission in London, in effect agreed with the British
position by stating that independent statehood for Austria
was not enough. Independence, the memorandum stated, was
not a prescription against future economic and 
political relationships with Austria's neighbors 
which, presumably, might assume the character of 
special economic arrangements, political federa­
tion, or even a merger of sovereignties, provided 
any such arrangement was approved by the parties 
concerned and^gas acceptable to the international 
organization.
As late as April 1945, when Soviet troops had completed the 
liberation of eastern Europe, a Department document of the 
committee on International Security Organization again 
considered the viability of such groupings. It stated that 
"in general, the Department of State has taken the position 
that the U.S. should favor the development of such regional
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groupings as might seem to promote the economic welfare and
76political security of the peoples involved... ." In 
practice, however, the Department did little to foster and 
much to prevent European integration in general and the 
unification of smaller European states, notably the east 
European governments-in-exile, in particular. It is to the 
latter subject that we turn in the next chapter.
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Hungary had broken up at the end of the last war. The 
presentation of this conception would, however, call for 
great care if jealousies and susceptibilities were not to be 
aroused.” (PRO FO 371/34465/C7012, June 16, 1943: "Extract 
from War Cabinet Conclusions," 16th June 1943).
71McNeill, p. 336.
72Woodward, pp. 90-91.
73Ibid.. pp. 127, 130-32.
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System and European Regional Arrangements," April 16, 1945.
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CHAPTER IX
THE REGIONAL REORGANIZATION 
OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE
Between 1940 and 1943, the exiled governments of Poland 
and Czechoslovakia and, to some extent, Yugoslavia and 
Greece attempted to form regional confederations in eastern 
Europe. The attempt was the most historically noteworthy 
wartime initiative to create interstate regional groupings 
as the basis for postwar order in Europe. The initiatives 
were encouraged and to a degree sponsored by the British 
government. They foundered when the Soviets, with American 
acquiescence, opposed the plans in 1943. Their significance 
lies less in the fact of their failure than in the shift it 
marked in the thinking of eastern Europe's political 
representatives. In the decades prior to the 1919 Paris 
peace conference, political representatives were moved by 
ideas of nationalism to fight for national self- 
determination through sovereign statehood as the dominant 
political goals. During World War II, the political 
vocabulary was no longer ethnocentric and statist, marked 
rather by ideas of regional cooperation and the diminution 
of national sovereignties. Centripetal social and political 
forces seemed to have overtaken more than a century of
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centrifugal tendencies. Understanding this change from a 
regional, non-nationalistic perspective provides a framework 
for understanding the diplomatic and nonstate war-time 
initiatives on behalf of regionalism and postwar order 
in eastern Europe.
Cultural and Political Dynamics in Pre-War Eastern Europe
After the turn of the 20th century, eastern Europe
became the most politically unstable and volatile region on 
1
the continent. Southeastern Europe in particular acquired a 
reputation as the "powderkeg of Europe." With the help of a 
general war, political nationalism, as the dominant 
political force in the region, broke up the large 
multinational empires that had ruled over dozens of peoples 
and cultures for centuries. The supranational empires were 
perceived as antiquated forms of political organization by a 
rising &lite of national liberals shaped by modern western, 
in particular, French republican ideas of politics and 
national development.
For all their anachronisms (and cooptations of western 
bourgeois culture), the central and east European empires 
left distinct marks on the political cultures of the Baltic, 
Danubian, and Balkan peoples. The German/Protestant 
Hohenzollern and Russian/Orthodox Romanov empires reigned 
over a Baltic area of Eurasian coastal plains that later 
comprised the postwar states of Poland, the Baltic states 
(Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), and peripherally, Finland. 
Geographically, the region is dominated by the Vistulan
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basin, which drains the Polish plains into the Baltic Sea. 
The Austrian/Catholic House of Habsburg, referred to as the 
Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1867 and arguably the only 
indigenous imperial polity in east central Europe, ruled 
in the Danubian basin, formed by the Alps and Carpathian 
ranges. Its successor states included Austria, Hungary, and 
Czechoslovakia and parts of Poland, Rumania, and Yugoslavia. 
Geographically, the Danubian region separates the Vistulan
t
basin and the Balkan ranges in the south. Politically, the
Danubian monarchy's frontier had by 1914 extended into both
the Baltic region and, in particular, the Balkans to
encompass a polity of 52 million people comprising more than
a score of nationalities and ethnic groups spread over a
o
677,000 square kilometer area. The Habsburg gains made in
southeastern Europe since the 19th century were at the
expense of the third, or Turkish/Muslim Ottoman empire, from
which emerged the sovereign states of Bulgaria, Albania,
Greece and parts of Yugoslavia and Rumania.
These geographic and pre-World War I political
divisions belied an otherwise complex ethno-linguistic and
cultural map of human settlements in eastern Europe. While
some coherence is gained by dividing eastern Europe into
these natural and political sub-regions, "all too often in
this part of Europe local variations mock geographical
generalization and force historical judgement into
3qualifiying parenthesis." As Walter Kolarz remarked in 
1946, "there are, as yet, no clear groupings of peoples 
moving forward towards larger coherent units such as have
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developed in the West. Everywhere there is intermingling of
diverse peoples, not only two but even three or four such
peoples being frequently pressed together in a narrow 
4
area." The Danube basin may well be said, a some Magyar
historians have in particular claimed, to divide the north
and south Slavs with a band of predominantly non-Slavic
cultures, notably the Austro-Germans, Hungarians, and
Rumanians. In reality, the Danubian region was also part of
a complex zone of intermixed populations where Slavs and
non-Slavs have intermingled, fought, and coexisted since the
5
7th or 8th century A.D.
Religious traditions constituted another layer of 
complexity. The dominant western Latin and eastern Orthodox 
traditions met in eastern Europe. But these major religious 
cultures also contended with significant Protestant,
Islamic, and Jewish settlements, not to mention pre- 
Christian or half-pagan, and half-Christian ideas and rites. 
Migrating tribes from the east and colonial settlers from 
the west contributed to the mosaic. The pre-World War II 
ethnocultural mosaic included: Catholic Austro-Germans in 
Austria and elsewhere; Lutheran German minorities in non- 
German lands; Catholic and some Protestant Balts 
(Lithuanians, Latvians); Catholic Slavs (Poles, Czechs, 
Slovaks, Croatians, Slovenes); Protestant Slavs (Czechs); 
Orthodox Slavs (Serbians, Bulgarians, Ruthenians, 
Macedonians, Ukrainians, Belorussians); Orthodox Latins, or 
Uniates, in Rumania; Catholic, Calvinist, and Unitarian 
Finno-Ugrian Magyars, Szeklers, and Csangos in Hungary, 
Rumania, Slovakia, and Serbia; Greek Orthodox in Greece and
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parts of Macedonia; Moslem and Christian Slavs in Bosnia and 
Macedonia; Moslem and Christian Albanians in Albania and 
Kosovo, Yugoslavia; assimilated and unassimilated Sephardic 
and Ashkenazi Jews; unassimilated gypsies; a host of smaller 
ethnic groupings such as the Chicks in Slovenia; the Slavic 
Gorales, Horaks, Zahoraks, Wends, Carpatho-Ukrainians, 
and Haunaks dispersed in the Czecho-Slovak regions; and 
Kutzo-Vlachs, or hellenized Macedonians, in Rumania among 
others.
This pattern of human settlement did not speak in favor 
of the western form of nation statehood. Rather, it favored 
large territorial political units such as the multinational 
and supranational imperial polities of the pre-World War I 
era. "Instead of a gradual fusion of peoples into larger 
nations and Nation States," Kolarz argued, "there appeared 
in the East various forms of federal organization by means 
of which smaller groups, especially, sought to gain 
protection. Instead of the Nation State there appeared the 
composite Territorial S ta t e . F o l l o w i n g World War I, 
however, the west European "one-nation, one-state" principle 
of political organization (which, ironically, was under 
attack by significant regionalist movements in France and 
Spain at the time), was given historical sanction in eastern 
Europe as the basis of the postwar settlement. The 
supranational and territorial ordering principle of the 
imperial polities (whether their regimes were autocratic, 
authoritarian, or liberal) gave way to ethnocentric states 
that were administratively centralistic and economically
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autarchic. As Czech statesman Jan Palacky envisaged in 1848, 
when he declared that Austria (i.e., the Hapbsburg Empire) 
would have to be created if it did not exist, the 
consequences of the national 6tatisme in a zone of mixed 
populations proved economically, politically, and culturally 
disastrous.
The belt of independent states established by the 
allies in 1919 was designed in part to function as a 
regional buffer, or cordon sanitaire, between a bolshevized 
Russia and western Europe. But the experiment proved an 
exercise in political fragmentation that resulted in an 
economic and political vacuum filled by German power in the 
1930s. The Nazis came to refer to post-1919 eastern Europe 
as the "devil's belt" (Teufelsgurtel) and viewed the region 
to their east as their "space of destiny" (Schicksalsraum) 
or "cultural sphere" (Kulturboden). The consequences of the 
fragmentation and, after 1933, German Gleichschaltuna in 
Danubian Europe was summarized as follows by economic 
historian Friedrich Hertz:
The disruption of the former Empire, and the inability 
of the new states to co-operate, led to terrible mass 
unemployment, to the impoverishment of wide sections 
of the people and the rise of the spirit of violence 
and cynical disregard for the rights of others. Hitler 
cleverly exploited this opportunity. When trade between 
the Danubian States had shrunk to a minimum, Germany 
offered to take large amounts of their production on 
favorable terms in exchange for her goods. This 
exchange was greatly welcomed by the States concerned, 
and for a time was certainly a considerable advantage. 
Later on, however, the cloven hoof became visible.
...The predominant political passions worked in the 
same direction as the economic distress. The Peace 
Treaties had brought no appeasement to the Danubian 
area, but had greatly aggravated national and social 
hatred. It was the lack of any real solution of the 
Danubian problem which paved the way for Hitler, and
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it is very questionable whether there would ever have 
been a Second World War if the community of Danubian 
nations ha<^  been maintained and reformed instead of 
destroyed.
The 1919 peace settlement satisfied the aspirations of 
several dominant nationalities, notably the Poles, Czechs, 
Serbs, and Rumanians. But it would be more precise to argue 
that the real winners were the nationalistic middle class 
Elites who acquired power in all the successor states. Hugh 
Seton-Watson, William McNeill, and others have claimed that 
nation statehood in eastern Europe essentially satisfied the 
aspirations of the small urban-based east European
g
intelligentsias of the dominant nationalities. Under their
rule, the smaller nationalities and ethnic groups in their
jurisdictions were involuntarily relegated to second-class,
or "minority,” status. The new power holders came to regard
them as potential (and actual) forces of irredentism that
threatened their power. Of some 86 million people that
comprised the succession states in 1920, more than one-third
9were classified as minorities. Invariably, the dominant 
nationalities sought to homogenize their states through 
centralization measures that included forced assimilation 
and population exchanges, not to mention the fratricidal 
disputes, skirmishes, and wars that were a commonplace 
particularly in the early interwar years.'*'®
At the same time, the division of east European society 
into majority and minority nationalities overlooked the 
reality that the "people" of the dominant nationalities were 
largely peasants who on the whole did not share their 
leaders' nationalistic ideas and centralistic policies.
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As the cultural bearers of their nations, peasants never saw 
an inherent need to identify their ethnicity with separate 
statehood. Eric Hula demystified the alleged nationalism of 
peasants:
The nationalism of peasants is essentially of a 
passive nature. To be sure, students of the problem 
agree that peasants react vigoroulsy against an 
policy of national discrimination unfavorable to 
them, and are therefore difficult to denationalize, 
more difficult than the inhabitants of the cities; 
in this sense the peasants are, indeed, the backbone 
of the national community. But they have not been 
eager to strive for national statehood. Their 
attitude belies, as it were, the very philosophy 
which has inspired the principle of nationalities, 
by disproving its basic assumption that the exis­
tence and integrity of a national group are depen­
dent on its political sovereignty.
In spite or because of the ensuing atmosphere of
institutionalized divisiveness, numerous proposals and plans
for reform of the 1919 Paris peace formula for eastern
Europe were devised by individuals, groups, and states
12inside and outside the region during the interwar period.
For the division of central and eastern Europe was, as David
Mitrany suggested in 1936, "as much a challenge for co-
13operation as an obstacle to it." During World War II, 
Europe's "shatter zone” became a special area of concern for 
postwar policy planners. The allied wartime plans for 
regional organization in eastern Europe, including those of 
east European governments-in-exile, form the bulk of this 
chapter. The chapter concludes with a presentation of ideas 
and plans by nonstate social forces in the region.
The British Initiatives
Encouraged by its own research and Prime Minister
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Churchill, the Foreign Office actively promoted the idea of
regional reorganization along federal or confederal lines in
14eastern Europe. Its semi-official Foreign Research and
Press Service (FPRS) research unit in Balliol College, which
was directed by Arnold Toynbee and included a number of
historians such as C.A. Macartney, produced lengthy
memoranda recommending a single unit or sub-regional
groupings in eastern Europe. Some memoranda speculated on
the feasability of a reconstituted Habsburg Monarchy, an
15idea that was privately endorsed by Churchill. What ever
the form of government, the Foreign Office's researchers
assumed that if British strategy did
not depart widely from the general lines which it 
has pursued very consistently... for centuries..., 
then no future British Government will want to see 
either Germany or Russia overwhelmingly strong, or 
in sole possession of the key points of Eastern 
Europe, and in particular, of the Straits. Hence 
it follows that some buffer state, or combination 
of states, between the two giants is desireable.
In a September 1943 memorandum of the Foreign Office
Research Department (FORD, FRPS's successor), four
possible futures for eastern Europe as viewed from British
17and world interests were considered. The first two options 
of hegemonial suzerainty or domination by Germany or Russia 
were rejected as unacceptable to British, world, and east 
European interests. While German control was no longer a 
realistic postwar prospect, the author suggested that German 
control provided some "valuable work in rationalising and 
modernising old forms" that could be appropriated by the 
allies (3). The option of Soviet hegemony over eastern 
Europe would have a similar leveling effect on the region
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but would also "in the long run prove intolerable to the 
peoples as a whole" (Ibid.).
The third and fourth options outlined an eastern Europe 
organized into one or several (North and South; Baltic- 
Vistulan, Danubian, Balkan) regional units. The third, or 
"selective," organization of the region mandated the major 
allies to support a system of "selected" dominant nations, 
as represented by the existing governments-in-exile and 
their regional unification efforts (see below), relying on 
them to maintain regional peace and security. But this form 
of interstate regionalism based on a few leading states 
would not solve the problem of "minority" representation. 
Consequently, the unrepresented nations and ethnic groupings 
would "turn for help sooner or later, to Germany or Russia, 
as the case may be," resulting again in "a division of 
spheres between them..." (6).
The fourth, or "comprehensive," scenario was the most 
creative and hopeful. It meant finding ways to organize the 
region "on the common interests of all the people inhabiting 
the area" (6). As a start, it meant granting the "greatest 
possible equality of treatment” (7). The memorandum's 
author, believed to be C.A. Macartney, suggested three 
"fields” of action to achieve this end. The "first field” of 
application lay in the more equitable revision of existing 
(or pre-1938) frontiers. After ethnic frontiers were 
redrawn, exchanges of populations could take place to 
further reduce the problem of disaffected minorities. This 
approach was an attempt to use the conceptual categories of
315
the modern state, among them, strictly defined borders, on
the recalcitrant ethno-cultural realities of eastern Europe.
But the indigenous pattern of human settlement in eastern
Europe defied the prevailing logic of political organization
based on the nation state ideal of ethnic homogeneity. The
author acknowleged this problem —  "great arguments against
the ethnic frontier" existed —  and advocated simultaneous
measures that "would make the nation-states thus created in
fact if not in name into parts of a larger, multination
organization" (7a). In a "second field" of action, economic
measures organized along regional-functional lines would be
introduced. The measures included free border traffic,
common institutions for economic planning, joint functional
agencies such as marketing boards, traffic commissions,
power grids, and river regulatory boards that would "make
the frontier unimportant, or even non-existent as an
economic factor" (8-9). The "third field" dealt with the
strategic factor. British policy mandated a unified bloc
that would serve as a buffer between Germany and Russia. The
strategic argument for such a bloc was based on the at once
obvious and novel argument that
it was the weakness and not the strength of 
Eastern Europe which exposed Russia to attack in 
1940. That attack came, not from Eastern Europe 
but from Germany, and it could not have come had 
Eastern Europe been united. ...Ultimate safety 
for all lies in making of Eastern Europe a thing 
which both Germany and Russia regard as a contri­
buting factor towards their own security and 
prosperity (11).
Once created, the "internal strategic lines" (i.e., state
boundaries) of such a regional grouping would become
"irrelevant" (9).
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Britain's strategic interest in an independent and
unified eastern Europe was outlined in a June 1942 Foreign
Office policy memorandum by Deputy Under Secretary of State
18Orme G. Sargent. Sargent struck the theme of the 
vulnerability of small states organized on "ethnographical 
grounds, without reference to the strategical and economic 
factors" that are essential to their security. A confeder­
ation of states with some executive machinery for a common 
defense, a custom's union and common currency, and a common 
foreign policy was seen as necessary. To this end, "the 
constituent units should abandon as far as possible the old 
conception of national sovereignty and agree to setting up 
some system of collective sovereignty." New and larger 
sovereign units where the nationality principle was not the 
state building factor was the goal. Sargent proposed 
dividing eastern Europe into northern and southern regional 
groupings of states, "a Central European and a Southeast 
European confederation.” The former included Poland (with 
any part of the Baltic states not absorbed by Russia and 
with or without east Prussia), Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and 
possibly Austria. The Southeast European confederation would 
include all the Balkan states. This north-south 
configuration corresponded to the Polish-Czechoslovak and 
Greek-Yugolav agreements for union signed by their 
respective governments-in-exile in January 1942, an outcome 
which the Foreign Office played no small part in bringing 
about.
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The Union Attempts bv the East European Governments-in-Exile
The war years in England and the United States were
rife with official and private activities for the postwar
reorganization of eastern Europe in one regionalist form or 
19another. The most important among them were the
unification attempts between 1940 and 1943 of the London-
based Polish and Czechoslovak exile governments, followed by
the Greek and Yugoslav governments. Although faced with
internal dissensions and external pressures that eventually
quashed their efforts, the four governments-in-exile
negotiated and in January 1942 signed agreements for
regional unions as a basis for postwar order in eastern 
20Europe.
The upheaval of the war broke apart entrenched patterns
of political behavior including peacetime rules of conduct
between states and other political actors. This flux helped
erase traditional obstacles, notably among them frontier
disputes, to cooperation. A significant aspect of the
Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations was the intent on both
sides to put frontier questions aside, at least for the time
being. In a February 25, 1941 letter to Polish General
Wladyslaw Sikorski, President Eduard Benes of Czechoslovakia
agreed "to create in Central Europe a new international
political organism, whose structure we shall discuss now,
irrespective of what the final boundaries of our countries 
21will be." The war provided the allied states, large and 
small, with new challenges and opportunities to restructure 
eastern Europe. Following a testy inter-war period marked by
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diverging foreign policy interests and the Teschen border
dispute, the first sighs of Polish-Czechoslovak
rapprochement occurred in the months following the German
invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939. The process began
with informal discussions between self-exiled President
Benes and the leader of the new Polish government in France,
Sikorski. The British government played a role in initiating
this process. In October 1939, the British told the Polish
Foreign Minister August Zaleski that "Poland would be too
weak to keep the balance between Germany and Russia. Only a
confederation based on a closely knit Polish-Czechoslovak
22federation could do it." In a December 20, 1939 foreign
policy statement, the independent-minded and flamboyant
Sikorski announced Poland's commitment to the "creation of a
politically solid bloc of Slav states extending from the
23Baltic to the Black Sea and the Adriatic.”
Benes, a successful if wily statesman who was seeking
allied recognition of a Czechoslovak provisional government,
competed in this period with a rival Czecho-Slovak National
Council in Paris headed by former Prime Minister Milan
Hodza. A Protestant Slovak and head of the Peasant Party,
Hodza was a steadier interwar advocate of central European
cooperation. While Prime Minister between 1935 and 1938, he
actively lobbied for a phased regional economic integration
plan for Danubian Europe guaranteed by England and France
through preferential tariff agreements followed by a customs
2 4
union and an economic union with common currency. Whether 
acting out of conviction, opportunity, or a mixture of both, 
Benes outlined his thinking on the structure of postwar
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eastern Europe in a 10-page memorandum which he submitted in
March 1940 to visiting Under Secretary of State Sumner
Welles in London. He reported that Na possible federal
organization in Central Europe is being spoken of" and that
as Foreign Minister of Czechoslovakia for 17 years, he had
"attempted to prepare the progressive building up of a
federal Central Europe, i.e., of a close economic and
political collaboration between Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia,
Rumania, Austria and Hungary, on the basis of some kind of
federation. Czechoslovakia therefore still accepts this
25principle today" (emphasis in original).
When the Provisional Government of Czechoslovakia was 
finally established in London under Benes' leadership after 
the June 1940 fall of France, Polish-Czechoslovak exchanges 
on the subject of union intensified under approving British 
eyes. The starting point of negotiations toward confeder­
ation may be said to have begun with Benes* November 1, 1940 
letter to Sikorski, in which he expressed,
I am of the opinion that neither Poland nor 
Czechoslovakia will be able to continue living 
separately from one another as was the case after 
the war of 1914. ...The Poles and Czechoslovaks 
will come out of this war rather weakened and, 
situated as they are between Germany and Russia, 
it will be their imperative task, imposed by 
reasons both political and economic, at least to 
trv to create in Central Europe a bloc composed 
at first of their two countries and sufficiently 
strong to give their two peoples^a minimum 
security (emphasis in original).
While emphasizing the need for a modus vivendi with the
Soviet Union, an objective that was not a high concern for
the Poles, Benes proposed a confederation that for the most
part retained the sovereignties and institutions of the two
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countries intact. Within this formula of interstate 
regionalism, he favored the restriction of economic 
sovereignty in the interest of "a common commercial policy, 
and a transport, customs and currency union." He also 
proposed common organs in a 1) Council led by the ministers 
of government whose "resolutions (would) be approved and 
carried out by both governments" and in which a common 
foreign policy would be conducted while also retaining 
separate diplomatic representatives; 2) a common General 
Staff with standardization of armaments, equipment, and war 
production while maintaining the General Staffs of each 
country? 3) a joint Parliamentary Committeee, "whose 
decisions (would) be submitted for approval to each 
parliament;" and 4) an Economic and Trade Council (40).
General Sikorski responded in a December 3 letter by 
raising the ante. He called for a higher degree of political 
integration and argued for a union that was independent of 
but not unfriendly toward the Soviet Union. Whereas Benes' 
thinking was oriented toward a loose confederation with 
links to the Soviet Union, Sikorski favored an independent 
and western-oriented federation between the two countries.
As he stated in a December 7, 1942 memorandum to the State 
Department, the east European "'bloc' would not have any 
aggressive designs against Russia. On the contrary, it would 
serve as a natural shield against any possible recurrance of 
German aggression. The central 'bloc' would also maintain 
correct neighborly relations with a disarmed Germany" (87)
In spite of this important difference of emphasis
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between the two leaders, both governments issued a "Joint 
Declaration of the Polish and Czechoslovak Governments 
Favoring Closer Political and Economic Association" in 
London on November 11, 1940. They announced their "closing 
once and for all the period of past recriminations and 
disputes" and pledged "to enter as independent and sovereign 
states into a closer political and economic association 
which would become the basis of a new order in Central 
Europe and a guarantee of its stability." Other east 
European states were invited to join the process.
The declaration was welcomed by Churchill in the House
of Commons on November 26 and became the basis for %
subsequent negotiations in 1941 by a Czechoslovak-Polish 
Coordinating Committee. This Committee supervised two groups 
of mixed Polish-Czechoslovak commissions. The first, 
comprised of politico-judicial, economic-financial, social 
policy, military, and cultural commissions, was devoted to 
mapping out the proposed union, while the second, consisting 
of foreign affairs, military, and propaganda commissions, 
dealt with current affairs. The negotiations proceeded 
slowly, hampered largely by differences between Benes and
Sikorski on the need for gaining Soviet approval.
Nonetheless, the Czechoslovak-Polish Coordinating Committee 
met in early November 1941 to consider the Polish draft of 
the "constitutional act" of union (63f.). The Polish plan 
called for a federation that constituted a new political 
unit where economic and other levels of integration depended 
on the degree of political integration. Foreign affairs were 
almost completely merged. While the member states had the
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right to conclude some treaties separately, they had to be 
negotiated through the union. Member states were required to 
approve treaties dealing with agreements with third powers 
as well as changes in state boundaries. Integration of 
defense affairs was not as far-reaching. A joint secretary 
(ministry) and chief of staff had supreme command over union 
forces in time of war, but national ministries retained 
control over their armies though in accordance with general 
union directives. The economics secretary directed foreign 
economic policy, coordinated the economic and social 
policies of the member states, and administered those 
affairs declared common to the union.
The Czechoslovak counterproposals were less ambitious.
The cautious Czechs feared being dwarfed by Poland in any
agreement as well as incurring the wrath of the Soviet
Union. Whereas the Poles wanted the mixed commissions to
assume an important role in the negotiations, the Czechs
limited their freedom of action and held that any final
27decision could only be made after the war. The Czechs 
favored an intergovernmental association in a confederation 
where member states retained their sovereignty except in 
designated areas in foreign, defense, and economic affairs 
where joint policies would merely be "coordinated." In place 
of integrated ministries, they proposed coordinating 
councils whose resolutions required adoption and 
implementation by the member states. It was the less 
ambitious Czechoslovak proposals which were adopted as the 
basis for the Polish-Czechoslovak agreement signed in London
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January 23, 1942. The 14-article non-binding agreement
provided for cooperation in foreign policy, defense,
economic and financial matters, as well as social and
communications policy. It envisaged a custom's union and the
accession of other east European states. Foreign Secretary
Eden welcomed the agreement in the House of Commons "as
marking a further important stage in the development of
28closer relations between these two Allies."
Spurred in part by the Polish-Czechoslovak
negotiations, the royal Greek and Yugoslav governments-in-
exile also began to discuss a closer union in the Balkans.
The idea of Balkan unity, which had a history as long as the
idea of Europe, acquired tentative institutional form with
the inter-war establishment of the Balkan Conference and, in
1934, the Balkan Entente between Greece, Rumania,
28Yugoslavia, and Turkey. While designed primarily to
maintain the territorial status quo in the Balkans, the
Entente also represented an attempt to close regional ranks
in the face of great power encroachment. The 1940 and 1941
occupation and dismemberment of three of the four states by
Germany and Russia underscored both the futility of and
justification for regional security efforts in eastern
Europe. Under the motto of "the Balkans for the Balkan
peoples," the Greek and Yugoslav governments signed an
agreement on January 15, 1942 for "the Constitution of a 
30Balkan Union." The agreement, signed at the Foreign Office 
in the presence of Foreign Secretary Eden, went beyond both 
the 1934 Entente and the Polish-Czechoslovak confederation 
agreement in outlining stronger common institutions, but in
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its basic outline it did not differ substantially from them 
as an example of interstate regionalism. It provided for the 
establishment of permanent organs with specific tasks for 
political, economic and financial, and military affairs, 
with a fourth organ serving as a secretariat for these 
activities.
The so-called Political Organ of the proposed Balkan 
union was composed of the foreign ministers of the member 
states. It would convene at regular intervals to coordinate 
the foreign policies of the member states, prepare projects 
for agreements of conciliation and arbitration, and 
coordinate through media organs "the reciprocal 
rapprochement of public opinion" in the member states. The 
purpose of the Economic and Financial Organ was to 
coordinate trade and tariff policy toward the formation of a 
custom's union, elaborate a common economic plan and Balkan 
monetary union, and improve inter-Balkan communications 
structures. The Military Organ was charged with adopting a 
common defense plan "to defend the European frontiers" of 
the union and in general coordinate the military 
establishments of the member states. Article X of the 11- 
article agreement declared that the pact represented the 
foundation for a wider Balkan union, where the parties 
"envisage(d) ... the future adhesion to this agreement of 
other Balkan states ruled by governments freely and legally 
constituted."
Both the Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav 
agreements were conceived by their framers in the context of
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a wider eastern European and all-European postwar federative
framework. King Peter of Yugoslavia stated upon signing the
Greek-Yugoslav agreement that the two unions, which were
conceived along similar lines, would create, "together with
a single supreme organ, a great organization which would
give serious guarantees for the peace and prosperity of
Europe." He said a union in eastern Europe would not "attain
its full significance unless the rest of Europe is organized
in such a way as to oppose the order by which Hitler and
Nazis wished to impose upon Europe their cruel
domination... ." Simiarly, Benes announced on January 19
that "both the Yugoslav-Greek and Czechoslovak-Polish pacts
form a basis for wider agreement and complete organization
31of Central and Southeastern Europe."
In the January 1942 issue of Foreign Affairs. Benes
placed the east European union within a larger European
federal setting. Anticipating Churchill's ideas, he argued
for a postwar order in Europe based "upon the balance of
32forces between a number of large political units." Europe 
was to be transformed from a skelter of large, medium, and 
small states into seven or eight political units of 
approximately equal size and economic and political 
strength. These units included Western Europe, whose nucleus 
was France and England, pre-1938 Germany as a decentralized 
confederation, Italy, Central Europe (with the Polish- 
Czechoslovak confederation as its core); Balkan Europe, 
consisting of a confederation between Yugoslavia, Greece, 
Albania, possibly Rumania, with Bulgaria obliged to join 
after the war; Soviet Russia, which he said had to "take
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part in the organization of Europe and in the future 
cooperation of the new European blocs;" and a Scandinavian 
union. In southwestern Europe, Portugal and Spain would 
decide on their future status (228-29). Benes predicted that 
the Czechoslovak-Polish confederation, which could "already 
be considered and accomplished fact," and the Greek-Yugoslva 
union would consolidate into a single central European 
regional confederation (228, 234-35).
Benes' conception of postwar Europe was based on an 
interstate regionalism that did not extend the cooperative 
principle implied in regionalism to the individual states 
themselves. The sovereign national state and its appurtances 
remained a sacred frame of reference. He regarded 
"minorities," for example as "a real thorn in the side of 
individual nations" and that "before we begin to define the 
rights of minorities we must define the rights of majorities 
and the obligations of minorities” (235, 237). He advocated 
frontier adjustments, population transfers, and the granting 
of individual rights rather than ethnic rights as possible 
solutions to the minority problem (238-239). In language not 
removed from French administrative centralism, he declared 
that "the common will must find expression in a united 
organization (regime)" (240). He also stated he was only 
prepared to accept those limitations on the state's 
sovereignty in economic and political affairs "which are 
accepted by other states" (239).
In spite of Benes' ambivalences, the agreements of 
January 1942 represented a chrysalis of thought and action
327
by state actors seeking to combine their political units
into larger regional entities. Piotr Wandycz stated the
agreements were signs of a "growing trend in favor of
33regional organization in East-Central Europe." The trend 
was not confined to state actors living in exile in the 
West, but was also sustained by transnational social forces 
inside as well as outside eastern Europe. Before turning to 
these movements, we examine the major power moves by the 
Soviet Union, with United States and, in the end, British 
acquiescence to eviscerate this trend.
The Soviet Veto and Anglo-American Acquiescence
As we have noted above, the adhesion of the United
States and Soviet Union into the "grand alliance" on January
1, 1942 radically changed the power configuration of the
anti-Axis coalition by diminishing the power and prestige of
the lesser allies, Britain included. Prior to that date and
after the German invasion of Russia in June 1941, the Soviet
attitude toward the unification attempts of the east
European governments-in-exile was one of benign neglect if
not grudging support. In December 1941, Stalin told Eden in
Moscow that the Soviet Union "would have no objection if
34some European countries wished to federate." Benes
received similar assurances from his envoy in Moscow, Zdenek
35Fierlinger, and Soviet ambassador in London, Ivan Maisky.
After February 1942, when Fierlinger privately informed 
Benes of the first sign of Soviet displeasure with the 
Czechoslovak-Polish negotiations, the Soviet Union began a
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campaign, if marked by confusing signals, to undermine the
diplomatic efforts on behalf of east European unification.
The Soviets accomplished this by exploiting the differences
between Benes and Sikorski as well as Czech fears of
antagonizing the Soviet Union; weakening the provisional
Polish government through criticism, territorial demands,
and finally withdrawal of diplomatic recognition in April
1943 (followed by the establishment of an alternative Polish
government in Moscow); and influencing western public
opinion against the idea of a "reactionary federation" that
would serve as an anti-Soviet cordon sanitaire. The Soviet
position and stragety was predicted in a May 12, 1942 minute
by Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary William Strang:
It will not be long, I think, before Dr. Benes is 
called upon by the Russians to choose between 
Russia and Poland: in other words, to conclude a 
treaty with Russia which will make any Polish- 
Czechoslovak federal scheme empty of meaning, or 
even stand in the way of its conclusion. The 
Russians certainly intend to isolate and encircle 
Poland and to prevent the formation of a BaltjjLc- 
Adriatic bloc, based on Poland in the north.
The Soviet position against the confederation plans of
the exiled governments centered on the arugment that the
regional groupings were conceived as a cordon sanitaire
directed against the Soviet Union. The Soviets also held
that the plans, promoted by "reactionary" exile politicians
living in the West, did not necessarily reflect the wishes
of the peoples. Referring to the Polish-Czechoslovak and
Greek-Yugoslav agreements and their possible extension to
other central and east European countries, Soviet Foreign
Commissar Molotov told British ambassador Clark Kerr in
Moscow on June 7, 1943 that "the Soviet government does not
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find it appropriate to engage in the creation of such a
federation and finds the inclusion of Hungary and Austria in
37this (federation) equally impractical." In the same month, 
the trade union organ The War and the Working Class 
published an article critical of the east European union 
plans. Broadcast over Radio Moscow to the United Kingdom on 
July 28, the article denounced "anti-democratic" and "semi­
fascist" elements of "bankrupt political groups in Britain, 
the isolationists and compromise politicians in the United 
States,” and &migr6 groups of "Poland, Hungary, Austria and 
others" who draw up "plans for the reconstruction of Europe 
hostile to the Soviet Union." The last paragraph concluded 
with a veiled threat in suggesting that
plans for the establishment of an East European 
Federation hostile to the Soviet Union can be 
built up, but only if the renunciation of the 
necessity for friendship and collaboration between 
the USSR and the Allies in the post-war period be 
taken as the starting point and the only if the 
Anglo-Soviet Treaty be renounced. Honest 
supporters of the Anglo-Soviet Treaty cannot 
uphold post-war plans hostile to the Soviet Union 
and Britain^ or hostile to even one of those 
countries.
The Soviet position effectively obliged Britain and to 
an extent the United States to choose between their east 
European allies and important Grand Coalition ally. The 
choice was less agonizing for the Americans, who provided 
lip-service to the idea of cooperation among east European 
countries but never endorsed the Polish-Czechoslovak or 
Greek-Yugoslav plans. In a January 1943 visit to Washington, 
Sikorski solicited a letter of support from Roosevelt that 
merely stated: "the United States Government desires to
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encourage the countries of Eastern Europe to continue to
make careful studies of their mutual problems to determine
points of agreement and disagreement in order that they may
be in a position to present a plan under which lasting
39relationships would be assured." Roosevelt's actual
thoughts were revealed in a note to Under-Secretary of State
Welles January 1942, the month when both the Grand Coalition
and the east European unification treaties were signed: "I
think Sikorski should be definitely discouraged on this
proposition. This is no time to talk about the post-war
position of small nations and it would cause serious trouble 
40
with Russia."
As we have seen, Roosevelt was at this time still
attached to his "Four Policemen" formula which saw the major
powers (including China) as the guarantors of postwar peace
and security in a world-wide organization also structured on
a regional basis. This conflicted with the views of
Secretary of State Hull, who rejected anything approaching
regional organization based on the major powers. When the
prospect of Soviet hegemony in eastern Europe emerged in
1943, the State Department studied the idea of a reciprocal
hegemonial regionalism that recognized Soviet security
interests in eastern Europe as parallel to American
interests in the western hemisphere. In a February 4, 1944
meeting of the Department's Sub-Committee on European
Organization, it was acknowledged that Secretary Hull's
internationalism "excluded the development of zones of
41influence and the concept of balance of power."
Nonetheless, as committee member Isaiah Bowman stated, "the
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United States might not like to acquiesce in a Soviet 
'Monroe Doctrine' for eastern Europe, but Cuba and the 
Panama Canal might always be pointed out as analogous 
instances of legitimate concern for national security" (22- 
23). The problem was one of reconciling legitimate concerns 
for security with the internationalist principles of the 
Atlantic Charter. Another committee member, Jacob Viner, 
felt that "the task of achieving a world order of the kind 
at present envisaged in this country was almost an 
impossible one in view of the existence of three great 
powers" (23). He submitted that it should be recognized 
that, "as of now, each great power, owing to propinquity or 
to affinity, stood in loco parentis to a group of other 
smaller states, a relationship which should imply both 
duties and responsibilities in both directions" (24). 
Hegemonial regionalism would be an unavoidable reality of 
the postwar world.
British support for the Polish-Czechoslovak
confederation attempt ultimately foundered on the so-called
Polish question, in particular major power displeasure with
Sikorski's leadership. Churchill stated that "the attitude
of Russia to Poland lay at the roots of our early relations
42with the Soviets." The Prime Minister's open support in 
1940 for the Polish-Czechoslovak declaration waned with the 
formation of the Grand Alliance and the need he perceived 
for the Polish government in London to come to terms with 
the Soviet Union. General Sikorski's plan for an independent 
eastern Europe that did not depend on the sanction and good-
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will of the Soviet Union caused concern in Britain as well
as the United States. The British supported the Polish-
Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav initiatives as late as the
fall of 1942. On September 26, 1942, Foreign Secretary Eden
advised a public audience that
small states ... are also alive to the need of 
collaboration among themselves. There are Polish- 
Czech and Greek-Yugoslav agreements, both of which 
call for and express a sense of unity. We shall 
continue to foster such agreements and encourage 
smaller states to weld themselves into larger, 
though not exclusive, groupings. Thus they will 
be better able in collaboration with the grgjt 
powers to play a part in maintaining peace.
By early 1943, the British dropped references to the
Polish-Czechoslovak and Greek-Yugoslav agreements and
gradually distanced themselves from Sikorski while still
favoring regional integration in eastern Europe. In his
February 2, 1943 "Morning Thoughts" on postwar security to
President Roosevelt, Churchill introduced his idea for a
European-wide organization composed of larger states and
sub-regional units of confederated smaller states. For him
the "need for a Scandinavian bloc, Danubian bloc and a
44Balkan bloc appear(ed) to be obvious." In the spring, as 
Soviet-Polish relations reached the breaking point, the 
British became partial to President Benes' idea of a 
tripartite Polish-Czechoslovak-Soviet agreement while 
simultaneously promoting the Danubian and Balkan regional 
confederations. Churchill again stressed in his March 21, 
1943 radio speech the importance of creating a European
regional council represented by "great states and groups of
45states" organized into confederations. In the meantime, 
Eden, in his March 14, 1943 dinner meeting in Washington
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with President Roosevelt and Presidential advsior Harry
Hopkins f complained of what he thought were Sikorski1s
unrealistc ambitions. As recounted by Hopkins, "Eden said
Sikorski was forever meeting with the small states of the
Balkans promoting Polish ambitions; that all this was known
to the Russians and Eden thinks Sikorski is doing far more
harm for Poland than good. Poland has very large ambitions
after the war and Eden says that privately they say that
Russia will be so weakened and Germany crushed that Poland
will emerge as the most powerful state in that part of the
46world. Eden thinks this is completely unrealistic."
Churchill again raised the idea of Balkan, Danubian,
Scandinavian confederations in his May 22 Washington meeting
with American leaders where he outlined his views on the
structure of the postwar world organization. He favored "a
Danubian Federation based on Vienna and doing something to
fill the gap caused by the disappearance of the Austro-
47Hungarian Empire." But mindful of the Soviet Union's 
diplomatic break with the Polish government in April, he 
seemed to be pulling the British rug from the Polish- 
Czechoslovak agreement in advising that "Poland and 
Czechoslovakia should stand together in friendly relations 
with Russia,"*® a view advanced at this time by President 
Benes. But the tripartite forumla, as Wandycz has argued, 
effectiviely meant "abandoning confederation of East-Central 
Europe based on the Czechoslovak-Polish and the Greek-
Yugoslav agreements and independent of either of the big
49 . . .neighbors." Moreover, a treaty joining two small states
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with a major power meant the "effective limitation of the 
Czechoslovak and Polish freedom of action —  which was 
precisely what the original confederation was meant to 
preserve and increase."
The issue of regional groupings in eastern Europe came
to a head at the October 1943 Moscow Foreign Ministers
Conference. At Churchill's behest, Eden placed three items
on the 17-point conference agenda whose acceptance would
have altered the postwar structure of central and eastern
Europe. Churchill sought to block the prospect of Soviet
hegemony in eastern Europe by promoting interstate
regionalism in the form of an all-European postwar structure
in general and voluntary confederations in eastern Europe
and elsewhere in particular. Viewed from a Soviet
perspective, Britain, "aware that she would be much to weak
to face the Soviet Union, ...decided to align Europe against
it. The first stage of this alignment was to be the setting
up of a series of federations and blocs, and the second —
the formation of a British-dominated European Council to
51head these federations.
The battle for easter Europe between Britain and the
Soviet Union was no contest. At the Moscow Foreign
Ministers' Conference, Britain hoped to block the signing of
the impending Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty on grounds that the
May 1942 Anglo-Soviet Treaty asked both governments to
"avoid entering into any commitments or agreements with
other European countries allied with them" pending the peace 
52settlement. She attempted to accomplish this by placing 
the "Question of Agreement between the Major and Minor
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Allies on Post-war Questions” as an item on the agenda. In 
the "exchange of views” which took place on this item on 
October 24, Molotov "could not understand why the British 
should have any objection to a treaty ... between two 
countries with a common frontier for the immediate security" 
(626). At the conclusion of a brief exchange, the minutes 
noted that Eden "had no objection to the conclusion of a 
Soviet-Czechoslovak Treaty" (752). The issue regarding the 
"Question of Joint Responsibility for Europe as Against 
Aeparate Areas of Responsibility," was covered in in the 
previous chapter. The "exchange of views” on this item and 
another concerning the "Future of Poland and Danubian and 
Balkan Countries Including the Question of Cconfederation" 
took place on October 26. Regarding the latter, Molotov read 
a prepared statement dismissing the confederation plans as 
untimely impositions of "6miqr6 governments" who were out of 
touch with the people and reminiscent of the interwar 
"cordon sanitaire" policy directed against the Soviet Union. 
While not foreclosing the possibility of small state 
cooperation after the war, the Soviet government considered 
the "restoration of their independence and sovereignty as 
one of the most important tasks in the post-war arrangement 
of Europe and in the creation of a lasting peace" (639,
762). Apart from protesting that Britain was not interested 
in creating a cordon sanitaire, Eden did not press the 
matter, stating merely that "there was great force in Mr. 
Molotov's argument..." (639). Secretary of State Hull's 
position was based on the need to adopt "a broad set of
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principles capable of world-wide application" before
considering separate and specific questions such as the
British proposals (638). He stated that the United States
government upheld the right of small nations to cooperate
"provided such measures did not affect the larger questions
of peace and security" (639). Molotov concluded the
discussion by understanding from the statements of Hull and
Eden that his position "had met with no objection" (639).
The contest between independent interstate regional
groupings vs. hegemonial regionalism in eastern Europe was
effectively settled with the December 12, 1943 signature in
Moscow of the Soviet-Czechoslovak treaty of alliance. The
Soviets justified the treaty on the need to contain Germany
"and to set up an effective system of cooperation to
53guarantee the security of Eastern Europe." The treaty was
seen as an example of "establishing a basis for future
relations between a Great Power and a small State, prov(ing)
the possibility of the participation of the small countries
of Europe in creating a system of general security, without
the help of artificial and insolvent associations such as
54so-called Federations, etc." According to Piotr Wandycz,
the Moscow treaty also" sounded the requiem for a free East-
55Central European system."
The Role of Transnational Socio-cultural Forces
The wartime trend toward regional integration in 
eastern Europe was not limited to a contest between state 
actors vying for interstate or hegemonial alternatives.
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Transnational socio-cultural forces, or non-state actors 
representing mainly peasant (agrarian) but also worker 
(social democratic, non-Muscovite socialist), neo-liberal 
(bourgeois radical), monarchist (legitimist) interests 
played a part in the east European esistance movements and 
exile/£migr6 activities in New York, London, and 
elsewhere.
Following World War I, peasant and to some extent
workers' movements, activated by the tumults of war,
revolution, and democracy, surfaced in eastern Europe to
develop a socially-oriented opposition to the westernized
57national-liberal or national-conservative regimes.
Although there were deep-seated differences between the
various movements, they shared a distaste for the social and
political values of bourgeois nationalism and a preference
for indigenous, federative principles of political
organization. In the Balkans, as indeed in other parts of
the region, "federation constituted a fundamental and
58integral part of their program and philosophy." By the
1930s, these movements had been suppressed or split into
fascist (pro-German), communist (pro-Soviet), or other
opposition groups. In that decade, regional unification
efforts were conducted primarily by neo-liberals operating
within the state-based system who sought to achieve their
ends by "persuasion and education rather than by radical
59social change."
Among these social forces, the peasant movement was 
perhaps the most important numerically and beguiling 
intellectually. With peasants or farmers comprising the vast
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bulk of the east European population, agrarian parties, with
the help of universal suffrage, emerged as significant
political forces in the region. Spurred in part by populist
writers influenced by the Russian narodnichestvo. or social-
minded intellectuals who saw the Russian village commune, or
mir, as an organizational paradigm, the peasant parties
became grassroots movements for moral regeneration and
social and political reform.^ As the main architects of
land reform following the war, agrarian parties formed
governments in Bulgaria (1919-23) and Rumania (1928-30) and
participated as uneasy coalition partners in others. "The
permanent electoral majorities of these parties, itself a
result of the initial aggregation of regional and local
interests on which the parties had been founded, had the
effect of drawing other political and electoral groups into
61coalition or cartel with them." In Bulgaria, the Agrarian 
government of Alexander Stamboliiski introduced sweeping 
land reforms at home and a policy of regional reconciliation 
and unity abroad. In 1920 he founded the "Green 
International" to incorporate the peasant parties and 
cooperatives, beginning with Yugoslavia, into a South Slav 
and eventually an east European federation of democratic 
governments. Although the "Green International" survived 
him, Stamboliiski's unorthodox, at times demagogic style 
antagonized the professional classes and army, who overthrew 
and assassinated him in 1923.
While the agrarian party programs were diverse in 
response to domestic and other concerns (viz., some were
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revolutionary, others parliamentary), they sought to
transform the existing bourgeois state into a cooperative
polity based on the numerically and morally superior
peasant. Ante Radic, a founder and theoretician of the Croat
peasant movement, spoke of a "new society based on the heart
and soul" that could be built if the peasants were able to
overcome the monopoly of power held by the urban classes in
the interest of a state governed "from below, not from 
62above." Another theoretician baldly declared that the
Green movement marked
the end of the epoch inaugurated by the French 
Revolution. It was the town that for a century- 
and-a-half represented State organization, the 
home of the intellectual and the artist, the 
tribune of the politician. The rural community, 
unorganised, estranged from large centers of 
public activity, led a dull existence, rarely 
touched by faint echoes of bourgeois ideas which 
subsequently would impose upon the village 
obligations and conventions alien to it both in 
form and in spirit.
Economically, the parties shared "a marked preference
64for cooperative modes of economic organization" that 
represented conscious alternative, or "third road," between 
western consumer and finance capitalism and eastern 
collectivist socialism. Their concept of agrarian reform 
centered on self-sufficiency and cooperative ownership of 
the means of production. Politically, they favored 
administrative decentralization based on self-governing 
regional and local units in a larger federative structure. 
"It seemed to them that a society of prosperous peasants 
linked by voluntary arrangements was not only more 
appropriate to agrarian states, but also more attractive and 
humane than either of the alternatives with their stress on
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large-scale enterprise, urbanization, and bureaucratic 
organization."
Through Stamboliiski's initiative, the southeast 
European parties developed their agrarian-based co-operative 
principle beyond the idea o£ South Slav regional 
cooperation.^ In 1927, the headquarters of the Green 
International, known officially as the International 
Agrarian Bureau, moved to Prague under the guidance of 
Antonin Svehla and Milan Hodza, leaders of the 
Czechoslovakian Party of Small Farmers and Peasants and 
opponents of Czech centralism. The green movement lost its 
Slavophile character with the adhesion or cooperation of 
Finnish, Baltic, Rumanian, Austrian and even French, Swiss, 
and Italian parties. A constitution was adopted in 1928 and 
the movement's first General Assembly in 1929 convened 17 
European peasant parties (including two west European 
parties from France and Switzerland) represented along 
national and regional lines.
The world economic crisis and subsequent rise of 
military dictatorships in eastern Europe marked the decline 
of the peasant movement as a political force in the 1930s. 
The decade was nonetheless punctuated by "village explorer” 
activity among populist writers and intellectuals. In 
Hungary, the populists' "Marciusi Front" (March Front) 
movement formed in 1937 led to the founding of the National 
Peasant Party the following year. Similarly, the emergence 
in Poland of an intelligentsia of peasant origin 
representing peasant interests led in 1938 to the founding
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of the League of Peasant Intelligentsia and Friends of the 
Village.^
Agrarian party leaders resurfaced in the emigration and
resistance during World War II. They were represented in all
the east European governments-in-exile. In the spring and
summer of 1942, delegates representing the peasantry of all
countries save Albania met in London under British auspices
to devise and adopt a 12-point "Peasant Programme" for peace
68in postwar eastern Europe. Issued in July, the Programme's 
purpose was to examine the postwar aspects of the "peasant 
community" in central and southeastern Europe. Its 
signatories rejected "a mere reversion to prewar conditions" 
and called on the nations of the region to "execute a common 
policy" in accord with the major allied powers. The 
Programme was politically sensitive to the interests of the 
major allied powers to whom it was primarily addressed. It 
endorsed the Atlantic Charter while stating the need "to 
develop it in relation to our own European situation." It 
also denied the inevitability "of hostility between the 
interests of the urban and rural population" and 
acknowledged the value of industrial development 
particularly in the area of processing home-grown 
agricultural and forest products. This industry would 
provide employment to alleviate the problem of 
overpopulation on the land. The cooperative principle of 
economic and political organization was emphasized along 
with the agrarian reform principle of peasant ownership. To 
the extent possible, both industry and agriculture should be 
organized on a cooperative basis in the interests of a
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69regional society of small producers.
A transnational spinoff of the Czechoslovak-Polish and
Greek-Yugoslav confederation negotiations was the
establishment in New York of a semi-official Central and
Eastern European Planning Board. In November 1941,
representatives of governmental, workers', and employers'
organizations of the four east European governments-in-exile
met at the International Labor Organization (ILO) conference
in New York to issue a common pledge of regional solidarity
and cooperation for postwar reconstruction. They established
the Board to function both as a inter-governmental
70organization and transnational planning agency. When the
project was publically announced on January 7, 1942, the
four state delegations issued a joint statement of intent
that recognized the need of the governments and peoples to
unite to solve problems peculiar to their area:
We agree on the essential need of a close 
collaboration among peoples and governments of 
the small nations of Central and Eastern Europe, 
while war is still being fought and later, after 
peace comes back to the world. The East European 
region has its own problems and those must be 
handled and solved by mutual consent and friendly 
collaboration of the respective nations. Doing so, 
they believe that the democratic world of today 
and tomorrow will be enriched by a new sincere 
effort and by a reconstructive experiment in the 
way of building of a better order.
The Board's steering committee consisted for four
members from the respective governments-in-exile and a
72secretary-general. Financed by the four governments 
(though in practice, mainly by the Poles), the Board 
conducted research from a regional perspective on 
constitutional, economic, social, and educational matters.
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One educational and four economic committees were set up
along with a monthly review, New Europe. which served as an
organ for collaboration among the members and a wider circle 
73of supporters. The work of the Board was conceived m
terms of providing a provisional and embryonic structure for
a federation organized along regional and functional lines.
Sava N. Kosanovich, chairman of the General Steering
Committee, stated at its inaugural meeting on May 28, 1942,
that the Board was a forum for a "wider concept of order and
reconstruction (that would) tackle problems which have a
74common value and unifying purpose... ." For Felix Gross,
this meant finding ways to implement "inner" federalism
through self-government and territorial autonomy within the 
75member states. But as the Czechoslovak-Polish and Greek-
Yugoslav federation attempts began to unravel in late 1942
and 1943, the Board's work and role also diminished in
importance. By the end of 1943, its work was reduced to
76research on mainly educational issues.
Not least representative among the transnational
sociocultural forces in eastern Europe were> the resistance 
77movements. And not unlike their west European 
counterparts, they called for a regional federation in terms 
not of an exclusive bloc between western Europe and the 
Soviet Union, but as a "stepping-stone towards an all-Europe 
federation from the Atlantic to the Soviet border." They 
also demonstrated a desire with their western counterparts 
for decentralization of the state. The program of the Polish 
multiparty "Committee of Political Understanding" (PKP), for
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example, showed "impressive agreement with the basic
conception of future policy that prevailed in the West
European resistance, especially in its emphasis on human
rights and the need for decentralization and 'far-reaching
78local autonomy' within states.” The underground Polish
newspaper, Nowe Droai. in commenting on January 21, 1942 on
the declaration of Czechoslovak, Polish, Greek, and
Yugoslavian delegates at the November ILO conference to
cooperate in postwar reconstruction, stated that a united
Europe had to be composed not of states, but "federated
regions," of which the "Central and Eastern European
79confederation is regarded as a necessary step."
These and other transnational ideas for postwar order 
combined interstate and autochthonous regionalism to develop 
a new theoretical approach to political organization in 
eastern Europe. Its greatest significance lies in its 
conception of the state in multi-national and not uni­
national terms and of Europe "as an entity of democratic and 
confederated or federated regions, 'une Europe des
80federations' instead of 'une Europe des patries'."
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CONCLUSION
REGIONALISM, POSTWAR ORDER, AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Regionalism is the only truly new 
phenomenon which has appeared on an 
international stage which for more 
than a century has been dominated 
by nationalism.
Robert Strausz-Hup6, 1945
CHAPTER X
When the fighting ended in 1945, the pre-war system of 
sovereign national states re-emerged as the structure for 
world and European organization. The United Nations was not 
far removed from its parent League of Nations in reaffirming 
the sanctity of the classical international system in which 
the state functioned as the sole political unit and actor in 
international relations. Unlike its predecessor, however, 
the United Nations also acquired a structure that included 
some regional and functional organization. "Regional 
arrangements” in matters relating to security and the 
peaceful settlement of disputes were recognized, albeit 
reluctantly, by the internationalists who drafted the United 
Nations Charter. Functional agencies relating to social, 
economic, cultural, and technical matters and administered 
by experts serving as international civil servants were also 
accorded legitimacy. Both changes introduced a measure of 
regionalism and functionalism to the traditional universal 
structure of international organization.
In Europe, the restoration of state sovereignties was 
also attentuated. The major power occupation of Europe, in 
particular by the military forces of the Soviet Union and 
the United States, divided the continent (and Germany) into
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eastern and western spheres of control. The Soviet Union 
exercised regional hegemony of a totalitarian nature over 
eastern Europe and imposed "people's democracies" as a new 
form of revolutionary state in the region. In western 
Europe, the revived states acquired their old forms save 
western Germany, which was decentralized into a federal 
republic of autonomous provincial governments. At that time 
(1949), most west European states joined the United States 
in an "Atlantic Community" regional security pact, the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). State sovereignties 
were also attenuated in western Europe by a significant 
postwar "federalist" movement led by political exiles and 
the survivors of the resistance movements. In spite or in 
part because of the major power hegemonies, in their 
declared opposition to nationalism the national state, they 
sparked the postwar drive toward west European regional 
integration. An inter-governmental Council of Europe was 
established in 1949 and in 1950, Europe's first 
supranational authority was created in the European Coal and 
Steel Community (ECSC). These and other postwar initiatives 
were part of a process or trend toward regional integration 
that began not at the end but at the outbreak of the war.
Several historical and theoretical conclusions emerge 
from this study of regionalism and the war-time allied 
debate on postwar order. In attempting to sort out the 
conceptual and terminological confusion that surrounded the 
debate on regionalism, we distinguished in Part I between 
state-based (interstate, hegemonial) and region-based 
(autochthonous) theories of regionalism. Interstate
357
regionalism was a theory of international political 
organization that retained the state structure of global 
society while adding to that structure groupings of 
(usually) continguous states who agree to relinquish some 
authority relating to security, economics, foreign policy, 
or social, cultural, and technical matters. Forms of 
interstate regionalism ranged from mutual assistance pacts 
and loose confederations to federations of states. Examples 
were the Czechoslovak-Polish and Greek-Yugoslav agreements 
of January 1942; the BENELUX custom's union signed by 
Belgium, The Netherlands, and Luxembourg in September 1944; 
the League of Arab States (March 1945); and the inter- 
American system as expressed in the Act of Chapultepec 
(March 1945). Hegemonial regionalism was a great power orbit 
theory of world organization where smaller states 
voluntarily or, as the case may be, involuntarily merge into 
regional groupings around a large and powerful state. The 
Soviet Union's "security zone" in eastern Europe is a 
partial example as is an inter-American system dominated by 
the United States and the war-time idea of an Asian-Pacific 
region under China's benign tutelage. At the the time of the 
Anglo-Soviet treaty of alliance in May 1942, the Foreign 
Office briefly toyed with the idea of dividing Europe into a 
British-led western Europe and Soviet-led eastern Europe. 
Finally, autochthonous regionalism took the organic 
historical-cultural region and not the state as the primary 
political unit of global society. Its "regionalist" 
advocates sought to break up the state by devolving power to
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self-governing regional and local units within a larger 
federative political structure. The process was applied both 
within and across existing states. A primary example of the 
former was the decentralization and federalization of 
postwar (western) Germany, whose historic provinces, or 
Lander, became self-governing units within a federal state 
that maintained economic unity and a common foreign policy.
A European regional federation or multi-state sub-regional 
groupings such as for the Balkan, Scandinavian, and Danubian 
regions of Europe were autochthonous if their internal 
structures were similarly based on principles of sub­
national regional autonomy. Apart from theorists, the main 
advocates of authochthonous regionalism were such nonstate 
actors as the resistance movements and the "green" or 
agrarian parties and so-called "regionalist" movements that 
became part of the cultural landscape of 20th century 
Europe.
The interstate and hegemonial theories of regionalism 
were as a rule advanced, respectively, by idealist and 
realist theorists of international relations while 
"regionalist" theorists, if fewer in number, developed 
autochthonous regionalism as a principle of political 
organization. The lines between these more or less distinct 
types of regionalism were by no means clearcut in practice. 
In practice, internationalists concerned by the 
powerlessness of the League attempted to incorporate 
"realist" concepts of power into their schemes. President 
Roosevelt himself took pride through 1943 in calling himself 
a "realist" in advocating a postwar order that contained
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elements of both interstate and hegemonial regionalism. Some 
advocates of power politics, such as Robert Strausz-Hup6 and 
Walter Lippmann, acknowledged that regionalism was also a 
function of historical and cultural "affinities" that did 
not necessarily express themselves through the state, but 
"from below." Among the practitioners, for example, Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill and Undersecretary of State 
Sumner Welles were essentially internationalists who in 
their advocacy of interstate regionalism drew on both 
hegemonial and autochthonous ideas.
A compelling historical conclusion that emerges from 
this study is that regionalism played a greater role in the 
debate on postwar world and European organization than is 
commonly acknowleged in the literature on the origins of the 
United eNations and the future organization of Europe. 
Indeed, the issue of regionalism constituted the substance 
of that debate. Regional forms of organization were not only 
discussed but preferred in both Great Britain and the United 
States until 1943. The research and initial policy 
recommendations of the Foreign Office and State Department 
and the views of Prime Minister Churchill and President 
Roosevelt attest to this truth. The Soviet opposition to 
plans for regional confederations in eastern Europe helped 
turn the State Department away from regionalism and back 
toward a universalism favored by internationalists. After 
mid-1943, American internationalism, with the decisive 
support of the person and office of Secretary of State 
Cordell Hull, gained ascendancy in the councils of the three
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major powers in determining the nature and structure of the 
new world organization. Although regionalism remained a 
contentious issue throughout the war, only Churchill and the 
smaller allied states among the state actors stuck to the 
regional idea after 1943. The near absence of the 
regionalist challenge in the historical literature is in 
part the reality of history being written by the victor. 
There was little reason for internationalists who fought 
against or sought to minimize the role of the regionalism in 
world and European organization to enhance its historical, 
much less theoretical, significance. Idealist and realist 
theorists who confronted the issue during the war 
essentially dropped it after the new international order was 
established in 1945. The debate and wrangling, which reached 
its crescendo in May 1945 at the San Francisco conference, 
had taken its toll. It was incumbant on all, it seemed, to 
rally behind the United Nations organization that alone 
stood between order and anarchy in international relations 
in 1945.
The war-time initiatives toward regional forms of 
organization, particularly for Europe or within Europe, 
constitute significant historical event when viewed as a 
whole. History has tended to judge them as schemes laced 
with utopian thinking, nostalgia, or romantic sentiment. 
While these elements were no doubt present, particularly 
among publicists, we have seen that there was also much 
serious and tough-minded reconception in the research, 
thinking, and plans of both theorists and practitioners 
concerned with the postwar order. At the same time, it
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should be acknowledged that seemingly outlandish ideals and
sentiments, like the European "federalist" movement in the
late 1940s, are not infrequently at the cutting edge of
change. In this regard, "sentiment," as Percy Bidwell
cautioned his colleagues at a June 1943 meeting of the State
Department's Subcommittee on European Organization, "no
matter how vague, should not be dismissed out of hand, since
the existence of the sentiment is itself a fact of objective 
1
importance." The war-time debate on regionalism and postwar 
order was thus not a marginal historical footnote or "blip" 
in the development of western political organization but, 
rather, a period of creative ferment that produced 
substantial rethinking about international organization and 
international relations. Regionalism and functionalism were 
born as alternative models of organization in this period. 
The research and debate on regionalism in the Foreign Office 
and State Department, the initiatives of the exiled European 
governments and governments of Latin American, Arab, and 
other non-western states, of which this study scratched the 
surface, are worthy of further serious study. Similarly, 
considerable material is available on the postwar 
conceptions of nonstate actors representing social and 
political forces (e.g., the resistance, populist, 
"regionalist" movements as well as radical liberals, 
conservatives, and socialists).
The findings in this study also have theoretical 
implications for the field of international relations. 
Regionalism as both an integrative concept and principle of
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political organization may be said to have emerged in
international relations during World War II. It raised the
question of the nature and impact of multistate "regional"
representation on an international system of sovereign
states. The Foreign Office and State Department research and
policy recommendations envisaged multistate regional
representation in world and European organization. At what
point and under which conditions would state units and
actors become regional units and actors? In the interstate
regionalism favored by Foreign Office and State Department,
plans for a world organization called for regional
representation on the executive council. Alongside the three
or four major powers would sit representatives of regional
groupings of smaller states. Similarly, the British promoted
the regional representation of the smaller states of eastern
and northern Europe alongside the larger states in a
European council. Churchill in turn saw the European council
represented on a supreme world council alongside American
and Far Eastern council representatives and the major
powers. The regional units were for the most part seen as
confederations or federations of states joined, presumably
by treaty. The Polish-Czechoslovak negotiations for a
confederal union between 1940 and 1943 provide considerable
insight into the process of sovereign states merging into an
interstate regional uniy. Under conditions of hegemonial
A
regionalism, states become regional units and actors when 
they are integrated into continental power blocs under the 
influence or coercive force of large and powerful states. 
Germany in Europe and Japan in Asia provided contemporary
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Axis models of this great power orbit theory of regionalism. 
On the allied side, the postwar "Atlantic Community" of the 
NATO countries was prefigured in early wartime plans, which 
found expression mainly in the public arena, of an Anglo- 
American condominium of democratic states. The Pan American 
Union or inter-American state system with the United States 
as primus inter pares was an example of a potential 
hegemonial power bloc.
With autochthonous regionalism, the region itself is 
the would-be unit and actor in a graded system of political 
authority. Political organization was based regional 
autonomy and local self-government within a larger 
federative political structure of an existing large state, a 
combination of smaller states, or a combination of regions 
that cut across existing state boundaries altogether. The 
regionalization and federalization of Germany is a clear-cut 
example of autochthonous regionalism applied to a large, 
centralized states. In a 1943 memo on "the political 
reorganization of Germany," the State Department's Committee 
on Germany recommended decentralizing the political 
structure of Germany by assigning to the federal units, 
organized along historic provincial lines, such functions as 
policing and major taxation powers and control over 
education in domestic matters and the right to ratify
international commitments in foreign affairs while
o
maintaining economic unity at the federal level. Apart from 
decentralizing large states into natural, self-governing 
regional units, autochthonous regionalism can also be
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investigated as a method of breaking up smaller states into 
their regional components as units in a larger federal 
polity. One of the frequently cited cases in point 
considered during the war by both the Anglo-American powers 
and social forces within the region was a Danubian 
federation or confederation. Although in most cases the 
existing (or pre-1938) states were envisaged as the federal 
units (i.e., interstate regionalism), in some cases the 
historical-cultural entities —  Bohemia-Moravia, Croatia, 
Slovakia, Hungary, Transylvania, etc. —  were advanced as 
the units of a reconstituted Danubian region. Beneath or 
perhaps above the clamor of real and threatened population 
transfers, creeping Sovietization, a nascent Cold War, and 
the 1947 Paris Peace Conference, the debates and plans for 
Danubian reorganization put forward by populists, socialists 
(including communists), and neo-liberal "functionalists" who 
came on the political scene at war's end is a subject that 
merits scholarly attention. Drawing on their writings, 
speeches, platforms, and activities, what were their 
regional conceptions of postwar order? How and to what 
extent did these "low politics" forces —  individuals and 
social groups organized in most cases into political parties 
—  articulate local and transnational forms of regional 
community in Danubian Europe as the basis for a new 
representational political unit?
What regionalism in its autochthonous form introduces 
in international relations theory is a "region-qua-region" 
concept in international relations. This questions the
"national" basis of the state as sanctioned by the 1919
365
Paris peacemakers and feasibility of a social reality-based 
or "low politics" approach to political organization. The 
postwar restoration of the national sovereign state as the 
primary unit of international society took place as the 
nationality principle as it had developed from the 19th 
century revealed clear weaknesses. As McNeill has argued, 
"the wars of 1914-45 augured the eclipse of nationalism and 
of ethnic homogeneity with separate polities as clearly as
the wars of 1792-1815 had announced the triumph of the
principle of nationality and of an assumed ethnic
3
homogeneity with separate sovereign states." From the
perspective of social and political forces during the war
("minorities," agrarian interests, the resistance movments, 
oppositional political parties), the national state seemed 
to have outlived itself as a credible way to organize human 
beings in society. This raises the theoretical question of 
regionalism, seen as a principle of power devolution within 
the state, as an alternative to nationalism as the basis for 
political organization in the state. In other words, to what 
extent does regional self-determination solve the pitfalls 
of national self-determination in areas of mixed 
populations?
Political units and their forms have come and gone over 
time, changed by structures that emerge from within society. 
The national.sovereign state heralded in 1919 as the last 
word in political organization was perhaps entering its 
eclipse as this news was being proclaimed. Theoretical 
efforts in international relations would do well to examine
366
the regional structure of Europe and the continents before 
elaborating abstractly conceived ordering principles. Social 
reality-based concepts and not abstract ideological 
constructions much less.sheer power motives are more 
reliable tools with which to unravel the art of political 
organization and relations between political units. For 
individuals will continue to strive, as Louis Wirth said of 
Max Weber, to enter the magic garden where the relation 
between the world as it is culturally experienced and 
politically conceived actually coincides.
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